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FOREWORD
The international political) legal .. and organizational processes
involved in tt-Ie developrnent of ttle la'N of the sea provide a model
for understanding or predicting the forrnulation of international lavv' .
... vhether applyln!~ theories of international relations or
s!dsternatically 8;<arnining specific issues .. the lav'l of tt18 sea clearly
dernonstrates the inherent relationst-lip bet'yveen national interests ..
t rl e i nt ern at ion e1 pol i tic ij 1 eli rn 8 t e J S C ie nt i fie and tee hn0 1og i cal
disco'",'eries .. and the1jeveloprnent of internationallav'l.
Prior to the TVventieth Century .. national interests in the sea
vv'ere prirnarily lirnlted to nal'ligation and living resource extraction.
Trl8 Ije'v'eloprnent of tt-,e la",,"," of tt-,e sea 'yvas .. ttlerefore J influencerj by
tt-Ie .freeljorn of tt-,e S8as ljoctrine,J ·'l'lt-,let-, provlljes tt-tat states anlj
inlji'·liduals enjo~d free .. equal .. and unirnpe1jed ijCCeSS to tt-18 see .. and
the individual actions of states. With the discovery of seabed
rn i nera 1· sanlj the con corn ita nt Ij e \l elop rn ent 0 f e >< p1I) ita t i (I n
tecrlnolog~d.1 h01vvever .. tt-,e focus of national interests st-liftelj ft-orn
tt-,e sea to tt1e s8atrelj.
2Extendin!~ over rnore tt-Ian tt'lree tlundred and sixty million
square miles of tt-Ie eartrl} trle s8etled is e vast reservoir of mineral
resources. Althougrl the scientific community uncovered the
seabedJs enorrnous v-tealth over e century ago .. the seabed did not
acquire an economic 'y' 81ue until the development of exploitation
technology in the earl!d 19605. Alerted to the economic potential of
exploiting tt-,e rnineral resources of tr,e seabed .. states began to view
the sea as a ·resource of trernendous economic importance. The
resultant conflict o\"er access to~ and oVtlnership of .. this ne\Nfound
resource challenged the estiJtJlisrl81j leJ'"v of tr,e sea. As a
consequence) tt-Ie international cornrnunity riBS deljicated the past
t'vventy-fiv8 years to the developrnent of a nev.... lcfyY of the sea ·which
reconciles conflicting national interests in the conventional uses of
the sea v-lith theeconornic potentialities of mining the seabed.
Altt-Iougrl tt-,e inter-nationijl cornrnunit!d· estetllishelj a neV·l 18\·..... of
tt-,e sea convention in 11~i:j2., ,jeep tji·vi 81 ons O\l8r tt-Ie convent i on)s deep
seabed rninin!d pro11l11isions rnilitate agalnst it ever entering into
force. Fuellerj t'!d tt-18 t8ct-lnolo!~!d e::<i!~ences of rjeep seabed· rnining)
tt-Ie central issues in tt-Ie conflict are national econornic .. nationel
soverei~~nt!d.. anlj national str-ategic interests. A.s are su1t )
3traditional alliances rliJve tle8n tlroken. ~;tates are tlound together by
national interests .. not geogr8ph~d or political ideology.
There is no better example of this fact than the alliance of the
IJnited States and Canada. The pursuit of different and often
conflicting goals in ttle developrnent of a new law of the sea
precipitated 8 conflict of interests between the United States and
C:aneda. Since one state could not achieve its objectives without
un1jermining the objectives of tt18 ott1er .. the traditional alliance was
broken. The severance of tt-tis alliance Ijernonstrates the central role
that national interests pla!d in international relations. Once it is
understood hO\A' conflicting national interests could divide the
\NorldJs t\'vo forernost allies .. it becornes possible to understand not
only hovv' tlut \,tlr,y tt1e Ijeveloprnent of international law can divide
the international cornrnunity in !~eneral.
Trtis .. trJen., is rn~d tt-Iesis: Itllt-,at ijr-e tt-,e econornic potentialities
of ,jeep seetl8d rnining'? "lalrrat are the national interests of trl8
otJJectiv8S in tr-Ie 1a \,',.,1 of the sea negotiations'? The ansvv'ers to tbese
questions Vt/ill tie provi,je1j tbrouqtl a sqsterYratic e;.~arnination of the
"- --
4la\·\, of the sea. issues specifically related to the deep seabed.
Follo·,tating this exarnination .. conclusions v,ti11 be drav'ln as to y,thether
or not t he Unit ed Stat esand Cana da achi eve d t he i r goa1sand..
ttlereby .. protected their national interests. Based on the
conclusions drav.... n .. predictions vy'ill be offered on the possibility of
trle 19B 2 Law 0f the Sea Convent ion enteri ng into force.
5ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My interest in the le",'\' of trle sea began Vv'ith trlY introduction to
international law by Professor v·I. H. r~. Hull and Professor J. P.
Sewell's introduction to inter-national organizations. Following
thesei ntroduct ions .. I wro t8 undergraduate papers on the law of the
sea for Professors G. Dirks and C:. Burton. My gratitude is extended
to these gentlernen for bott-, their e>::pertise and their guidance. r10st
particularly .. I am gratefUl to Flrofessor ,J. P. Sewell .. for 'without his
ad1y1ice 8nfj assistance tbis tt-Iesis ·t.'vould not t-Iave been undertaken ..
let alone cornpleted.
CHAPTER
6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
II
III
IV
\/
\/ I
\/1 J
\.•• t I I
I::·::
x
In troduct i on .
The Deep ~3e8betj ..
The Uni ted States and the Seabelj _ ..
Canada and the Sea .
Tt-Ie F1errnanent Seabelj C:ornrnit tee .
IJr~c:L[I~; III ..
C:ornrnittees II CJnlj III ..
Cornrni t tee I: The [teep Seabed .
F1reparatorld C:ornrni ssi on .
I::or-tc:l tJsi Otl .
7
2()
33
43
6()
64
I~ 1
1 10
143
164
Endnotes......................................................................... 192
Bi b1i ogbrapr-I~d·................................................................ 206
7INTRODUCTION
Though not in force .. the 1982 Lew of the Sea Convention is
havi ng a stabi 1i z1 ng effect on nat i ana1 pol i cl es governi ng the area of
the sea and the seabed under national jurisdiction. After more than
rtalf a century of conflict bet.'vVeen coastal and maritime states ..
consensus on tt-Ie ·........ idtt1 of trl8 territorial sea and coastal state
SOlylereignty over offst-IIJre resources appears to r,ave been ecrlieved.
Flrior to 11~Ei2. coastal states '",vere cleiminq territorial seas of
. ~
any'vvhere frorn three to tv-lO rllJndred and fifty rniles. I\Jow .. only
eighteen states claim 8 territorial sea exceeding tVielve miles.]
r10re tt-,en one rluntjred states rlave establist-,ed twelve-rnile
territorial seas and sevent!d-nine states have legislated tvv'o hundre,j
rnile e::-:;clUS1\,18 econornic zones (EEZ),2
19Ei3 and e>::tendelj its territorial sea to t'Y\lelve rniles in 1968. On
qOI'lernrnents ere quided ttq tt-t8 pro f'lisl0ns of tt-18 11~Ej2 Lev'/ of the See
- ~ ~
8Con'Y'ention witt·, respect to the traditional uses of the sea. 3 v1ith
the endorsement of the vv'orld1s forernost maritime powers .. the
t".'\"elve-rnile territorial sea and the t''1vo-hundred mile EEZ have nov-!
passed into customar!d i nternat i anal 18\N.
Unfortunately .. a sirnili:ir consensus has not been achieved on tt-Ie
Convent i on's deep seatl8d mi ni ng provi si ons. After more than twenty
years of negotiations tt-tere is still no agreement in sight. At the
centre of the dispute is tt·le issue of \,vt-,etrler trle deep seabed rninlng
industry st-Iould be governed b!d the free rnerket system or by a
pO'vverful international regirne. Tt·,ou!~h kno'yvledge of the seabed's
rnassiv8 rnineral 11,.....'ealtt·1 rlas e~<isted for rnore than a century .. it did
not bee 0 rn e the sutlJ ec t 0 f 1nten se i nt ern at ion a1 deb 8 t e un til the
early 19t50s t'ivt·len tt·le lje\,'eloprnent of technology opened up trl8
prospects for exploiteJtion. 41'l\litt-, tt·le Ije·.... eloprnent of exploitation
tecrlnology .. the S8C1t181j su,j,jenl~d tJecarne an itliportant future source
of rnineral supplies. At the sarne tirne) hovv'ever} this Ijrarnatic
increase in trre value of the ~:;e8tJetj anlj its resources renljerefj the
e>< i s tin9 1a"lv' 0 f t t-j e seij i nfJij equa t e.
Tt-,e ,je'v'eloprnent of ~:;eatJelj tect-Inology r,tlfj surpassed the
developrnent of international la'v\/. There V'las no inter-national regime
9to prevent trle escalation of national conflicts and rivalries
instigated by seabelj tect*lnology and trle econornic potentialities of
exploiting seabed rnineral resources. 5 The United Nations responded
in 1966. Under Resolution 2172) the General Assernbly requested
that the United Nations .. in cooperation with its agencies and
interested member states) undertake a comprehensi ve survey of
activities in rnarine science and technology .. including trlineral
resources .. and forrnulate proposals vv'itt*1 regard to the exploitation
and developrnent of rnarineresources. 6
Resolution 2172 letj to tt-Ie creation of the Expanded Program for
Ocean Exploration. Follo'vving a cornpret-tensive survey" the Expanded
Program for Ocean E:x:ploration conclu,jed that the seabed contains
rnore petroleurn 8ntj rnineral resources tt-Ian have 8lyl er been exploited
by rnen Bn1j., unlike land-tJi:lS8Ij resources) they are renev'/ab18. 7 In
8tjljition to rnassive petroleurn re~:;erl·/es., the seabed contains large
placer deposits of gOllj., iron .. titaniurn .. ljiarnonds and other
industria·l rnineral~:;. r"'lan~~ane~:;e nOljules vv'ere found e~-<tensively in
t~-le Atlantic .. F1aclfic an,j Inljii:in I]ceans. Containing r,igher
8Ijrni::.;tures of cot1alt., nickel .. rnanganese., ijnd copper than sirnilar-
nodules found in st-,allo","l/er \'vaters 8.. tt-Iese nodules \"r'ere estirnated
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at approxirnately tbree billion tons in the rnid-1960s. This figure
was adjusted to fifteen ttillion tons in the mid-1980s.9 According to
Gerrnan scientists .. seabed nOljules contain fifteen times more
copper.. fifteen thousand tirnes rnore nickel .. and four hundred times
rnore rnanganese than all land subsoils.IO At trle 1960 rate of
consumption .. it was estimated that these deposits could meet four
hundred tbousand years of 'vvorld rnanganese consumption .. one
hundred and fifty thousand years of 'v'lorld nickel consumption .. and
six thousand years of ...".... orllj copper consurnption. 11
Although potentially lirnitless .. rnineral resources are not evenly
di stri buted trlroughout the deep seabed. Most deposi ts are located
'tNithin two tlundred rniles of tt18 coastline. Ttle continental margin
including the st-,elf .. the slope iJnd the rise l contains the greatest
part of ttiepotenti i:il sutl~seiJ resources likelw to be recovered within
the next seve ra 1 tj eca.j es.12 A::; I] f 1I;} 15 7.. ,j epo sit S I) f t \/'/ 0 ~., undre d
trillion tons of oil rlij,j tleen locatelj in tt-Ie continental srl81f alone. 13
t rl e co t1 S t iJ ceo un t eIj for- t '","/8 11.,.1 8 perc en t 0 f t t-, e IJnit eIj ~3 tat es' ·0 i 1
production and eight percent of '....'/or-llj pro 1juction. 14
V'I,lr1ile sutlstantiel1~d srnallet- nurntler-s of rniner-els ere located in
1 1
trl8 large oceen basins .. trl8 total arYlount is extensive. By the late
1960s .. scientific research had only obtainelj definite knowledge of a
few hundred sites in four exploitable nodule zones which together
comprise a very srnall part of the deep seabed. 15 Because of the
rnassive economic rent of recovery and processing .. it is estimated
that only a small percentage of deep seabed minerals are ever likely
to be recoverable. 16 r',Jonetrleless .. the economic implications of deep
seabed rnining are startling. Land-based rnineral producers estirnate
tt-Iat at mediurn levels of output .. a single firm could reduce the
v'lorllj rnarket prices of rnan!~anese frorn $.90 to $.50 per unit, cobalt
from $1.5() to $1.()C1 per pound .. iJnlj nickel from $.7() to $.65 per
pound. 17
On August 17, 11;17(1, stirnulated by trle econornic potential of
exploltlnq. tt-'8 seatled'~:: rnineral t-esources Arvid Pardo Malta's
.... . J J
TV'lenty-Second ~3esslon of tt-le· f3eneral Assernt1ly include "trl8
examination of the question of the reserl'letion exclusively for
peaceful purposes of tt-Ie seabed and tt-Ie ocean floor) anlj the subsoil
Jurisdiction end tt-Ie use of tt-Ie resources ·in tt-,e interests of
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rnankind." 18 In a drarnatic tt-Iree and one-half rlour speech Pardo
appeal ed to the Uni telj r\Ja t ions to es tab 1i sh an i nternat i ona 1 regi me
to govern the seabed. [:lairning that .. if internationalized) the income
from exploiting the rrlineral resources of the seabed could return
five billion dollars to the United r~ations' treasury by 1975 .. 19 Pardo
proposed that a new 18V'1 of trle sea treaty be drafted. As envisaged
by Pardo .. the ne'tH treat!d ·vVoul.j prevent the national appropriation of
the seabed .. restrict tt-,e definition of ttie continental shelf .. and use
seabed assets priniarily to benefit the developing nations.20
Pardo's estirnation of tt-Ie value of trl8 seabed}s 'vvealth appears
to have been based on t t-, e arno un t 0 f rn anqane S8 nodu 1es found in th e
'-
deep seatled. He rnust not t-IiJve taken into account the fact that
seabed rninerals are of a rnUCfl lo ...,ver-grade and are} therefore) less
valuable trlan land-based rninerals.: ttlat seabelj n-linerals are much
costlier- and riskier to rnine than lanlj-tlas8lj rninerals.: that the
efficiency and reliat,ilit!d of ,jeep seatled rnining technology has not
tleen proven.: and.l tt-tat onl~d e '.,,'er!d srnall arnount.J pert-lfipS less than
ten percent) of deep seetlelj rninerfJls ""I'li11 e\ler tie e>~ploited. More
on the assurnption tt-Iat alrnost tr'8 entire seatted \,\"ould be
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designated the cornrnon heritage of rnankind. In 1967; the legal limit
of coastal state sovereignty vv'as irlree rniles from the coastline.
Coastal state jurisdiction 'yves limited to the mineral resources of
the continental shelf. As proposed by Pardo .. then .. the entire
continental shelf and high seas beyond the three mile territorial sea
1i mi t waul d belong to the i nternat i ona1 area. When the val ue of the
continental shelf resources are includetj in Pardo"s estlmates .. the
di screpancy bet \Jveen the, deep seabed"s real weal th and Pardols
estirnated 'i..... ealth is explainetj. F'arljo"s failure to clarify this fact
led the General Assernt1ly .. particularly the developing nations .. to
over-estimate the econornic potential of e:x:ploiting the deep seabed.
Sin ce the corn rn 0 nt-Ier ita9e 0 f rn ankin d pri nc i p1e appea 1edt 0 th e
eeanornie interests of the poorer nations) it VIles overVv'helrningly
endorsed by the developing nations. As a result) the TVv'enty-Fifth
Session of the Gener-al Assernttl!d declarelj the ocean"s deep seabed
the cornrnon t-lerita!J8 of rnankind to be go\,terne1j by an international
regirne. Tr,e Ijeclaration le,j to the establisrlrnent ot- the Pernlanent
~;eatlelj Cornrnitte.8 .. tt-Ie Tt-lirlj Llnitelj r··Jations C:onference on Trle Lavv
of tt-Ie ~;88 (Llf"JC:L[JS III).' an,j tt-18 La"l'''' of tt-Ie ~;ea F1reparatory
C:ornrnission (PrepC:orn). [Iirectelj to tjraft treaty articles and 8
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con-I pre hen s i vel i s t I) fit ern s f I) r neg 0t ia t ionsat UN CLOS J If.. the
Pernl anen t Seabed Corn nl ittee ij sse rn b1ed six tim es bet wee n 1970
and 1973. From Decernber 1973 to SeptetYlber 19S2} UNCLOS J II held
eleven negotiating sessions for the purpose of producing 8 new law
of the sea treaty of universal character. At the conclusion of
UNCLOS III) the PrepCorn \Alas created to implement the deep seabed
mining provisions of the 1982 Lay..,' of the Sea Convention.
Creation of ne¥1 international law' naturally challenged the
conventional uses of the sea and .. therefore .. established national
seabed policies. Thus .. neqotiation of a new la"N of the sea treaty
gave rise to t¥lO related issues. First .. vv'hat part of the seabed
should be designated the international area and how should that
designated area be define1j; arllj second ......vt-tO vv'ould exploit the deep
seabed resources in tt-Ie interni:Jtional area anlj how should that
exploitation take place'? To otltain an accornrnoljation between the
nurnerous and conflictinq interests evoked bl l tt-18S8 tVv'in issues two
__ .:t ..
nevv concepts v"hict-I departed drastically fronl established
international lfj'yvvvere put for","'.,'arlj.21 To address trl8 issue of
Ijefinin~d tt-Ie outer lirnits of tt-Ie international area, the first concept
\,vas the estatdishrnent of a t\'\"o-t-Iundrelj rnile exclusive economic
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zone (EEZ). Coastal states ''!'/ould enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over
the resources in the EEZ 'vvt-tile the seabed beyond this point \Nould be
designated the international area. The second concept was the
creation of an international regime to govern deep seabed activities
in the i nternat i onal area.
Rather than canfl iet resolution .. the two concepts inspired an
intense international debate. V\/t'tereas the 200-mile EEZ was
considered necessary if states endowed with 11tt18 or no continental
margins were to be fairly treated .. 22 implementation required
coastal states with broad continental rnargins to nlagnanimously
renounce national jurisdiction ol'lerall resources beyond the 200-
rnile lirnlt. Although the rna..i0rity of coastal states endorsed the
cornman rleritage of n-18nkind in principle .. they were not prepared to
sacrifice their national econon-lic interests in order to attain this
ideal.
Acrl i evi ng con sen sus 0 n h0 \'V to i rn p1ern en t t rl e i ntern 8 t ion a1
regirne V'las equally problernatic. A conflict of interest developed
bet Vv' eenth ree p r inc i pal gr0ups - - i ndus t ria 1i zeIj 8nd rn i neral
consurninq states) Ije'",'elopinq states, anlj lanlj-tl8serj rnineral
~ ~. .
e:x:portin!~ states. The inljustr-ialized anlj rnineral consurning states)
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whi 1e wi 11 i ng to srlare """'1 th the internet i anal communi ty revenues
derived frorn mining the international area .. vv'ere concerned with
securing unimpeded access to the minerals of the deep seabed. 2 3
Developing states .. in pursuit of e new world economic order..
insisted that the international area end its resources be developed
primarily for the benefit of the poorer nations. In effect .. these
states saw the developrrlent of deep seabed mining as the vehicle
through which technology Elntj capitel coullj be transferred from the
de ve lope d tothe dev elop i ng na t ion s. V-it-Ii 1e the deve1opi ng mi nera1
exporting states ·vvere ideologically aligned with the developing
states .. tt-Ie industrializ81j rnineral exporters shared interests with
both groups. On the one t-Iarllj .. as industrialized states} they sought
the right to participate in the developrnent of the deep seabed
mining industry. On the other hand) as mineral exporting states}
ttley vvere intent on pre'.lenting a ,jisruption in the rnerketing of their
lend-based rnineral prcnjuction. Because of the inability of these
groups to acrdeve a balance of interests) ne!~otiations ,jeadlocked.
Trl8 deadlock's irnpact on ttle creation of ane'yv international
law' of the see \·vas t".,\"ofold. First .. the negotiations becarne an
ongOing process of inJjeter-rninate lengtt-I. Tt-18 cornrnittllent of rnore
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than six years to preparations and eight years to negotiations
tranSfOrtlled Ur"JCLI]S III frorn a conference for the progressive
developrnent of international law into a process of codification.
Second .. although UNCLOS III succeeded in producing the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention .. rnany of the Convention's deep seabed mining
provisions have been eroded by tirne. The failure of negotiations to
stay ahead of .. or at least to keep pace vv'ith .. ad'y'ances in seabed
research end technol o!~y underrnined the PrepCorn. t1andated to
i rnpl en-lent tt-Ie Convention's Ijeep seabed tlli ni ng provi s1 ons .. the
PrepCom is no'vv atternpting to irnplernent policies Which .. because of
the passage of tin18 .. are otlsolete.
Of the one hundrelj 8tilj fift!d-eight states participating in the
18\-v of the sea negotiations none vi/ere rnore fictive nor tYlore
influential tt-,an the United ~3tates anlj (:anada. TVa/o of the eleven
Ijraft seatl81j tr-eaty pt-OPOSi:tl s sutlrnit terj to the Pet-rnanent Seabed
Cornrni t tee ""vere tattl elj t'~d tt-Ie IJni telj';~~~:3 tates end (:ana,je. r'1any of the
proposals presente1j tlY the Llnitelj ~3tf1tes 8nlj C:analja eithet- strongly
influenc8 tj .. or '11,'Ilere actual1!d incorporatetj into .. tt-Ie 19i:i2 La\,v of t~,e
Sea I:ont·/ention. As ',/,/ell .. rno~:;t of tt-Ie contentious issues dividing
tt,8 Prept:orn ",'·I,I'ere for-eseen t'~d the IJnitelj ~=;t8tes and Canada at
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UNCLOS III. Consequently .. an exarnination of trle United States' and
Canada's interests in the deep seabed v',ill serve to explain their
conflicting goals at IJr~[:LOS III .. why the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention has not entered into force .. and why the PrepCom will
ul t i matel y fai 1 to achi eve its rnandate.
With December 1991 .. the date targeted by the PrepCom for
completion of its mandate., fast approacrting .. the time is appropriate
for such an examination. Tr,is thesis .. ttlerefore J asks several
fundamental questions. \.\/rIi9t V'lere the Llnited States 1 and Canadats
interests in the developrnent of a nev'l 18V'I of the sea? What were
their interests in deep seatl81j rnining'? \t-lhat 'vvere their lavv of the
sea goals? What ot'jecti'".ies Ijid tt-Iey pursue in the law of the sea
negotiations .. and 'vvhat "l'lere their actual echievernents? Trle
answers to tt-,8se questions ere SOU!dtlt tt-tt-ougrl an exarninat i on of the
Un i ted Stat es ' and C: anaIj fj ·S P0 sit ion son t V'l 0 re 1atedis sue s )
specifically~ v\,'r, i. ct-, part of tt-,e seatl81j st-Ioullj tie designated trle
international area anlj t-,O\·\l st-,oullj tt-,at ljesi~~natelj arefjbe define,j;
end) 'yvt-,o st-joul,j e::-=:ploi·t tt-I.8 ljeep seatleij r-esources in the
international area an,j t-IO ...·",,· st-,ould that e;.~ploitation take place?
Naturally., tt-tis e:>=:arnination necessitates an i9ns"/ver to tf18 further
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question of Yvhere trle Unitelj States and Canada stood on the
concepts of 8 t\NO hundred-rnile EEZ 8nlj trle establishment of an
international regime to go·...·ern the international area? Since the
protracted negotiating process is directly related to the stagnating
rat i fi cat i on process .. one fi nal quest ion 81 so ari ses. What effect has
the prolonged process had on the IJnited states' and Canada's
at tai nrnent of thei r 1a'","/ of the sea goal S'?
For clarity) tt-tis thesis begins "" ..... ith a tlrief history of seabed
politics; identifies trle Unitelj States' anlj Canada's national oceans
policies and layv of the sea goals~ and e:x:arnines their objectives in
the law of the sea negotiations. In conclusion .. this thesis will
demonstrate that the IJnited States Vias substantially rnore
successful than Canada in the fsttaintl-Ient of its lav-I of the sea goals.
20
It
THE DEEP SEABED
Historically .. there is no evidence that an international law was
ever established to divide the sea into different zones governed by
different rules and regulations. It vvas the natural propensity of
coastal states to extendelj their national jurisdictions as far out to
sea as possible that lelj to the legal division of the sea into zones.
The first division vv'as trle territorial sea .. the second was the
continental srlel f .. and the tt-Ii rlj V'las the ,jeep seabed. After years of
unilateral coastal state clairns to jurisdiction over the coastal
\avaters adjacent to tt-,eir coast1i nes) the three-mi 1e territorial sea
passed into custarnary international lev'l at ttie end of the Nineteenth
Century. v\,littl tt18 tt-Iree-rnile territorial sea entrenched in
international la'~'v) tt-,e sea 11"I'l8S le~~all~d Ijivi,jelj into tv,/o zones--tt-,e
territorial sea and tt-Ie t-Iigt-I seas. Linder international 16\''./) the
coastal state enjo~ds e::-::cluSl'...'8 juristjiction over the vi/sters.' subsoil)
seatJ 8d .. resources; anlj airspace \·\·'itt-lin tt-Ie territorial sea. V';hile
foreign-ov·... ne1j stiips enJo~d tt-,e t-ight of innocent passage througt-, the
terr-itorial sea.1 o'..,'erfligt-,t tl!d for-eign aircraft of the sarne (ship-
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owning] state is contingent upon coastal state approval.
Traditionally .. everything beyon1j the tt-tree-mile territorial sea was
designated the high seas. Under the freedom of the seas doctrine ..
all states and persons have equal rights of free and open access to
the high seas and high seas resources.
The trend towards seabed claims began in the early 1940s with
the discovery of seabelj oil deposits and the development of
exploitation technology. In 1942.1 unljer the Treaty of Paris .. Britain
and Venezuel a uni 1aterall!d di vi ,jed the seabed in the Gul f of Pari a
between Venezuela and Trinidad. v1hile the intent of the initiative
was to resolve e juristjictional Ijispute over seabed oil .. it
precipitated the division of the sea into 8 third 2one--the
continental srlelf. \",'ithin tt-Iree years .. the United States unilaterally
extended its national juris1jiction o\·'er the rnineral resources of the
continental st-,elf. In 11;J45 .. tr-,e Llnitelj ~;tates iSSU8,j trle Trurnan
Proclarnation V-lhict-, declar-ed United States jur-is1jiction over the
natural resout-ces of tt-18 sutlsoil anlj seabed of tt-,e continental shelf.
Unlike the Eiritain-\lenezuela agr-eernent .. bov'lel",ler} the Trurnan
Proclarnation assiduousl~d fj'·/oiljelj Ijefinin!~ tt,e outer lirnits of the
st-'81f and layin!~ clairn to tt-Ie sea or seatled. As 8 for-ernost rnaritirne
22
state" higt-Ily depen1jent upon the freedorrl of the seas doctrine} the
United States ensured that the TrumanProcl 8trlat ion 'Nas carefully
worded. The Proclarnation .. ttlerefore} claimed United States'
jurisdiction over the tllineral resources of the continental shelf
while clearly specifying tt-fat lithe character as high seas of the
waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free and
uni mpeded nevi gat i on are in no "ivay thus affected·24
Despite its careful vvordi ng._ trle Trurnan Proel arrl8t i on triggered
an extension of tr,e territorial sea to the superjacent vvaters of the
continental stlelf. V,t'itt-lin one rnonth .. Latin American states began
clairrling territorial seas and/or coastal state sovereignty over the
epicontinental sea to Ijistances of tvvo hundred rniles or more from
their coasts. By 1952 .. Brazil .. Chile .. Ecuador} Mexico .. Panama) and
Peru clairnelj sovereignty o'."ler trle continental shelf) the seabed} the
subsoil .. and tt-Ie superjacent III-Ill-laters. In effect, trley closed-off the
entire area of ttle sea a1jJacent to their coasts out to a distance of
t\rVO t-,unljrelj rniles. l'lilt-lile unilateral clairns enabled the Latin
Arnerican coastal states to pt-otect their off-st-Iore fistling in,justry
frorn foreign-ov,"ne,j fist-ling fleets; tt-tey ll,'vere .. nonetrleless .. 8
violation of international lavll. As a r-esult._ 8 major dispute erupted
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bet"Neen tt-,e coastal and the rnaritirne states.
At the heart of tt-Ie ,jispute vvas freedom of navigation on the
hi gh seas. An extensi on of the terri tori 81 see beyond the three-mi 1e
lirnit not only reduces the area of trl8 high seas .. it places a large
number of international straits under the jurisdiction of coastal
states. According to a IJnited States' survey .. a general extension of
the territorial sea frOtll ttiree to t"''''le1'y'e rYliles affects one hundred
and sixteen international straits. More ltllportantly .. from the
perspecti"le of the IJnited ~3tates} eigtlteen straits 'would fall under
the sovereignty of states rnost likel~d to clairn trle right to terminate
or interfere 'vvitt-I tt-Ie transit of Arnerican \·varships and aircraft.25
A general extension of the territorial sea to six miles ¥/ould result
in eleven of fifty-t'vvo straits falling under the jurisdiction of
states rlostile to tbe United ~:;tates' interests. Even where
international strijits are not 6ffecte 1j .. a general extension of the
territorial sea tl~d Just one rnile re,juces the area of tt-te higrl seas by
280 .. (IOC1 square rniles or- rnore,26 Hence} any extension of the
territor-ial sea,! no rnatter- t-lO\"'/ rninor .. t-esul ts in an equal reljuction
of not onl!d trle ares of tt-Ie t-Ii~~t-l seas tJut the free,jorn of navigation.
If tt-fe rules enlj re!~ulations ~~overnin!~ trle territor-ial sea and
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the high seas were trle S8tl1e .. there 'vvoul,j be no problern. However..
this is not the case. Whereas the high seas are governed by
international law .. the territorial sea is governed by coastal state
law. Vessels navigating the higrl seas enjoy freedom of navigation
and are SUbject only to the jurisdiction of their flag or nation state.
The freedorrl of navigation does not apply to the territorial sea ..
however. Vessels traversing the territorial sea only have the right
to innocent passage. ~;ubrnarinestrJust navigate on the surface of
the water. Aircraft have no right of innocent passage. And} in
certai n ci rcumstances .. such as a securi ty threat} the coastal state
can ten-Iporarily suspen~ tt18 rigt-It of innocent passage for all foreign-
owned vessels. Furtt-terrnore .. vessels operating in the territorial sea
are SUbject to tt-Ie Juris1jiction of the coastal state .....vhile the
coastal state t-,os no prosecutor-ial po ...·ver J it Ijoes rlave the authority
to i rn p0 un d fo re i 9n- 0 \·v neIj s t-I ips. Sin c e t rl e pot ent i 81 ex i s t s for
coastal states 'v'v'ith furlljarnentally Ijifferent political) economic and
rnilitary interests seriously to r-estrict tt-Ie strategic and economic
interests of tt-Ie rnat-itirne states .. the Trurnan Proclamation
precipitated a conflict of interest t,etv'leen tt-Ie cOfjstal and trle
rnaritirne states. Tt-,e rnarltirne states recognized the coestal states'
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legitirnate right to Jurisdiction over the seabed and seabed
resources of trle continental srlelf. They vvould not .. rlovv'ever .. extend
that juri sdi ct i on to the superj acent waters.
t10t1vate d by the cheot i c candi t 1ons whi ch began to Drevai 1.. the
United ~Jations intervened. In 1949 .. the United ~Jations
comrnlSS10ned the International Law COrTlrrflSsion (ILC) to codify a
law of the sea. Following tr,e tabling of the ILe's recommendations
in 1956} the United r·,Jations tiosted the Flrst United r~ations
Conference on trle Levv' of tt-Ie ~3ea (Llf··JCLCIS I) in 1956. As
recotlimended by tt-,e ILC:., the sea "I,vas divided into three 2ones--the
territorial sea .. the continental st-Ielf .. and the high seas. Under the
provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf)
tr,e coastal state ,,'vas grante1j exclusive juris1jiction over the
continental shelf 8n,j tt-Ie non-liVing resources of the shelf. For
1ega 1 purp (I Ses.. the C(I ntin en t al s t-, elf 1s ,j efin eIj as t t-I e sea bed end
subsoil of the subrniJrine area adjacent to the coast but outside the
area of tt-Ie territorial se8 to fj ,jeptt-I of one tlunljrelj fathoms (two
t-Iunljred rnetr-es .. si::.; t-Iunljrelj anlj fifty-five feet). To accornrnodate
tt-Ie exist.ing Latin Arner-ican Clf:1irns and tt-Ie interests of the t,roa,j-
rn a r!~ ins tat e S ,J 8 nile ::< p10 ita tJi 1i t ~d II c18 use "/'l8 S 8 Ppen Ij edt 0 t rl e
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Convent ion. The expl oi tabi 1i ty cl ause provi des for coaste 1 state
jurisdiction beyond trle one r,undred fathom limit to Where "the
depth of the superjacent water adtllits of exploitation of the natural
resources of the sai d aree."27
While UNCLOS I established the Convention for measuring the
breadth of the territorial sea .. it was singularly unsuccessful in
achieving consensus on the 'vvidth of the territorial sea. Although a
second conference .. UNCLOS II .. was convened in 1960 for the sale
purpose of concluding an accord on the width of the territorial sea ..
it .. too} ended in failure. Rather trli9n facilitating agreement .. the
Ile's recommendation that the territorial sea be extended to six
miles and not more than twelve rniles .. led to an impasse. The
majority of rnaritirne states subscribed to the six-mile limit.
Coastal states w'ere Ijivided. Vt/rtile sarne advocated adoption of the
tValelve-rnile lirnit, ott-fers souqt-It tr,e riqt-lt to estatllistl their av-tn
. ..... ....
limits. For this reason .. Llr"JC:LCI~; I failed to establish a nev-/
13eneve Conl'lention on tt-Ie C:ontinentfjl ~3t-lelf into international lew)
coastal states Bcquire1j Juris1jiction over tt-Ie srlelf end its
resources. C:onsequent 1!d., t.here "/'/8S 8 ~~reater Ijegree of uni forrni ty in
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the national seabed policies of the coastal states.
Since the majorit!d of coastal states incorporated the 1958
Geneva Convention on tt-,e Continental Shelf into their national
oceans policies .. the Pardo initiative challenged their policies. The
greatest challenge arose over the issue of where to set the
boundaries for the international area. Delimitation would not only
determine the precise outer lirnits of national jurisdiction .. it would
al so deterrni ne the all ocat i on of seabe.j resources. A1though Pardo's
extravagant estirnate of the value of manganese nodules had
stimulated the coastal states" interests .. this was not thei r main
concern. The prirnary seabed resource in the late 1960s was
petroleurn.
The key factors in e:x:ploiting the mineral resources of the
seabed are technolo!~y and economics. Deep seabed mining
tecrlnology tied not tleen perfecte1j in 19t5ti. Manganese nodules were
recoverable only at deptrls of thirty to sixty rnetres. Although there
v.... ere prelirninary designs for rnining at depths of tvvelve hundred
metres or rnore .. the e>::ploitation differentials increase rapidly with
trle increasing deptrls of v·later. Antj .. since deep seabed rnining was
rel at i vel y untested .. the est i rnated costs and ri sks 't,·vere very hi gh.
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Conversely .. land-bas81j rniner-el reserves exist on all continents;
t·,8ve a superior gr8 tje tt-Ian ,jeep seatled minerals; and .. are
considerably easier to exploit than deep seabed minerals.** The
deep seabed is .. trlerefore .. an irrlportant future source of minerals
Vv'hen land-based reserves are depleted or no longer sufficient to
rneet ....../orld dernand. The seabed rnineral of immediate concern .. then)
was petroleurn. Acquiring or tl-Iaintaining jurisdiction over seabed
petroleutYt reserves took precedence for coastal states. Even
rnineral e:x:porting states viev'Ielj deep seabed rnining as a future .. not
an irnrnediate .. tt-treat to tt-teir land-tl8sed n-Iineral industries. The
issue of tJounder!d ljel i rni tat i on .. therefore .. focused on who would
have jurisdiction over the continental shelf and its resources.
By the end of 1968 .. tt-,e off-st-tore oil industry was in a rapid
state of tjeveloprnent and e~<:pansion.28 I]ff-stiore v'Iells were
producing oil fr-orn unljet- as rnuct-, as t"/..-'o-t-,un,jre,j tl-,etres of \'vater.
Estimates '",\"ere tt-tat \,\·'itt-Iln ten !dears '·/·/ells ··..vauld be producing oil
frorn untjer t'.,\··o t~-tousanlj rnetr-es or about 8 n-lile and e quarter of
V-later. 29 I]av'er t\'vent~d countt-ies t-IOlj off-st-Iore oil anfj gas pt-01juction
and another fift~d ',/,,·'ere acti '\"81!d en!~a~~elj in off-st-Iore 8xploration. 30
V,litrJ off-st-,ore ",'vel1s accounting for appro:=<irnetely eight percent of
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Iworld production; alrnost el·... ery coastal state halj visions of off-
shore petroleum wealth.31
Under the 1958 Geneva C:onvent i on on the Conti nental Shel f;
coastal states have sovereignty over the mineral resources of the
shel f. HOVv'8'Y'er; the estatllist-Irrlent of an international area
challenged the open ended nature of the Convention. Since a precise
definition of trle internat.ional area \'\'ould automatically define the
outer l1mits of coastal state Jurisdiction) it vv'ould also restrict the
definition of the continental st-Ielf. Tt"t8 exploitability clause in the
1958 Geneva (:onvention on tt-'8 C:ontinental Shelf was) therefore} at
ri sk. In ef fee t} t t-,e co rn rn on t-I eri tage of rnank i nd pri nc i p1e cou 1d not
be in1plernented without prejuljice to the interests of the coastal
states. Land-locked; geogr-apt-lically disadvantaged; end limited
continental st-,elf states \ivoullj acquire seabed rights V'/ithout
sac ri fie i n!~ t too, ei r nij til] nij 1 so 11/ 8 re i ~d nt y. H0 -1,,1,/ e I1I1I er} t t~1 i s \·v as n(I t t he
cese for coastal states. IJn tt-,e one t-lan1j .. coastal states Vv'ould be
required to fore!Jo tt-Ie e::-::ploitat,ility clause in ttl8 C:onvention. (In
tt-Ie other han1j.1 ,jepen,jin!~ upon 11/I/t-t8t-e the t1oun1jary v'/as dra'vvn/ they
rnigt-It tie required to relinquist-, sovereignty over tt-Ie richest area of
tt-Ieir off-shore resource~:;. Hence .. tt-;8 Flarijo initiative challenged
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both the sovereignt!d anlj the economic interests of coastal states.
Anticipating trle Ijivision of tt"18 entir-e seabed at their expense ..
coastal states began to extend their national jurisdiction to
unprecedented distances frorn shore. As observed by Pardo .. the
establishment of an international area initiated the greatest
territorial annexation since the Berlin Congress. Solidifying their
position within a unitelj regional agreernent,l the majority of South
AtYlerican states uniforrnly antj unilaterally extended their
territorial seas to t·vvo t"II..Jndred rniles. B!d r1arcrl 1970 .. all coastal
states in Soutrt Arnerica) e:x:cept for trle northern) geographically
disadvantege1j states--Colornbia .. GU!dana arllj \/enezuela--clairned
20Ct-rnile territorial sees.
Although ideologicf111!d eli~Jned v-,..itt, tt-,e ~;outh American
states) the Organization of Afr-icf:tn Llnity ([IAU) sought a compromise
position. Ratt"18r tt-Ian e;:.::ten,jin!~ tt"18 tet-r-itorial sea to tVy'1) rtunljred
rniles .. tt-Ie (JALI propos8 1j tt-,e estatllist-Irnent of a tV'lelve-mile
territorial sea an,j a t''I'''/O t-turnjrelj-rnile e::-::clusive econornic zone
(EEZ) . Vii t-I i 1e C0 astal s ta t es \"'/ (I Ul,j enJ(I Y ~; (I \,J et-ei 9nt hi 0 ver t rl e
resources in ttle EEZ,. rnaritirne states v'loullj t"lave na"r,Jigational
rigtlts. The [IALI dilj not .. t-loV'l8\·ler .. support coastal state sovereignty
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over the continental srlelf. Unlike the Sautrl American states ..
A f ri ca is a di sadvantaged cant i nent in that it lacks an 8xtensi ve
continental shelf. Arllj \¥rlat little continental shelf there is .. is not
evenly distributed arnong the African states. To prevent annexation
of the continental shelf frorn increasing the territory .. economic and
poli tical power of coastal states .. the OAU argued that the entire
continental shelf srloullj be declared the common heritage of
manki nd.
Despite their continental st-Ielf differences .. the African coastal
states aligne1j v'lith the Central., Soutrt Arnerican .. and Caribbean
states. TrJe alliance agreernent provided that these states \Nould
resist any atternpts to lirnit coastijl state sovereignty at the law of
the sea conference. Future negot i at i ans v'loul d be premi sed upon
coastal state sovereignt~d over all trl8 r-esources lvvithin to'NO hundred
rniles of tt-,e coastline or- o'·/er tt-,e entit-e continental srlelf even vv'rlen
it extended beyond the t\oVO t"lun,jrelj rnile lirnit.
C:ornttined .. tt-Ie Parljo initiati tol8 anlj tt-Ie consequent alliance of
tt-Ie del...'eloping coastal state::: pr-ecipitate1j an intense conflict of
interest tJetv"teen rnaritirne anlj cOijstal sti:Jtes and inljustrialized and
developing states. At tt-Ie centre of the ,jispute v""Jes national oceans
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policies. Conflict resolution "./'/ould tlave a direct impact on the
national oceans policies of all four groups. This was particularly
true for the United States and C:anado. The notional oceans policy of
the United States reflected botrl its national strategic and national
economic interests. C:analja's national oceans policy embodied its
national sovereignty and national econornic interests. Protecting
their national interests necessitated that both the United States and
Canada assurne leaderst-lip positions in the future law of the sea
conference.
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III
THE UNITED STATES
AND
THE SEABED
The Un 1ted States is 1 at one and theserrl8 t i rn e .. a major coast e1
state .. the foremost rnllitary pO\Ner J and a Y-/orld leader in ocean
technology. Tt-18 national oceans policy of the IJnited States was ..
therefore .. far rnore specific in the late 1960s than either
international levv' or the policies of rnost otrler states. By 1968 the
Uni ted St8 tes' na tiona 1 seabed po 1i cy for e:x:p 1ori ng and expl 01 t i ng
the seabed vv'as firrnl~d establist18lj. The 1945 Trurnan Proclamation ..
the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act .. and the 1958 Geneva
Convention on trle C:ontinentfJl Shelf provided the policy framework.
IJnder tt1ese acts .. trl8 JJni telj ~3tates clairned jurisdiction over the
mineral resources in tt-Ie continental sr,elf but not over the
superjacent v·... ater-s. Tt-18 acts also careful1!d refri:ilrt frorn setting
frorn sr,ore of Llnitetj Stfites' Juris,jiction.*** Tt-,isdeliberate
explained tlY trl8 Llnited ~3tates' enor-rriOUS oceans interests.
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The coastline of trle Unitelj States is over t"Nelve thousand
rniles long. The Unitelj States' continental shelf is eight hundred and
sixty-three thousand square nautical miles. And .. these numbers
increase substant i all y when the coast 1i nes and continental shel ves
of Alaska .. the Aleutian Islands .. Hawaii .. and Puerto Rico are
included.32 Substantial petroleum deposits are located in the
continental shel f of the llni ted ~;tates alone. Accardi ng to 1970
estimates .. recoverable petroleurn resources to a depth of 200
rnetres V'lere two hunljrelj billion barrels of oil and eight hundred and
fifty trillion cubic feet of natural 988.33 Along V',ith Lake Maracaibo
in \/enezuele and the F'ersian Gulf .. trle continental shelf off the
coast of Louisiana accounts for sixty-three percent of off-shore oil
production. 34 By 19r58 .. Louisiana continental shelf oil leases were
generatin!J over five t-Iundrelj rnillion dollars in bonuses. 3 5 At the
sarne tirne .. oil e:x:ploration iJnlj e:x:ploitation licences ......... ere being
issued to distances of forty rniles off ttle coast of California (Forty
t-"lile Banks) anlj to ,jeptt-,s of tlll,I'I"O thousen.j feet.36 As "Nell} the
LI nit eIj ~3 t et es [) epa r-t rn en t 0 f t t~l e 1nt er-i (I t- re ali zetj 0 ve r t vv' I) bill ion
Ijo11ars in revenues frorn tt-,e issuance of licences to explore and
ei<ploit off-sf-,ore oil re::;er ll/e::;.37 Lln,jerstan,jst,ly .. tt-,e [)epartrnent of
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the Interior strongly 81jvocated that the United States extend its off-
shore jurisdiction over tt-Ie entire continental n-tergin J shelf .. slope
and ri 88. 38
Complying witrl the Department of the Interior's wishes ..
ho ....vever .. was not in the tlest interest of the United States at that
time. The United States' interest in off-shore petroleum is not
confined to national coastal \'vaters. The off-shore petroleum
reserves of other coastal states are of significant importance to the
United states. With offshore oil production accounting for eight
percent of Arnerican anlj t ..'ve1 ..... e percent of v,'orld consumption .. the
United States petroleurn industry had ..... ested interests v.... orld-vt/ide.
Of the seventy or rnore coastal states engaged in off-shore
petroleurrJ exploration and exploitation .. rnost were dependent upon
Atllerican companies to Ijevelop the in1justry. This dependency sterns
frorn ttle ract that t110S1. coastal states are ,je'..,'eloping nations. As
developing nations., tbe!d lack t,ott-I the capital and the technology to
develop their OV'ln off-shore industries.
\'''It-Jile seabelj oil acti\·'ities in international and foreign-
controlled V'laters ··I·I·... er-e econornicall il ijljl...lantaqeous for trle Arnerican
:::i "-
posed a unique protllern for the IJnitelj States.
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5i nee the
establishrnent of an interni:itional area trlreatened trle exploitability
clause in the 1958 13eneva Convention on the Continental Shelf .. it
was in the best interest of the United States to extend its coastal
state sovereignty as far out to sea as possible. However.. a
universal extension of coastal state sovereignty rnight have a
detrirrJental irnpact on the Arnerican oil industry's off-shore
investtl-Ients. F1roduction sites located in international waters could
suddenly fall under the juristjiction of coastal states. Such a
de ve lop rn ent rn i !J rl t 1ead to SO rn e co astal s tat es nat ion 81 i Z1n9 the
Ameri can-ovv'ned product ion 8i tes located in thei r nevyl y acquired
territories. Tt"lere Vilas also the possitdlity that sorne coastal states
would} for political reasons .. stternpt to interfere vvith or restrict
trl8 rnovernent of Arnerican oil tflnkers. Tt"lis latter concern erose
frorn the fact that a nurntler of international str-aits "h'Qul,j be
absorbelj tlq a tr-lree or rnore rnile e::<tension of tt-Ie· territorial S88.
Tt-IUS., V'i't"lereas tt-Ie Arnet-ican oilln,justr~d t",alj initiall!d ali!~nefj v'lith
tt-Ie Depar-trnent of tt-Ie Interior .. it t1egan to ijlj',/oCfjte litYlited coastal
state juris,jiction.
I',,\"t-,ile tt-Ie Llnitelj ~=;tates' pi-irnary inter-est in seatled resources is
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petroleuni) it also rli:iS considerable interest in deep seabed herd
rnineral resources. This is because trle United States is not only a
major oil irnporter .. it is also a net importer of the minerals located
in the deep seabed. In fact) the United States spends over two
billion dollars annuall!d on tYllneral itllports. In 1972 .. the United
States imported ninety-eight percent of its manganese .. ninety-two
percent of its cobalt .. eigt-l1.y-four percent of its nickel .. and nineteen
percent of its copper. 39 To rneet tr,e trernendous domestic demand
for n-11neral resources .. tbe Llnitetj States' hard tYlineral mining
industry invested consideratrle tirne and capital in tr,e development
of deep seabed rnining tecrtnology. By 1969 .. Deep Sea ·ventures .. an
Atllerican corporation) t-ttilj perfected a dredging system for
recovering seabed nOljules in ",'vaters frorn seven hundred and sixty to
nine hundred ftnlj fifteen rnetres Ijeep .. 40 and \·V88 experirnenting with
techniques for r-eco',/erin!~ rnetals frorn seabed nodules 'vvith
acceptetlle efficienc!d. 41 In ijtjljition to [)8ep ~3ea \/entures .. 8 number
of other Arner-ican .. \·'lest European .. f:!nlj ,Japanese cornpanies were
financing lat-!~e-scale tjel",leloprnent pt-oiects. 42 Bas81j on their
advances., 13errnan scientists \,"l8r-e pretjictinq tt-Iat deep seabelj
rnininq v,"ould tie perfecte1j ""","ithin enott-Ier five years.
- ~
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Trl8 advantage to tt-Ie Llnited ~3tates, and trle other industrialized
states .. frorn rnining tt-,e ,jeep seabelj ·"vere threefold. First .. it would
reduce trle United States' dependency on foreign-owned land
reserves. This was particularly important given the propensity of
developing nations to nationalize Arnerican-owned industries.
Second} other natl0ns 'vvould no longer be able to extract political or
econorYlic concessions frorn trle United States in exchange for access
to rnineral resources. Tr,ird .. access to seabed rninerel resources
would curtail the out·'l·tarlj flo 4llv' of Arnerican capital. Ratrler than
contributing billions of ,jol1at-s to trle econornies of other nations ..
Arneri can rni neral e;<penlji iures \/loullj tie relji rected to the United
States' econorny.
establishrnent of an interni:itional seabelj regirne rtad significant
eeanornie irnplieations fOt- tt-,e Llnitelj ~3tfjtes.
H0 "l'I" e\,' er- .J t t-, e LI nit e,j ~:; t ;j t e~:;' nfj t ion;j 1 eel] n0 rn i c i nt ere sti n t t-, e
seatled is :3upers8 lje 1j tlY its national strategic interests. Trl8 Llnlted
States is fit-st anlj forer-nost ij rnilitar!d pov'ler. As such .. the United
States} national security interests are profoundly dependent upon
t~-Ie free,jorn of tt-Ie SeijS ,joctr-ine. 'v\,'itt-, tt-,e ,je'·,·'eloprnent of surface
tl-lissile st-,ips anlj nucleat--pO\'\/8r-e 1j sutJrnarines .. suet-, as tt-'8 Polaris ..
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trle strategic irnportf3nce of seapovver becarne paramount to the
Un i ted Stat es J sec uri t yin t ere s t s .43 BY 19 6 8 .. the Un i ted Stat es J
links between seapo'tfver .. navigational rnability and freedom had
been firrrily established for rnore than a decade. As early as 1958..
Admiral Arleigh Burke observelj that:
((Naval forces are rnore irnportant in the rnissile age than
ever before. r"'lobilit!d is e prirnary capability of navies.
Support of our free ''1",''orld allies depends upon the ability of
the f'aJavy to move .. unharnpered .. to 'wherever it is needed to
support Arnerican foreign policy. This is the great
corltribution of Unitelj States seapovver toward the
progress of free ci 1Y
'
ilization.·'·'44
V~ith seapov'ler funljarnental to tt-Ie United States" national
security policy .. trle r',Javy I'lie'vved the establishrnent of an
international regirne v'litrl aliJrrn. The propos8 1j international area
caused coastal states to t1egin to e>-:.tenlj their national sovereignty
uni 1aterall ~d as fer out to sea as POSSl ttl e. In tt18 process .. 1arge areas
transforrned into territorial "'IJ1'I,laters. ~=;ince trle freedotYt of the seas
doctrine Ijoes not apply in territorial lll'vaters .. trle navigational
V'lr,ile seatl8,j rniner-el resources ar-e of conslljeratlle less irnportance
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they are) nonetheless) a potential future source of strategic ra\'v
rnaterials. Trlerefore) free anlj unirnpeded access is considered to
be in the best interest of tt-Ie Unites States ~·Javy. Since the
establishment of an international regime challenged the freedom of
the seas doctrine .. the r··Javy argued that it was not in the best
interest of the Uni ted States.
Because of its e::-::tenSi\.'8 oceans interests .. ttle United States is a
rr,lcroCOStll of the international cornrnunity. Just as the United
~Jations rnust act-'leve a balance tlet ...·veen trle diverse and often
conflicting interests of the international community .. the United
States rnust seek a tlalance of interests t'etv..'een opposing domestic
groups. For this reason .. the IJnited States" national oceans policy
c 0 tll bin esc 0 as tal stat e Juri S tj i c t1 I) nover the sea bed IvY i t h the
freedotYl of trle seas Ijoctrine. In tt-,is 'flay .. tt-Ie IJnited States
protects tlott-, its nationf:tl econornic and national stt-ate~~ic interests.
T t~1ego a1 0f t t-I e LI nit eIj ~:; t fj t es) t t~1 en., ""V est (I ens ure t t-I a t t t-, e
establist-Irnent of a ne"l'!" inter-national seatl81j r-egirne on,j a nev·"
international la·...v of 1.t-,e ~:;eij tjilj not unljerrnine tt-,e IJnitelj States)
nat i anal oceans pol i c~d,
Tt-Ie IJnitetj States" interest in the ,jeveloprnent of 8 new
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international law of tr,e sea Vilas tvvofollj. First) an international law
would establish the lirnits of coastal state jurisdiction and put an
end to unilateral extensions of the territorial sea. Second .. an
international regime I'Nas required for the resolution of disputes
precipitated by overlapping claims to deep seabed mining sites.
However.. if conflict resolution was achieved through the extension
of coastal state jurisdiction and the establishment of 8 powerful
supranational autt-,ority .. the freeljorn of the seas doctrine would be
undermined. Since tr,e free,jorn of trle seas doctrine underpins the
United States" national oceans policy) defending the doctrine was
essential to the '-tnited ~:;tates·1 national economic and national
strategic interests.
The developrnent of a neVll international law of the sea
convention 'vvas .. therefore) pr-otdernatic for tt-,e United States. On the
one hentj" trte Llnitelj ~;tates advocaterj tt-18 81joption of a convention
\,vr,ich \lv'ould secure international peece end stability. On the other
han Ij.. t be LI nit e,j ~; tat es '",'./ ant eij torn ai nt 8 i nthest 8 t us quo. Sin ce
trle latter ob j eet i \.'e "ll"les an i rnpossi bi 1i ty., tt-Ie Llni ted States sought a
cornprornise resolution. Tt-Ie task of tt-Ie Llnitelj ~;tates policyrnekers
Vilas to Ijr-aft a propo::;al ","I,··t-Iict-I actlie'·,,'elj a tlijlance of interests.
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Ideally; the proposal lltvould rnirror the United States J national
oceans pol icy.
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IV
CANADA
AND
THE SEABED
By all standards of tYleesurement and definition; Canada is a
major coastal state and a foremost rnineral exporting state. The
Canadian coastline is one of trle five longest in the world. CanadaJs
two million or more square nautical nliles of continental margin are
equal to approxirnately forty percent of its enorrnous land mass.
The contine-ntal rnargin ot-f Canada"s north coast reaches
considerable seaward distances at great depths. The east coast
continental margin extenljs over six hundred miles seaward to
depths of two rlundrelj fijtt-Iorns or rnore. Ace.ording to research
est i rnetes .. l:anadf('S conti nenta1 rnargi n contai ns ni ne percent of the
'vVorldJs potential off-st-Iore petroleurrl t'8sins. The estimated
resource potential of tt-Ie tlasins is 5 1;J.6 rnillion barrels of
recoverable oil and 457.2 trillion Guttie feet of recoverable g88. 45
...."'hen cornbinelj \tvith Canada)s land-based petroleum reserves} off-
shore petroleurn deposits are of significant irnportance to the
Canadian econorny. C:onsistent \,vitt·, its national eeonornic interest}
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t'!d tt-Ie late 19t.lJS C:analja ',,·'·/as actively issuing perrnits for petroleurn
e:x:ploration and e>~ploitation.. par-ticularly off the I:anadian east
coast.
As both a developed and a developing nation .. Canada"s off-shore
petroleurn concerns are tV'lofold. First .. as a developed nation ..
Canada possesses tt-Ie technology to explore and exploit its
continental srlelf resources. For this reason .. Canada reserves its
rigrlt to develop .. 8nlj control trle Ijeveloprnent of .. its national off-
shore petroleurn in1justr!d. ~;econlj .. as a ,jeveloplng nation .. Canada
lacks trle capitel to de'...'elop trle industry and the military
capatlilities to defenlj it.. C: 0 nsequ en t 1YJ Cana da" s of f - sh are
resources are vulneratlle to trle e:x:ploration and exploitation
act i vi tie s 0 f fore i 9n- I) Vll neIj CI) rn pan i es. The rrlost fundamental
st"lore interests frorn tt-Ie incur-sions of forei!Jn-o I0/ne 1j cornpanies.
Frorn (:enf:1lja o's perspective., tt-Ie key to national sovereignty
protection is tt-Ie entrenct-,rnent of coastal stete jurisdiction in
internationalla\·",". To t.his en1jo' C:analja erner-ged on trle v'/orld stage
as a rnejor adll,,'ocete of coastal stf1te r-iqt-Its.
.. ~
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extension and the protection of coastal state jurisdiction in the
establishrnent of a nevy' la'vv of the sea. "vhile neither conference
aehi eved consensus on the wi dtrl of trle terri tori al sea .. as Canada
had hoped .. Ur~CLO~=; 1 estatllished tv'/o conventions of particular
interest to Canada. Botrl the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental ~;t-Ielf fecilitiJted the extension of coastal state
sovereignty. Linder tt-Ie 11;)Si:i 13ene"ia Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone} coastal state sovereignty over the
territorial sea e:x:tends to trle seatled J subsoil and airspace. Article
1\/ or- tr,e Convention., v'lbier, is of particular interest to Canada ..
provides for the use of strait baselines for rneasuring trl8 territorial
sea areas wr,ere the coast 1i ne is ,jeepl y i nden ted and cut into .. and
v'/t-Iere trlere is a frin~~e of islanljs along tt-Ie coast in its irnrnediate
''I'lcinit!d. V1lt-lile trl8 use of str-ait tlf;1selines cannot be invoked for
purely econornic t-ef:Jsons .. \,II,,'t-i8t-e geo!~r-ap~-lic conljitions vvarrant
J
econ 0rn i c i n t er-e s t S 0flo n!~ s tan Ij i n!~ rn a ~d tl etaken 1n t 0 ace 0un t.
Corntlininq tt-Iese pr-ol...1isions ","v'itt-I tt-Ie 8;-::ploitat,ility clause in tt-Ie
1956 Gene"rl'a C:onvent i on on tt-Ie C:on t i nenta 1 ~;t-Iel f.1 Canalja acquired a
tr-ernentjous accretion of tert-itot-~d.
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Canade"s rnainland coastline is not only deeply indented but ..
because of its island portions .. it is also very irregular. Using
strai ght basel i nes from headl and to headl and .. rather than from the
sinuositles of the coastline .. to rneasure the territorial sea)
therefore .. substantially increases Canada"s sovereignty over the
continental shelf. At the same time .. by employing the
exploilability clause in tt-Ie 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf.1 C:anada \t\'fjS atlle to e~<tend its sovereignty over
trle conti nental st-181 f off its east coast to unprecedented 1i mi ts.
Because trle ocean crust off tt-teeest coast of Canada is not sharply
defined .. it is scientir-icall!d irnpossible to determine the outer limits
of the conti nen ta 1 srl81 f. At t t-18 very 1east .. the exp 101 tabi 1i ty c1 suss
enables Canada to clairn sOi'lerelqntq out to a Ijistance of six hundred
- '-
rniles and ij deptrt of t:,!",."o t-,untjrelj fethorns. V·/itr, the existence of
tect-,nolo~~~d for- e::<ploitin~J petroleurn at ,jeptt-rs of fifteen hundred
feet under tt-Je seatl8 lj.1 C:anatja considerelj trl8 e:x:ploitability .cleuse
crucial to its nationel econornicas '1.'vel1 ijS its national sovereignty
; nterest.
Ern p loy i n!d t t-I e t "1"'/ 0 C: 0 n lV' en t ion s., an ,j un i 1et era 1 ect ion "1'/ tl en
19608.
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At tlOtt-1 IJr"JC:LCI~3 I anlj IJr\J[:LO~:; II; Canada proposed tt18
adoption of 8 six-rnile territorial sea and a six-mile contiguous
zone. Undaunted by the Conferences; rejection of this and other
proposals., Canada turned to rnultilateralism. Following the close of
UNCLOS II; Canada aligned with Australia and Britain in an attempt
to entrench the six plus six forrnula in a multilateral treaty_ By
1962; forty-four of the f1 fty-four states that supported the formul a
at UNCLOS II agreed to sign the rnultilateral treaty provided that the
rnajor pov.... ers participated. 46 Even trH)ugrl the United States had co-
sponsored the six plus six forrnula at Ur··JCLOS II; it declined to
participate in the rnultilateral treaty. The IJnited States believed
that an international accord \,vas necessary to prevent the individual
practice of states frorn., in tirne; leading to the establishment of a
tV'lelv8.-rnile territorial sea. 47 Tt1e IJnitelj States \·vas, therefore;
concerne,j tt-fijt tt-Ie rnultileter-al treijt~d ·\,J',"ould pro'...'oke a rusrl of
unilateral cleirns tJ!d tho~:~e ::;tates not party to the treaty. For this
reason, trle IJnitelj ~3tates insisterj that unless an international
ace 0 r- d ",'V asac t-, i e tli eIj .. t t-, e t t-I r ee - rn i 1e t erri t I) ria 1 sea 1i rn i t 'vY I) u1d
rernain in for-ceo Tt-t8 Llnitelj ~:;tates" po~:;ition \,I't"as 1.ronclad. In fact)
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nonacceptance of trlei r proposal 1eft trle preexi st i ng 51 tuat ion intact
and tt-Iere "/v'as uno ottligation on the part of states adhering to the
ttRlree-rnile lirnit to recognize clainRls on the part of other states to 8
greater breadth ... an trlat we stand ..... 48 r~onethelessJ Canada held the
United States responsible for undermining the multilateral treaty
and .. therefore .. Canada's national sovereignty interests.
Unable to achieve its national sovereignty interests through
either internationalisrn or multilateralisrn .. Canada resorted to
unilateralism. In 1964) C:anaija legislated a nine-mile contiguous
fishing zone parallel to its ttRlree-rnile territorial sea. Canada
just i f1 ed 1ts act i on on tt-Ie gr-ounds that it vv'es necessary to prevent
trl8 Ijepletion of C:analje's east coast fishery tty foreign-owned fleets.
AlthougtR J a vali,j ar!~urnent) tt-,e fishery in1justry accounts for less
trlan one percent of C:anoljij's Gr\JP. In reality) CanBda)s unilateral
action Vilas rnotivatelj tl~d national sO\lerei~~nt~~ inter-ests. Leg·islating
a nine-rnile conti!~uous zone anlj using streight baselines for
rneasurernent enablelj C:analja to e::.::tend its coastal state jurisdiction
\'V rt i 1est i 11 a,j t-I er i nq t [I t t-l e t t-lt-ee- rn i 1e t er t- i t (I t- i a1 sea 1i rn it. Not
surpt-isingly .. tt-Ien., in 11;tti! C:ijnada ernplo~delj straigt-It baselines to
rneasure tt-,e ter-ritorial sea an,j tt-,e contiguous zone along trl8 coast
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of Labraljor and the soutrtern an,j eastern coasts of Newfoundland.
Since the 1958 Geneva C:onvention on the Continental Shelf provides
that the continental shelf begins at the outer edge of the territorial
sea .. the use of straight baselines not only enabled Canada to extend
its territorial jurisdiction .. it enabled Canada to absorb a large part
of the continental shelf into the territorial sea.
'...vitrl the cont.iguous zone elnlj trle use of straight baselines
firrrily entrenched in Canada's national oceans policy .. Canada once
again resorted to unilateral action. In 1970 .. Canada unilaterally
declared a tv\lelve-rnile territorial sea. The niotivation behind the
legislation \{vas threefold. First .. a nurnber of developing coastal
states .. particularly African .. anlj Central and South Atnerican states ..
·...../ere alreadq cleirninq territorial sees frorn tt'Nelve to two hundred
-- '"-
and fifty rniles '·l...·ide. E;ecorllj .. C~anada .. along V'lith these other coastal
and the Lev...· of tt-'8 ~;ea C:onfet-ence that tt-,e tt'lree-rnile territorial
8.doption of a tV'I·'el'·ie-rnile territor-ial sea "'."'l,'as essential for the
protection of C:ana,ja's Ar-ctic ::;o\"8r-eignty intet-ests.
Altrlougt-I a rnatter of histor-ic concer-n .. tt-Ie perceiv8,j need to
50
protect Canada's soverei!~nty over the archipelagic waters of the
Arctic increased in tt-Ie 196()s. The provocation came from the
scientific discovery that the seabed and subsoil of the Arctic ..
particularly the Canadian Arctic basin .. is one continuous continental
shelf with massive petroleurn deposits. Exploiting the huge
petroleurn deposits off the north coast of Alaska .. however} posed a
transportation problern for tt-Ie IJnited States" oil industry. The
industry Vv'oul d rt8 1...'8 to tll..Ji llj a pipeline or transport the 011 by tanker.
In 1961~ .. trle industr!d announced plans to test the feasibility of
transport i ng oi 1 by tanker frorn Alaska to the eastern coast of the
United States. The test in"lolved the voyage of the American oil
tanker .. the /'"·lar,hatt8r1 .. througt-I the t,Jorthwest Passage. Canada ..
an internal
v-taterway. Arguing trlat the t'ldf1fiattafj voyage was a violation of
Canadian SOIII,lerei~~nty .. C:ijnalja lo,j~~e,j ij ljiplornatic protest vv'itt. the
IJnitetj SteJtes. ~:;ince tt-Ie IJnitelj ~:;tates does not recognize) nor do ij
nurnber of ott-Ier state~:; .. C:anij,ja··s Arctic sover-eignty c181rrls .. it
rejected tt-Ie protest. r'''1elintijinin!~ tt-Iat tt-Ie drcrtipelegicwaters of the
Arctic eJre international., not internal .. tti8 Unitelj states
proceededv~"itrl tt-18 t"lafifiattari I'lo!da!~e as plannefj.
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Wrlile trle dispute focused on the issue of transit rights or
freedotYl of navigation .. trle central issue was jurisdiction over
seabed resources. Under the Territorial Lands Act of 1968 .. Canada
cl ai ms juri sdi ct i on over the 1i censi ng .. regul at i on) and management
of all mineral and petroleum exploration and exploitation in the
mainland Arctic and sub-Arctic. The future exploration and
exploitation of the petroleurn and hard rnineral resources of the
Arctic seabed is .. trlerefore .. fundamental to Canada's national
oceans policy. If the rl,Jorthv\/8st Passage was designated an
international strait tt-Ien not. only tt18 ....vater but the seabed would be
governed by the free,jorn of trle seas doctrine. Trlis raised the
spectre of Americans .. not Cana,jians .. exploring and exploiting the
Arctic's seabed resources. It vias .. therefore .. essential that Canada
take steps to estatdist-I sovereignty. Legislating 8 twelve-rnile
territorial sea enablelj Canada to close off Ttle Barrovi and Prince of
Vila 1es Straits .. the gatev'lays to the f'IJorth'vvest Passage. However..
Canada .. therefore .. skilfull~d linked envir-onmental protection with
national security interests. C:iting tt-Ie Ijrarnatic increase in oil
tanker accidents .. C:anada clair-ned tt-Iat there ·v...'a8 a profound need to
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protect the Arctic's fragile ecosystem. According to the argument.,
oi 1 tankers navi gat i ng in coastal waters pose as great a threat to a
coastal state's national security as do warships. Ergo ..
environmental protection is an essential aspect of national security_
To protect the Arctic's fragile ecosystem from the threat of oil
pollution and other contaminants} Canada legislated the 1970 Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The Act establishes a one hundred
nautical mile pollution prevention zone and provides for Canadian
juri sdi ct i on over the en"lironrnental funct i on of the ent ire Arct i c
area. 'while not directly asserting sovereignty} the Act declares
Canadian statutory authority. Under the Act} all aspects of
petroleum exploration and exploitation} lncludlng pollution
prevention in the Arctic seabed and the entire continental shelf) are
under Canada's jurisdiction. A concurrent amendment to the Canada
Shipping Act establisrled broad pO'vvers to set ship standards for all
vessels navigating in (:anadian Arctic and coastal waters as well as
enforcement and regulatory pO'vvers. Since the Amendment was 8
direct violation of international lev',) Canada also amended its
acceptance of the International I:ourt of ,Justice's (ICJ) jurisdiction.
Tti8 atliendrnent proviljes tt-Iat all disputes relating to the prevention
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and control of poll uti on .. conservat i on and exp1oi tat i on of the 1i vi ng
resources in tt-Ie rneri t i rne ereflS adjacent to the coast of Canada 'vVi 11
no longer be justiciable before the international court.49
The ingeniousness of ttle Arctic Y1aters Pollution Prevention
Act and the related leqislation cannot be underestirnated. Inone fell
swoop Canada avoi ded nat i onal appropri at i on and achi eyed national
appropri at i Ort. 50 The territorial sea extension and the Arctic
v1aters Act enabled C:analja to gain control over the arcr,ipelagic
'waters of trle Arctic} particularly the r~orthwest Passage} without
actually claiming that tt-Iey v'Iere internal waters. In effect .. Canada
reinforced its jurisdiction \,vithout claiming jurisdiction. At the
sarne tirne .. Canada cleverly placed one hundred nautical miles of
seabed outside trle bounds of tt1e international area. International
reaction to the le~~isliJtion \'\"as n1i~<efj. Most Ijeveloping coastal
states .. especially tbe ~;outh and C:entral Arnerican states .. aligned
v'Iith Canada. Tt-te rnaritirne states., particularly the United States
and Britain .. disrrlisselj t~-Ie leqislation on tt-Ie grounds that it v'Ias a
violation of international la'.,.'v'.
BeCause or qeoqraprtq an.j national streteqic interests· Canada's
'-'- '- ..."
uni later-a 1 acts t-18tj a tji reet i rnpact on tt-Ie national oceans policy of
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the United States. In using straigrlt base 1i nes to measure the
territorial Seij and the contiguous zone .. Canada changed the
boundari es betv'/een t.he IJni ted States and Canada. A di spute ..
therefore .. arose over overl appi ng cl a1 ms to the sea and the seabed ..
part i cul arl yin the Grand Banks area of the Gul f of Mai ne. The
dispute is over econotYlics .. not sovereignty. The Grand Banks
contains one of trle "/vorld's ricrl8st fisheries and continental shelves
and Canada v-las laying Clfjirn to tt-Ie rict1est part. v1hile trle conflict
\aVas eventually adju,jicate,j by the le...l .. fisheries disputes continue
to erupt. Althougrr C:anada's unilateral claim to a twelve-mile
territorial sea was consistent v'litrl the practice of other coastal
s tat es.. i t \tvasincon sis te nt '........ i t h t r, 8 Un i ted States' t hre e- mi 1e
territorial sea as establist-Ied tty custOtllary international law. By
1970., the fJnited States \'··... as \,vil1in~~ to accept a t·...velve-tYlile
territorial sea so lon~J iJS it V·... iJS entrenched in an international
accord. Eiecause tt-,e Llnited States beliel",'ed tt-Iat unilateral actions
\,'",' 0 U1dunIj errn i net t-J e ac t-, i e 1",1 ern en t 0 fan i ntern a"t ion a1 ace 0 rd) i t
rejected CaniJlja's clairn.
Since tt-Ie Arctic \'\/ijtet-S F1ollution F't-evention Act and the
arnendrnent to the C:ana,jij ~;t-lipping Act POS8,j 8 rjirect threat to the
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United States' national strategic interests) trle United States'
condernnation was unequivocal. If unchallenged) the Canadian
legislation "Nould give Canada the right to interfere in the national
security interests of tt-Ie United States. By simply invoking its right
to set stlip standards in Arctic 8nlj coastal waters) Canada could
interfere \Nith the navigational freedom of the United States Navy.
More irnportantlYJ the legislation would establish a precedent for
coastal states host i 1e to the interests of the Uni ted States. These
states rnight be rnotil'lated to adopt similar legislation and then use
it to impair trle rnotdlity of tt-Ie IJnitelj States Navy. The legislation's
irnplications V'lere not lirnited to trleLlnited States/however.
Britain .. France} Gerrnany., Greece) the Soviet Union/ and all states
with strategic and or cornrnercif:ll interests in ocean navigation 'were
equally affected by tt-Ie le!~islation. Tt"'8se states) trlerefore) joined
existing inter-national 1a''!'''I''j coastal state jurisdiction over pollution
setting stanljf:Jrds V'las lirnitelj to the ttlree-rnile territorial see. In
fact. Canalja rernovelj tt-,e leqislation frorn trle jurisdiction of tt-Ie ICJ
. '_.-
tl8causeit e::<ceetjetj the lirnits of 8stablist-'8Ij international levy. It
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was Canada"s hope trlat tt-lis latter action Vt/ould discourage
maritime challenges to the legislation. However .. it didnJt. The
noncompliance of the rnaritime powers rendered the Arctic Waters
Poll uti on PreVetlt i on Act and the amendrnent to the Canada Shi ppi ng
Act ineffective. Llnless t:anada could effect a change in existing
international law .. its national oceans policy was unenforceable.
International i srn J t·'ov.... ever .. posed an even greater threat to
CanadaJs national oceans policy than unilateralism. The source of
the threat was the establist-,rnent of an international seabed area and
an international regirne to govern trle area. The establishrnent of an
i nternat i onal seabelj area presupposes a defi ni ti on of the outer-edge
of the con t i nen ta 1 she If. The exp 1oi tatli 1i ty cl ause in the 1958
Geneva Convention on the I:ontinental Shelf would J therefore .. have to
be rernoved. So long as trle e:x:ploitability clause remained in force"
the international SeeJtl81j area coul,j not tie defined. And .. \I'lithout an
international ar-ea.' tt-Iere "."t/oullj tie no need for an international
regirne. The cornple;'~it~d of the issue gave rise to a conflict of
interest for C:analja. Ttle e>~ploitat'ility clause in the 1958 Geneva
C: 0 nvent ion 0 n t t·, e C: 0 ntin ental ~3 t-I elf un Ij erp ins [: anadaIS nat iona1
oceans polic!d. Ttierefore., a ct-tallenge to tt-Ie e:=<ploitability clause is
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an automatic challenge to Canada's national oceans policy. And ..
since Canada's national oceans policy enshrines its national
sovereignty and national economic interests} the establishment of
an international seabed area threatened to undermine those
interests.
On the other hand, Canada considered the establishment of an
international seabed reginle essential to its national economic
interests. As a foren-Iost larllj-based rrlinerel producer) Canada is
tYtore dependent on the export of natural resources than any other
advanced capitalist state. 51 Entire Canadian communities depend
upon the export of natural resources for their survival. Ranked fifth
in world rnineral pro1juction, C:anada produces forty-one percent of
"Norld nickel .. ten percent of v.,'orld copper .. and over seven percent of
'vvorld cobalt.52 Of tt-Ie four principal ,jeep seabed mineral
resources) C:analja is a net irnporter· of rnanganese only.53 Canada is}
trler-efore., concernetj tt-Iat e>;ploitation of the deep seabed will
increase the v'lorld suppl!:l of rninerals .. particularly nickel .. while
,jecreasingthe v'lorld ,jernanlj for 8nlj price or Canada's land-based
reserves. To pre\"ent tt-lis ,jeveloprnent .. C:analja aljvocated regUlating
and lin-titing incr-eeses in trl8 supply of 'vvorldminerals. As a
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consequence .. Canada endorsed trle establishment of an international
regirne twitr, the rnandate to regulate and lirnit the production of
deep seabed mi neral s
Drafting a law of the sea proposal for Canada .. therefore ..
required a considerable degree of ingenuity on the part of Canada's
policymakers. They v'/ould have to draft a proposal which not only
protected Canada's unilijteral clain-,s but I'lvhich achieved a balance
between Canada's conflicting interests. Like that of their American
counterparts .. ttle proposal v'/ould t-Iave to focus on limitations. First ..
to protect Canellja·s unilateral clairns the proposal 'would have to
limit the pO'vvers of tr,e fl-Iarititl-'8 states. Second .. to protect
Canada's sovereignt!d over tr,e entire continental shelf the proposal
would have to litllit the boundaries of the international seabed area.
Third .. to protect CarliJdals lan,j-base,j nlineral exports the proposal
\rlOullj hallie to limit the pro,juction of ,jeep seabed rrlinerals.
While limitations Ill.... ere tt18 k8~ to success for both the United
States and Canada .. tt-Iere \,vas one fundarnental difference. For the
United ~;tates to pt-otect its national strategic and national
eeonor-nie interests .. the juris,jiction of botrl coastal states and tt18
international regirne ''t'voul,j ~-Ia","e to tie lirl-Jited. The security of
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Canada1s national sovereignty and national economic interests}
t-Io'vVever} rested upon its ability to limit the jurisdiction of the
maritlme and mineral consurning states. To a considerable extent}
then} the Uni ted states and Canada were the focus of each others}
limitations objectives. In effectJbecause of their conflicting
national oceans interests} one state could not protect lts national
oceans policy YVitrlout irnposing litYlitations on the national oceans
pol i cy of the other.
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THE PERMANENT SEABED COMMITTEE
f1andated to prepare for trle establishment of the international
seabed autrlority and the organization of Ut~CLOS III .. the Perrnanent
Seabed Commi t tee hel d 8i x ne!=lot i at i ng sessi ons between 1970 and
-.., . ...
19 73 .54 Bet ".'V een August 1970 8 nd October 19 7 1..8 1even s t 8 t es or
groups of states subrnittelj Ijraft laval of the sea proposals to the
Cornrnittee. 55 Six proposals v'/ere frOtTI developed states and five
were f rorn de ve lop i n!~ states. In general) the Ijeve loped sta tes--
United States--presentefj proposals \/vhich advocated the
establishrnent of a relati\,'elq ',,"leak international seabed authority.
Trl8 de\,'81oping states--r·"lalta .. Tanzania., seven landlocked and
geO!~t-8pt·,ic811y ,jis8,j'",'anta~~e,j states) anlj fourteen Latin Arnericen
estatllisrlrnent of a ~:;tt-on!~ international authority "/'/lth fBirly
extensive pO",ll/ers. Tr-18 Iji sa!Jreernent o'v'er the natur-e anlj tt-Ie povt/er
(I f t t-, e in t er-na t i 0 na 1 aut t-I I] r-i t!d r-e '",I 0 1'",' eIj around ttl ree cruel al
questions. HO'I."",I \,\"oullj tt-Ie international seetl81j area be developed'?
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\/.... rlere v'/ould the pov'lers of tt~le international authority be located'?
Should tt~le international autr,ority t-18\,J8 tr,e pOV'/er to regulate the
production of deep seabed minerals?
The central problen-I in nearly all of the issues 'Nas how to
resolve the dernands for control over activities) whether by coastal
states or by an international authoritYJ with the demands for
freedom of action rllade by traditional or potential users of the
oceans. 56 Witt', the bulk of real ocean v'leeltrl located within two
hundred rniles of the coast .. geogrephy and economics were the
dotl1inant tt-Iernes. f10st states.1 Ije\/elope1j or not) adopted attitudes
that varied according to their geographic locations) according to
whether tt-Iey possessed continental st-telves; and according to the
fortTl of the shelves. 57 C:088t81 states agree1j on trle benefits to
sought to extend their national sovereignty as far out to sea as
possitlle. 5Ei C:oastal states rneintainelj sol i ,jarity on tti8 issue even
though .. ir-onicelly .. reseerct-, inljicates that st-Iould a]l the profits
frorn exploitin!~ trle resources in the t'I/I/O tiunljretj mile area accrue to
t t-I e co as tal ~; tat es. rn 0 t-e t han f i f t ~ perc en t 'yV 0 Ullj q0 on l!-t tot en
. ~ ~-
states. Furtt-Ierrnore .. rnor-e rell/enue~:; I'lv'oul,j accrue to thirteen
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developed states than to all one r,undred and tVllenty countries of trle
Third World.59 Maritirne and industrialized states,:vvhile agreeing to
share seabed resources and profits with the international
communi ty .. sought to preserve the freedotTl of the seas doctri ne.
Tt-Iey subscribed to the freefjorn of navigation and the developrnent of
the deep seabed mining industry under the free market system.
Thus .. while rnost states '",vere united in advocating a neval kind of
internationalisrn .. they retainefj anlj IjetYlonstrated nationalistic
tendencies. 50
Assun-ling tr,e lead .. the Llnitelj States subrnitted the first draft
seabed proposal to the F1errnanent Seabed Commi t tee on August 3 ..
1970. ~Jotlng trlat the present laval of tr,e sea v'/as too inadequate to
rneet the neeljs of rnOtjern technology iJnd the concerns of trl8
international cornrnunit~d., tt-,e Ijr-aft proposal callelj for a neVa'
rnultilateral agr-eernent to prel,.,lent nijtional conflict enlj rivelr-y.61
Divisitlle into tt-tree perts,. tti8 dr-aft proposal provided for tt·Je
Ijelirnitation of tt-le seetlelj unljer national juris,jiction; the
estatllisrirnent of an interirn re~~irne for ~:;eatlelj rninin!~ prior to the
Convention's entering into force~ and .. tt·18 pov'lers end duties of the
International ~;eabed Autt-lorit!d (ISA).
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Addressin!d botrl coastal and rneritirne state concerns .. the
United States proposed tt-Ie establisrlrnent of 8 twelve-mile
territorial sea coupled with the freedotYl of navigation on .. over .. and
through international straits. Using the two hundred nautical mile
figure in the 1958 Geneva Convention on theCont i nentel Shel f J the
Uni ted States proposal call ed for all nat ions to adopt a treaty under
which they would renounce national claims over the natural
resources of tt-Ie seabelj beyorttj trle point vvtlere tt-Ie hi gtl seas reach a
deptrl of tv,'o rtunljrelj rnetres an,j agree to regard all trlineral
resources beyon1j this point as tt-,e cornrnon t-teri tage of rnanki nd.
Beyond the two hundred rnetre lirnit., the ISA would establish two
different systerns for exploring and exploiting seabed rnineral
resources. Bet"tv'een trle tVII"O t-Iundred rnetre lirnit and the outer edge
of the continental shelf) tt-Ie ISA ",vould establish a Trustee Zone.
Tt-Ie Trustee Zone \lvould tie rnijna!~elj t'!d tt-18 coastal state. Trle
coastal state 'I"l'loul,j t-,8ve e><clusive jurisfjiction over all ei<ploration
anlj e>~p10 i tfJ t i on act i 1.,lll tie::: in t t-18 Zon 8. As trustee .. tr-Ie coastal state
\tvoullj retain a portion of the i nternat i Onfj 1 r-evenues ~~eneratelj in the
Zone. Tt-,e retl-Iainljer- of tt-Ie pr-ofits \"Iloul,j tie turned over to the I~;A
for di stri tlut i on to tt-Ie poorer nat. ions.
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Since neither tt-,e Trustee Zone nor tti8 ISA "Nould come into
force until after the ne'yv levY' of the see convention vvas ratified} the
draft proposal provided for the establisrlrnent of an interim regirne.
As envisioned by the United States .. coastal states would continue to
explore and exploit tt-,e tl-tlneral resources in the future Trustee Zone
during the interim period. Exploration and exploitation activities
would continue beyond ttiis point as \"Yel1. However.. a substantial
portion of trle rnineral royalties Vv'oul,j be transferred to the ISA.
The ISA 'vvould .. in turn .. use tt-,e royalties for' international
cornmunity purposes., particulet-ly eeanornie assistance to the poorer
nations. 63
The international area vl/ould t1egin at the outer-edge of the
Trustee Zone and \·\,'oullj tie under tt-,e e:>::clusive authority and
regulation of tt-,e IS;A. 1]1..,ler- t-'81f trle et-ticles in the draft proposal
Vilere devotelj to 1.t-,e PO\"ller-s anlj Ijuties of tt-18 1~;A.64 As tr,e prin-,iJry
function of the ISA ,t/t"IOUllj be issuing licences and resolving
overlapping site Ijisputes .. an operations cOtl-,rnission and a tribunal
v,"ould tie fjppointe1j. The opet-ations cornrnission \,vould upon receipt
of a specified fee issue fj licence to a contracting pBrt~d .. parties}
natural or juritjical persons under its autt-Iorii!d anlj sponsorsr,ip.65
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Trle licence would !~rf2nt the licensee exclusive exploration and
expl 01 tat ion ri !~rlts ina speci fi elj area) or areas) of the deep seabed.
The tribunal "'''{ould resolve all seabed mining disputes in the
international area through legal processes. The resolution of
disputes would be mandatory.
The ISA ¥v'ould also establish an assembly and an executive
council. The assembly of all states .. eacrl rlaving one vote .. would be
responsible for general policy. The ISA's rnost powerful body would
be ttle executive council. As the rnain decision-making organ .. the
executive counci 1 would reflect trle pro1jucer and consumer interests
of those states most concerned \rlith deep seabed mining. Elected
every three years., the executlve council would consist of
representatives frofl-I tt-,e six niost industrially advanced states and
eighteen additional countt-ies of \'vt-l1ct-1 tV'lelve \flere to be developing
nations. At least t'Y"lO of tt~le t""venty-four members v'lould be
landlocked or geogr-apt-lically ljisatjvanta~~ed st81.e8. 66
Since tt-Iere v\,'oultj tie a renunciation of e:;<istin!~ rights vvhen the
Convention entered into force., tr-Ie ljraft. proposal contained a
gr8ndfatt~ler pro',lision. [) ue pr (I tee t ion f I] r the i n t e9r i t yo f
investrnents rnade pt-ior to t~-Ie C:on&·lention corning into force was
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guaranteed. Grandfatt-,er rights ·v..... ould also ensure the continuation
of seabed exploration end exploitation during trle interirn period.
In conclusion .. trle draft proposal stipulated that the United
States vv'ould not vie l....., •• the ne'"v la\N of the sea as tirnely unless it
was achieved in accordance \-vith the General Assernbly schedule.
The schedul e call ed for U~~CLOS III to produce a new convent i on by
1974 or} at the very latest .. 1975.67
As an 8xarnination of the draft proposal indicates .. the United
States detl-Ionstratelj a consiljeratlle tjegree of Willingness to
cotYlprornise. Althougrl it preferred the rlistoric three-trille lirnit ..
the United States V'las prepare1j to accept a twelve-mile territorial
sea so long as trle freeljom of navigation through international
If entjorsed,. the provision would
accornrnodate trle interests of botrl coastal and rnar-itirne states. On
the one rlanlj .. t~·le Llnitelj Stfjtes' netionel str8te~~ic interests
tYtitigate1j against a tlt-Oijlj e;-::tension of coastal state juris1jiction.
On tt-Ie ott-ler t-1i9nd .. the Llnitelj States recognized theirnprobability of
cOf2stal states,. pf1t-ticulijt-l~d tt-Iose v'/itt-I lon~~ cOi:tstlines an,j/or broiJlj
con tine ntal sh e1ve s 0' agree i ng t (I a t'I"I""O t-,U ndre Ij rn et re 1i rn it. T be
Trustee Zone ·',"'I·'as,. tt-Ierefore .. a cornprotl-tise. Tt-Ie Trustee Zone
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combined relatively narrO\N lirnits of national sovereignty over
seabed resources v'littt a pragrnatic division of royalties and
administration of continental shelf resources. 58 With all rights of
coastal states in the Trustee Zone specifically delegated in the
Convention and restricted to the seabed} coastal states \Nould be
prohibited from extending their sovereignty to the superjacent
waters. 59 r'Jational sovereignty and national economic interests
ya... ere .. therefore .. balanced ".'vitt-I national strategic interests.
At tt18 san. e t i rn e., tti 8 Trustee Zone assured the continued
exploration and exploitation of trle seabelj during the interim period.
To protect the integrity of investrnents rnade before and during the
interirn period .. the draft proposal prOVided for Grandfather rights.
"rlithout guaranteed in\IJ 8strnent protection} investors might suspend
all deep seabed 8cti\,'ities until after an accord was reached. While
neitr,er the Llnitelj ~:;tijt8S nor- ttie ottler inljustrializelj states
favoured suspending seabed activities ,jur-ing the interim period .. the
developin!d nations Iji,j. Tt-terefore., to entice the developing nations}
trle llnitelj ~;tates pr-offere1j irnrnediate financial cornpensation.
Ratr,er trlan \,vaitin!~ until after- an accortj Vilas struck .. the Trustee
Zone vI/auld generate rnineral re'",'enues for trl8 international
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community .. particularly the poorer nations; during the interim
peri ad. 5i nee rnos t of the revenues to be shared from the Trustee
Zone would cornefrorn tt-Ie United States; it was a very generous
proposal.70
The draft proposal cl early demonstrates the paramountcy of
international and national security interests to the United States.
For the sake of international peace and security .. the United States
proposed a balance of interest accord bet¥leen the diverse and
conflicting groups. Econornic concessions to coastal and developing
states are balanced Vall tt-l the freeljorn of action for marit 1me and
industrialized states. Econornic concessions indicate the
willingness of the United E;tates to compromise its national
econ 0 rn i c i n t ere s tsin e >~ c t-I eng e for C (I nee s s ion s on nat iona1
strategic interests. HO"f'·'I,'ever., tt-re Llnited ~3tates v-tas not prepared to
sacrifice ttle forrner for- tt-Ie latter-. 71 To protect tlotrl its national
strategic and its national econornic inter-ests .. trle United States
ernployed tV'lO strategies. Fit-st., in tattling tt-Ie first draft proposal
the IJnitelj States set tt18 agen1ja. l]ttler states v'Iere not only forcelj
to address tt-Ie issues iljentifielj t'!d tt-le Llnited States .. they 'vvere
require1j eitt-,er to enljorse tt-18 proposf11s or offer acceptatlle
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elternatives. The Llnited States .. therefore .. narrowed the focus of
discussion to triose areas of greatest importance to itself. Second)
the ski 11 ful 1i nkage of issues in the dreft proposal 1i rnited the
ability of other states to rnenoeuvre. In order for coastal states to
extend their national jurisdiction .. they had to concede navigational
freedoms--no freedom of nevi gat i on through i nternat i anal strai ts ..
no twelve-rnile territorial sea. Soverelgntyover the mineral
resources in the Trustee Zone required coastal states to concede
jurisdiction over trle superJacent ",,"... aters. To receive immediate
financial beneri ts frorn e;x:p 101 t i ng t tie Ijeep seabed .. eoasta 1 and
developing states v'loullj t-tave to endorse ttle Trustee Zone .. the two
hundred rnetre lirnit .. anlj Grandfather rights. And; the establishtYlent
of an international regitYI8 'vvas contingent upon developing the deep
seabed rni ni ng i ndustr!d under tt-Ie rnarket s!dstem. In effect; then .. the
Llnited States' Ijr-ijft proposal not onlq forcetj other states to address
spec i fie iss ues ) i t f 0 r- cedt t-, ern torecog ni ze C0 unt er vail i n9
interests.
C:anatjij'S initial response to tr'8 IJnitelj ~3tEJtes' draft proposal
Vv'iJS outrage. Frorn C:ana,ja's perspective .. tt-18 t\·vo rlunljred metre
deptt-I line anlj tt-Ie Trustee Zone underrnined Canadc(s national
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sovereignty and national econornic interests. If adopted) trle
proposal would depri l'i8 Canada of its acquired rights over trl8
continental shelf anlj continental shelf resources. Since the
continental shelf off Canada's east coast extends more than six
hundred miles sea'vVard .. the loss would be significant in terms of
nat i onal soverei gnty and na t i anal econom i c interests. Renunci at ion
of the 1958 Geneva C:onvention on trle Continental Shelf was ..
therefore .. as anathen-IiJtic to Canada as renunciation of navigational
freedorns Vv'as to the Llni ted ~;tates.
As a regional .. not a global .. pov'/er.. Canada is less concerned than
the United States V'lith rneinteining the rnaXltllUm possible freedom
for international use of the oceans. 72 Although Canada shares the
United States' and ott-Jer "'''iestern pO''1vers· preoccupation with global
naval strategy .. C:anada is rnore concerned ....../ith naval passage through
straits close to its st-lore. 73 Tt-lis is particularl~d true v'/itrl respect
to tt-Ie r,Jortt1V'l8st F'assage. 'v'lt-lile C:anada clairns that tt-Ie r~ortrlwest
Pas S89e i sin t er al i a ani nt ern a1 s t r ait., t t-I e IJnited S1.8 tes 8ndotrl er
fl1 ar i t i rn e po Vv' ers rn a i nt a i n tt-I atit i san i nt ernat i on a1 s t r ait. T rt e
Llnited States' linkage of tt-Ie tl·lv1elll,.le-rnile territorial sea· vv'ith tt-Je
freedorn of na,...'i!~ation tt-lrOU!~t-1 internationel straits "I,ves} trlerefore)
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problernatic for Canalja. On the one rland; Canada vv'anted its
unilateral extension of the territorial sea to be entrenched in
international leVv'. On the otrler hand .. Canada did not want the
Northwest Passage to be governed by the provision. The problem for
Canada} then} was to draft a counter-proposal which would secure
the former and prevent the 1at ter.
The trlird area of concern elicitelj tlY the draft proposal was deep
seabedrnining. As a prospective Ijeveloper of the deep seabed mining
industry .. Canada sought equal access to seabed resources for the
Canadian mining industry. As a land-tl8sed mineral producer and
exporter.. hoV'tever .. (:anada aljvocated lirnitations on the production
of deep seabed trrinerals., particularly nickel. 74 As envisioned by
Canada .. trlen .. the ISA ......, OU llj ria '.Ie trl8 PO¥I er t (I 1i rrli t see bed mi nere1
production but not to litYlit Canaljian access to deep seabed mining.
But .. the IJnitelj States' draft proposal did not distinguish between
land-based and seabelj rnineral production. "Drevving up special
restrictions for one source of rninerals and not trle otrJer was")
according to tt,e IJnitelj ~;tates .. "equ i l.lalent to agreement by treaty to
discrirninate a!dainst i:Jl1 ::;tates ''/'It-IO rnay be seatl81j producers.H75
Hence .. tt-Ie Llnitelj ~:;tates' dr-aft proposal treated seabed mineral
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production in tt-Ie serne rnanner as lanlj-tliJsed production.
The centrality of tt-Iese issues to C:anada's national oceans policy
rendered the Uni ted States' draft proposal unacceptable. For Canada
to secure its law of the sea !~oals) its national sovereignty and
national economic interests v'lould have to be protected and/or
extended nat l as proposed by the United States} limited. In fact} if
Can ada v.... ere t 0 acrti eve its 1a",'V 0 f the sea goa 1s) 1i tTl ita t ion s W 0 U1d
tiave to be irYlposed on trle national strate!~ic and national econornic
interests of tt-Ie Unitelj ~;tates. [:analja's strategy was to ernploy
strong diplornatic initiati\,'es fol1ov'led by the tabling of a counter-
draft seabed proposa 1.
To defend its national sovereignty and national economic
interests .. C:analja rlCllj to cjefend ttle four 1958 Geneva Con"lentions)
particularly tt-Ie Continental St-Ielf Convention. HO'vVever) defending
tt-Ie C:on'v'entions !~el...'e t-ise to tt-Ie question of cr-edibilit!d. Althougrl
Canada Viles a strong proponent of trl8 Conventions at Ur~CLOS I; end
had even invoke,j tt-Ie C:on\.'entio.n::; to support its unil.ateral clairns j
C:anada rlad never r-atifielj tt-Iern. As recor-1jetj .. C:analje did not ratify
t t-Ie 19 Sci Gene '...'a (: on l...1 etlt i on on the Cont i nen tel St-181 fun til Marett)
1969. Tt-,er-efor-e .. tt-Ie C:on\J'ention'~:; provisions tj;tj not epply to Canada
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until March .. 1970. It is not insignificant trlat Canada did not ratify
tr,e Convention until alrnost tv·... o ~dears after Ambessaljor Par,jo urged
tr,e international con-,rnunity to r-enounce all national claims to the
continental shel f beyond the tv·/o hundred rnetre 11mi t. Ratificati on
"1'1 as .. clearly .. fundatYlental to Canada's strategy. Having ratified the
Con ven t ion.. Can ada V'I as n0 Vll i nthe po sit ion toexpandon its vi rtues .
In December 197(J .. C:ancllja took its case to the General Assernbly.
Extolling trle substantial act-Jie\·'ernents of tt'8 four 1958 Geneva
Conventions .. Canada appeale,j to the 13eneral Assembly for retention.
Reopening all of tt-,e rules of lev'" ernbotjietj in trle Conventions yyould ..
ace 0 r din 9 t 0 Can ada.' pre j ulj ice t t-, eirachi eve rn en t sand was ..
tt.erefore .. inadvisatlle. 76 r"'laintijinlnq tt-,at tt-J8 continental st-lelf
extended out to tt-Ie continental rnargin., Canada proposed an
alternatl/·ie to trle Llnitelj ~:;t8te::;' t\-'y'O t·,unljr-elj rnetre lirnit arHj Trustee
Zone. As pt-OPOS8 Ij try C:ana1je .. cOi:Jstal states v'/ould
irnrnediately ijecli:Jre tt-Ie area of tt-Ie seatlelj 'Il'lt-lict-, tl~d any reckoning
V'las beyond their pr-e::;ent or pos::;itlle future national Juris(jiction~
cor-nrnit a percenta!~e of all futur-e oil .. g;:15 and rrlineral revenues
"tVittlin trleir territorial "l'/8ter~=; to an international agency for
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distribution to the poorest countries; 8n 1j .. pa!d a fixed percentage of
all the revenues deri velj frorn trl8 v-thole seabed area cl a1 med by thern
beyond the outer limits of their internal waters. 77 Hence) whereas
the United States proposed economic concessions in exchange for
lirnited national so'Y'ereignty) Canada offered econornic concessions
in exchange for extended nat i onal soverei gnty. Havi ng appeal ed to
the General Assernbly to protect tt-Ie sovereignty interests of coastal
states J Canada turnelj its attention to trle Permanent Seabed
Comrn it tee.
On August 24 J 11;)71, Canalja tabl elj a detal 1ed draft seabed treaty
proposal in tt-Ie Perrnanent~3e8tled C:ornrnittee. Like trlat of the
IJnited States, tt"l8 (:anijljian pr-oposal adopted a cornprornise approach
tothe La \/-; 0 f the Sea neg 0 t i at i (I ns. H0 ...."1 e I.,.' er., un 1ike t rl eArneri can
proposal .. tt-Ie CaniJ,jian proposal ernpt-Iasizetj the national sovereignty
en Ij nat ion iJ 1 eC[I n0 rn i c i nt et-e st s 0 f t ~-I e C(I astal stat e. Rei t era tin q
tt-Iet coastal states .. not tt-18 internfltional cornrnunity~ define tt-Ie
outer- lirnits of tt-leir continental st-181ves .. tr-18 C:analjian proposal
call e,j f 0r- t-e11/ enue :; t-, ar- i n~d Ij Ur- i n~d t t-l e per- i (I ,j 0f t r-ansit i (I n. Si rn i 1ar- t (I
tt"'8 Unitelj States propos8 1j intet-irn pet-io,j .. tt-Ie C:anadian transitional
pet-iolj gUf1rentee 1j re1'1,'enue S~-lijt-in!d ljurin!~ tti8 negotiating pr-ocess.
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To ensure a speedier negotiating process) Canada proposed that all
states identify and resolve all rninirrlUtll non-contentious issues
prior to the start of Ur,JCLCIS III. And} during the negotiating process}
Canada recommended t ......... 0 different fornls of revenue sharing. First}
a skeleton authorit4 ',..vould be established to govern the area of trle
~ ~
seabed which coastal states designated as outside their notional
jurisdiction. The skeleton autr,ority Vrlould licence and regulate
activities in the international area) and collect revenues from the
exploitation of seabed revenues. Second .. the Canadian proposal
recomrnended the establist-,rnent of an international development
furllj. Coastal states \."1"1 trl i ncornes frorn the exploitation of their
continental st-,elf areas l',"',"oulsj rnake voluntary contributions to the
international developrnent funlj, A portion of tt-te revenues Vt/ould be
distributed to the developin!~ nations ""\litrl trle lion's srlare going to
tt-Ie poor-est nations.
'al1hile the (:analj;an pr-oposal supportetj tt-Ie establishrnent of a
t"/'l81ve rnile territor-ial sea in e;:.::ct-tan!J8 for navigational freedorns
trtrough international stt-aits.; it tjistin!~uist-Jelj tletv'teen international
international strait ther-e rnust tie evitjence tt-tat the streit "Nes
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traditionally used for international nfjvigation. The "traditional use"
c1 ause Vilas essent i 81 to tr'8 protection of C:anadi an sovereignty over
trle NorttlV\/est Passage. 51 nee Canada rnai ntai ned ttlat the t40rthwest
Passage ¥vIas an internal not an international strait .. it would be able
to invoke the IItraditional use" clause to exempt the Northwest
Passage from the Conl'lention.
In line \11"I"itrt the IJnited ~;tates' draft treaty proposal .. trle
Canadian proposal endorsed the establist-Irnent of a relatively weak
international reg i rne. IJrlljer tr'8 C:anadi an proposal .. the i nternat i one 1
regirne v'/ould be rnanljated prirnarily for tt18 purpose of issuing
licences to private anlj state enterprises. Ho\'vever) as envisaged by
Cana1ja J tt-,e international regirne "I"I/auld be endavv'ed V-lith strong
regulator!d po '........ ers. Llsin!~ these pov'/ers .. the ISA vvould prevent the
'vvholesale exploitation of ljeep seabelj rninerals j pat-ticularly nickel.
To tbis enlj .. tt-18 C~ijnaljian Ijr-aft tt-eat~d pr-oposal callelj for trle
esteblist-Irnent of an asserntdy .. e council) a secretariat and a
tribunal. It ,ji,j not .. t-IO "/'l 8 1ller) provilje for 8 veto or "lv'eighted voting
in tt18 8xecuti i'le council. Instea1j .. [:ana,ja pt-opose1j equal voting and
the allocation of four- per-rnanent e>::ecutil'le council seats for land-
ba sed rn i nera 1 pr-olj uce r-s.
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A comparison of t~-Ie IJnited States· anlj Canada's draft seabed
treaty proposals reveals their fundarnentally different lay" of the
sea interests. Altt,ough both ,jraft proposals provide for the
establishment of a twelve-mile territorial sea" revenue sharing" and
8 relatively weak international regirne .. they differ in form and
substance. Whereas the IJni ted States· two-hundred metre 1i mi t and
Trus tee Zone was des i gne1j to 1i rn it na t lone1 soverei gnty .. Canada·s
retention of trle 19SE, Geneva Con\,lent i on on the Conti nental Shelf
Vilas directed towards tt-,e pr-otection and/or extension of national
sovereignty. \h/hile bott-, proposals call for- revenue sharing .. there is
a subtle ,jifference. The Llnitelj States' proposal does not specify
·whether revenue srlaring is rnandatory or voluntary. The Canadian
proposal .. rlowever .. clearl!d stipulates that revenue sharing is
voluntary. In usin!~ tt-Ie voluntarld provision; Canada provided an
escape route for COij~:;tal ~:;tate~:; intent on pt-otect ing tt-Jeir national
econornic interests.
A sirnilar situation 8>::18tS lll"'/it~-, tt-Ie e:>::tension of the territorial
sea. To protect its national str-ategic inter-ests frorn creeping
national Juris1jiction.1 the Llnitelj ~3tates rn81je acceptance of tt,e
t\'velve-rnile territor-ial sea conditional upon tr,e freedom of
78
navigation througt-, inter-national straits. To protect its national
sovereignty interests .. rlovvever .. Canada lirnited the freedom of
navigation to international straits traditionally used for
international navigation. In so doing .. Canada provided an escape
clause for coastal states ....Vittl national sovereignty interests. And ..
whereas the United States sought to protect its mineral consuming
interests .. Canada sought to protect its rnineral exporting interests.
The Unitelj States' rtierarct-tical1y structurelj ISA contrasts sharply
with Canada's land-tl8sed protjucer interests. Hence .. \I'lhereas the
United States' proposal assigns ,jecision-rnaking povver in the ISA to
the industrial po·"vers., C:anfnje's proposal !Jrants equal decision-
rnaking autrtority to land-tl8s8lj rnineral producers.
There \.yas one issue .. tiOV'l81·.·'er.l on 'Yvrticrt the IJnited States and
Canada '0lere in cornplete accor-d. Eiott-, states 'vvere Y'lilling to
proffer econotl-,ic conce~:;sion~:; in order to protect trteir 18'vV of the
sea goals. Tt-18 Llni t.elj ~=;ta tes '...'vlas ...'v'i 11 i ng to cornprorni S8 1ts nat i onel
eeanornie lnterests in e>::chan!~e for concessions on national
strateqlc lnterests. An,j., C:analjij "I,'I/iJS \"llilling to comprotYlise its
national econornic int.er-e~;ts in e::<cr-,ange for- concessions on national
c ~ II - r- - l' q t- t I I l' ti t l~ r- - ,-. t .-.
,,-' CI '.' I::! e ... l:::t I _ r:: I::! ,:s - ':'. Tt-,e irnportance of national eeonarnie
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interests in the act,i 8vernent of 8 n8\N i nternat i anal 1aw of the sea
accord was clearly urlljerstood by both the United States and Canada.
Economic concessions not"vithstanding J tlott-l the United States and
Canada would have to enlist tt-Ie support of the developing and
coastal states in order to achieve their law of the sea goals.
Anticipating that the entire ocean ....vas about to be partitioned
off) coastal states} particularly developing nations) began to extend
their national sOI.... ereignty as far out to sea as possible. By March
1970; ell coastal states in ~;outt-I Arnerica; eXc8pt for the northern
states of Colorntti 8 .. 13uyan8 .. and \/enezuel a., claimed two hundred-
rnile territorial s8as. 7i3 In i:J1jtjition .. they clairned jurisdiction over
the entire continental shelf el,/en vv'hen it extended beyond the tv-/o
rl un dre d- rn i 1eli rn it. I........ i t t~1 the e :=< c ep t i (I n 0 f t t"I e I v 0 ry C0 as t) all
African coastal states clairnetj t"l'lelve-rnile territorial seas except
f (I rei 9htee n s tat eS ","'l t-I i Ct-I C1fj i rn eIj terri t (I r-i a1 sea S 0 f t vv en t y tot V'l a
hundred rniles. 79 For reasons of consistenc!dJ the [IAU proposed that
coastal states fj,jopt a t\/\,'el l·/8-rnile territorial sea and a t\',/O hundred
rn i 1e E:x: c1us i "", e EC(I n(I rn i c Z0 ne (E EZ) co up 1e ,j V'l" i t ti a re 9i me (I f
innocent passage. Hov'le'",'er) contrary to its ~;outrl Arrierlean allies}
the (IAJJ reJecte1j coastal state sot."lere;!~nt!d Ol·ler the continental
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shelf. The OAU argu8 1j that annexation of tt-Ie continental shelf and
its resources \,voullj increase the territory .. economic .. and political
power of coastal states at tt18 expense of non-coastal states. For
this reason .. the OAU proposed that the entire continental shelf be
desi gnated the comrnon heri tage of manki nd.80
In 1971 .. the developing nations presented six different draft
seabed treaty proposals to tt-Ie Perrnanent Seabed Commi t tee.
Consistent v'/ith the developing nations" Ijiverse interests in the
conventional uses of the s8a) the draft proposals reflected both
coastal and non-coasti:il state interests in trle territorial sea .. the
EEZ .. and the continental shelf. Ho\/vever .. the developing nations
maintained solidaritw v'litrl respect to their provisions for a
po'vverful supranational i:iuthority. All six draft seabed treaty
proposals called for tt-Ie estatllisrlrnent of e highly centralized and
bureaucr-atically stt-ucturelj I~=;A 'v".,'itt-I cornpre~-Iensive pO"l'vers over all
aspects of deep seatl81j rninin~~.i31 r··Jone of trl8 draft proposals
provided for a sqstern of ··/·... eiqt-lte1j '..,'otinq calculatelj to perpetuate
,,_. -- --
trl8 rule of the rnost po·,,"·.·'erful. Ci2 r',Jor- '",'",'er-e tt-Iere any pr-ovisions for a
systern of licensing ljesigned to give an unfair advantage to the
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rnonopolies to serve tt1e interests of individual and private
cornpanies .. 83 Instead .. the ISA .. as proposed by the developing
nat ions .. Vv'oul d:
1. Be rliererchical1y structured with the executive
council under the supervision of the assernbly which
would be the supreme organ of the ISA;
2. Operate on a system of one nation one vote v'/lth no
preferential voting rights for trle technologically
advanced states.:
3. Es tab 1i Stl an i nternat i ona 1 rna chi nery wi th the power
to explore and exploit the deep seabed and lts
resources;
4. Have extensive pov.... ers in the control .. managernent
and regulation of activities in the area including the
use and rnarket i ng of raw tYlateri al s;
5 .. Ensure the active participation of the developing
nations in all aspects of seabed rnining through
training prograrnrnes and the publication of all
research pl ans and fi ndi ngs;
6. Protect land-based producers from the adverse
economic effects of deep seabed mlning through a
Drogren1 of rational exploitation and price
stabi 11 zat ion;.
7. Set international cornrnodity ceil~ings for rninerals
that are readily available in the ¥lorld rnarket;
8. Relate the sharing of benefits to the needs of
countrl es on the basi s of an agreed scal e whereby the
least developed countries would receive the tliost and
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trle rnost developed countries ¥/ould receive the
least~
9. Assurne the responsibility for training personnel
from the Tt-,ird World including the transfer of
blueprints and the est ab1ish rn en t 0 t-· a fund for
financing the training prograrn;
10. Guarantee tr,e participation of all national liberation
movernents recognized by the OAU and the Arab
League as observers at LIf~CLCIS 111.84
As envisaged by the developing nations .. then .. deep seabed
rnining .. and rnost particularly tt-,e ISA .. \Noul.j facilitate the creation
of a ne¥-I \I'lorld econornic order. LI n1ike 0 t r, er i ntern at ion a1
organizations .. tt18 ISA \,vould be controlled by the general assernbly.
And .. since trle general assernbly 'vvould be controlled by the
developing nations .. ergo the ISA vv'ould be controlled by the
developing nations. Llsin!d this control .. tr,e developing nations would
effect a ne',/v' 'I,"',"orl,j econorni corder.
V-lrlile the ,jeveloping nations' pro',lisions for tjeep seabelj mining
·...vere cornpletel~d inconsistent ·,...·... itraj tta,ose of trale IJnited States .. they
'Here only partiel1~d inconsistent ·...vitr' C:enelja's prol,.,lisions. V·/hereas
the IJnited State;:: i5tjl.iocated lje""lelopin!~ trale tjeep seabed rnining
industry under the fr-ee rnat-ket systern .. trle developing nations
rejected the rnarket systern.
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The Canadian proposal J however..
contained aspects of both the United States' and the developing
nations' provisions. As an industrialized state .. Canada supported
the free market systern. As a developing state} in terms of mineral
exports .. Canada supported a regulated system. To accommodate its
dual and conflicting interests .. Canada recommended that deep
seabed rnining be developed unljer a regulated tnarket system.
As a result of trlese diverse and conflicting seabed mining
interests .. the Perrnanent Seabed Cornrnittee failed to achieve its
rnendate. After three !dears enlj six negot.iating sessions .. there v.... es
neither an organizational frarnevv'ork nor an agenda for UNCLOS III.
Even though the draft treaty proposals contained provisions which
sundered the Permanent Seabed COtllmittee .. they remained the
underlying basis of negotiations at U~JCLOS Ill.
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VI
UNCLOS III
The Twenty-fifth Session of the General Assembly voted to
convene the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) in August 1973. On December 17, 1970, the General
Assembly adopted Resolution 2750 (XXV) which provided for the
establishment of an equitable international regime of universal
character including the international machinery, for the area and the
resources of the seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.85 The comprehensive
mandate required that the Conference determine a precise definition
of the international area and deal with a broad range of related
issues including those concerning the regimes of the high seas, the
continental shelf, the territorial sea and the contiguous zone,
fishing and the conservation of the living resources of the high seas,
the preservation of the marine environment, and scientific
research. a6 The expectation was that a new law of the sea
convention would be produced by mid-1975 at the latest. However,
given the comprehensive mandate of the Conference, a number of
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states questioned the practicality of a two-year time frame.
The United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Japan, and
West Germany challenged the comprehensive mandate. Arguing that
the issues were too complex to be dealt with in one conference, they
advocated the convening of two separate conferences--one to deal
with the conventional uses of the sea and one to deal with the
international regime. To convene such a comprehensive conference
would, in the United Sta~es' opinion, mitigate against agreement and
consensus. 8 ? The developing nations disagreed. The maritime
powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, were
more interested in achieving an accord on the conventional uses of
the sea than they were in implementing the common heritage of
mankind principle. Since the common heritage of mankind principle
was more attuned to their interests, the developing nations insisted
upon the convening of a comprehensive conference. 8s They believed
that a comprehensive conference would force the maritime states to
negotiate, even compromise, deep seabed mining issues in order to
achieve an accord on the conventional uses of the sea. The
developing nations, therefore, used their majority voting strength in
the General Assembly to ensure that Resolution 2750 was adopted.
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While both the United States and Canada voted in favour of
Resolution 2750, it was for different reasons. The United States
was anxious to secure a new international accord on the width of the
territorial sea and the freedom of navigation through international
straits. Therefore, despite its concerns about the comprehensive
nature of the Conference, the United States voted in favour of
Resolution 2750. However, the House and the Senate expressed
reservations about the comprehensive nature of the Conference.
Both considered any move to vest control over seabed resources in
an international organization highly detrimental to the United
States' national economic interests.89 As a consequence, they warned
the international community that if such a development were to
occur Congress would never pass the necessary legislation to give
effect to the treaty. 90
Like the developing nations, Canada favoured the convening of a
comprehensive conference. Unlike the United States, Canada
considered the law of the sea issues inter-related and inseparable.
Coastal state sovereignty, especially over the continental shelf, and
the establishment of an international area were directly related and
could not be dealt with separately. Canada, therefore, aligned with
the majority and voted in favour of Resolution 2750.
After more than six years in preparation, UNCLOS III was finally
convened in August 1973. Heralded as the most magnificent
conference in the history of the United Nations, UNCLOS III was
attended by more than two thousand delegates from one hundred and
fifty-eight nations. Consistent with its mandate to establish a new
law of the sea of universal character, the Conference issued a
consensus agreement declaration. The declaration provided that "the
Conference should make every effort to reach an agreement on
substantive matters by way of consensus and there should be no
voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been
exhausted."91 The intent of the declaration was to protect the
interests of the different and divergent groups at the Conference.
The maritime powers and other minority groups, such as the
landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, required the
consensus agreement in order to protect their interests from the
overwhelming majority of developing states. The one hundred and
twenty developing states, however, felt a need to protect th'eir
interests from the political, economic, and technological power of
the maritime and industrialized powers. At the same time, the
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developing nations were concerned that the consensus declaration
would be used by minority groups to undermine the achievement of
an accord. On this point, they were right. The consensus declaration
not only mitigated against agreement, it prolonged the negotiating
process.
The Permanent Seabed Committee's failure to agree on a single
draft negotiating text also had a deleterious effect on the
Conference. Without a set of working parameters,UNCLOS III could
not begin negotiations. As a result, the first operational aim of
UNCLOS III was to produce a draft negotiating text from which the
new law of· the sea could be derived. For the sake of expediency and
because of the Conference's comprehensive mandate, UNCLOS III was
divided into three separate committees. Committee I was
responsible for establishing the legal regime of the international
seabed and the powers and functions of thelSA. Committee II dealt
with the conventional uses of the sea--the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the continental shelf, international straits,
navigation, high seas, and fisheries. Committee III focused on
protection of the marine environment and the control of scientific
research. The function of the Committees was to produce individual
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draft negotiating texts which could be subsumed into a single draft
text for collective negotiation and adoption at Caracas in 1975.92
However, after months of intense negotiations, it was clear that the
Caracas deadline could not be achieved. Rather than scuttle the
Conference, it was agreed that the time-frame would be extended
until agreement was reached.
The first single draft negotiating text was produced in May
1975. Profound disagreement over the text's deep seabed mining
provisions, however, precipitated the drafting of a second single
draft negotiating text. The second text was produced in 1976.
Although the 1976 text reflected considerable achievements in
Committees II and III, it also demonstrated the intensity of the
divisions in Committee I. In fact, the 1976 single draft negotiating
text clearly indicated that deep seabed mining was the point on
which UNCLOS III might founder. 93 Combined, deep seabed mining, the
consensus agreement, and the Permanent Seabed Committee's
incompetency, sabotaged UNCLOS III. Once the time-frame was
removed, the consensus agreement facilitated a hardening of
positions in Committee f. As a result, UNCLOS III was transformed
into two separate, albeit unofficial, conferences. While the first
00
conference, Committees II and III, made tremendous strides in the
progressive development of international law, the second
conference, Committee I, stagnated.
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VII
COMMITTEES II AND III
Although Committees II and III dealt with the conventional uses
of the sea, a number of the issues were directly related to and
inseparable from deep seabed mining. The establishment of the ISA,
for example, required a clear definition of the international area.
But, defining the international area was predicated upon the
deli mitation of coastal state sovereig nty, particu larty over the
continental shelf. The delimitation of coastal state sovereignty, in
turn, had significant implications for the freedom of navigation. The
resolution of these overlapping issues was, therefore, of
fundamental importance to the national interests of the United
States and Canada.
The United States' foremost law of the sea goal was to protect
its national strategic interests. The greatest threat to the United
States' national strategic interests was the extension of coastal
state jurisdiction over the maritime areas adjacent to the coast.
The United States' principal objectiv-e in Committees II and III was,
therefore, to limit the extension of coastal state jurisdiction to the
92
1i vi ng and non-l i vi ng resources of the ocean. So long as coastal
state jurisdiction was not extended to the superjacent waters the
freedom of navigation would prevail and the United States· national
strategic interests would be protected. Conado·s principal law of
the sea goal .. however.. V'I8S the protection of its national sovereignty
interests. Since the greatest threat to Canada·s national sovereignty
interests Vilas the freedorn of navigation and the proposed
in te rnat i ona1 seabed area .. Canada's ma1n ob j ect i ves in Comm 1t tees
II and III were twofold. First .. Canada sought the expansion of
coastal state jurisdiction over both the resources and the super
adjacent vv·aters of tr,e rnaritime area adjacent to tr'8 coastllne.
Second .. Canada was intent on preserving the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf. In effect .. trlen, Canatja sought to limit the
juri sdi ct i on of both tt-18 rnari t i n-18 states end the ISA. Because of the
IJnitelj ~=;tates" anlj C:anada"s conflictin!J lij\'v' of ttle sea interests .. the
extent to \/v'hich either state achieved its goal depended upon the
ability of COtlltYllttees II iJntj III to negotiate compromise
resolutions.
C:ornrnittee If's pr-irnar!d task "lv'as to acrtie\,'e a tlalance betvv'een
the interests of trl8 \·vorld cornrnunity in as free or unirnpeded
ffi
navigation as possible and the interests of coastal states in national
sovereignty, economics and security. 94 The success or failure of
Committee II, therefore, rested upon negotiating agreements on the
breadth of the territorial sea, the outer limits of national
jurisdiction, and the definition of the continental shelf. Since the
United States, the Soviet Union, and the other maritime powers made
acceptance of the twelve-mile territorial sea contingent upon
freedom of navigation through international straits, the issue was
non-negotiable. A nine-mile extension of the territorial sea would
place one hundred and sixteen international straits under the
jurisdiction of coastal states. The potential would, therefore, exist
for some coastal states to use their newfound jurisdiction to
interfere with navigational interests. Not only did the possibility
pose a threat to the national strategic interests of the United
States, and the other maritime powers, it threatened the commercial
interests of the international community. Consequently, the delicate
balance of multilateralism and unilateralism95 rested upon the
willingness of coastal states to compromise.
The majority of coastal states were opposed to the freedom of
navigation through international straits under their national
jurisdiction.
~
However, their opposition conflicted with their
national economic interests. Most coastal states are developing
nations highly dependent upon ocean transit for the export of their
natural resources. Because of this export dependency, their national
economic interests are tied to foreign-owned (Western) shipping
companies. The same situation applies to Canada. Although Canada
is a major industrial state, its primary export is natural resources.
In the absence of a major maritime shipping industry, the bulk of
Canada's exports are transported by foreign-owned vessels.
Attempting to interfere with the navigational freedom of the
maritime industries could result in retaliatory measures, such as
dramatic increases in shipping and/or insurance rates. Once coastal
states recognized that the freedom of navigation is as vital to their
national economic interests as it is to the maritime powers'
national strategic interests, consensus was achieved.
While Canada supported freedom of navigation in general, Canada
sought to limit its application to straits traditionally used for
international navigation. The limitation was considered critical to
Canada's sovereignty claim to the Northwest Passage. Canada
contends that the Northwest Passage is an internal strait and has
ffi
not been traditionally used for international navigation. Inclusion of
the "traditional use" clause in the draft article would, therefore, not
only exempt the Northwest Passage from the terms of the
Convention, it would strengthen Canada's sovereignty claim. As
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage is integral to Canada's
national oceans policy, Canadian support for the accord was
conditional upon inclusion of the "traditional use" clause.
By 1975, the OAU's proposed EEZ had become the principle
around which the new international system was to be built. 96
Negotiating a compromise between the divergent interests of
coastal states and maritime states in the EEZ, therefore, became the
focus of Committee II. The first conflict between the two groups
centred on the status of the EEZ. While the OAU proposal combined
coastal state sovereignty over the resources in the EEZ with a
regime of innocent passage, it carefully avoided designating the EEZ
as either territorial waters or the high seas. Save for specific
resource rights, the maritime states maintained that the EEZ was
part of the high seas. 97 Coastal states, however, argued that the EEZ
was an area sui generis, belonging neither to the high seas nor to the
territorial sea but possessing attributes of both. 98 If the EEZ was
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designated part of the high seas, coastal state jurisdiction would be
limited to the natural resources and would not extend to the
superjacent waters. Since freedom of navigation, not innocent
passage, would prevail, coastal states would have no jurisdiction
over navigation. Neither, would coastal states have any jurisdiction
over the emplacement of communications equipment and devices on
the seabed of the EEZ. Hence, the status of the EEZ was of
considerable importance to the interests of both coastal and
maritime states.
The second area of concern elicited by the EEZ was the'
definition of the continental shelf. Access to the continental shelf's
vast mineral resources is of considerable importance to all states.
However, many states lack coastlines and/or continental shelves.
Although coastal states, the shelf-locked and geographically
disadvantaged states have very minimal or no continental shelves at
all. Land-tocked states have no coastlines and, therefore, no
continental shelves. To correct this inequity, the United States and
the OAU proposed that the entire continental shelf beyond the two
hundred -mile limit (the United States proposed a two hundred metre
depth, not mile, limit), be designated the common heritage of
fJ7
mankind. In this way, coastal states would have exclusive access to
the resources of the shelf under their national jurisdiction while the
disadvantaged states would share the continental sheff resources in
the international area. While the designation accommodated the
disadvantaged states, it was biased against the interests of the
broad-shelf states. Only those states whose continental shelves
exceeded the two hundred mile limit were required to relinquish
sovereignty. Maintaining that the designation seriously undermined
their national sovereignty and national economic interests, the broad-
shelf states--Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, India and
Norway--based their position on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf.99 Led by Canada, the broad-shelf states sought to
formulate a precise geological definition of the continental shelf
and to combine this definition with Canada's scheme for sharing
reve nues .100 Under the terms of the proposal, the revenue sharing
scheme would in no way prejudice coastal state sovereignty over the
entire continental shelf and its resources. However, the broad-shelf
states were in a minority position.
The continental shelf off the coast of most states extends less
than two hundred miles seaward. Ninety-five percent of the
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continental shelf on the Baltic lies at depths of less than two
hundred metres. IOJ Forty states are either land-locked or shelf-
locked. Consequently, interest in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf was eclipsed by the EEZ. The majority of coastal
and non-coastal states favoured adoption of the two hundred mile
EEZ coupled with the United States' proposed Trustee Zone. While
the maritime powers are also major coastal states, their first
interest in the EEZ and the continental shelf is navigation. So long
as the freedom of navigation prevailed in the new zones, the
maritime states, particularly the United States, were willing to
compromise the economic advantages in the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf. Since the broad-shelf states' extended
national sovereignty interests posed a threat to the freedom of
navigation, the maritime states supported the majority position.
The linkage of the EEZ with sovereignty over the continental
shelf was particularly problematic for Canada. On the one hand,
Canada considered the EEZ the cornerstone of a successful law of the
sea convention .102 On the other hand, sovereignty over the entire
continental shelf was the foundation of Canada's national oceans
policy. Sacrificing the latter for the former was out of the question
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for Canada. Canada took the position that coastal state sovereignty
extended over the entire continental shelf and that the continental
shelf extended out to the continental margin. Unless the Conference
was willing to recognize this position, Canada warned that it was
prepared either to pursue a multilateral agreement with other broad-
margin states or to act unilaterally.1 03
As in Committee II, interest in the EEZ transcended all other
issues in Committee III. Negotiations focused on who would control
pollution setting standards and marine scientific research in the
EEZ. The debate over pollution setting standards in the EEZ devolved
into a power struggle between the coastal states and the maritime
powers. While of vital interest to all parties, the issue of scientific
research did not have the implications for seabed resources that
pollution setting standards did. At least not for Canada. By virtue
of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, Canada claimed
jurisdiction over one hundred nautical miles of the Arctic. This
included jurisdiction over the exploration and exploitation of the
deep seabed. Entrenching the Act in international law would enable
Canada to, in effect, claim sovereignty over one hundred nautical
miles of Arctic deep seabed resources. Coastal state jurisdiction
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over pollution setting standards was, therefore, essential to
Canada's national sovereig"nty interests. However, coastal state
jurisdiction over pollution setting standards posed a threat to the
United States' and other maritime powers' national strategic
interests. As a result, neither the United States nor the other
maritime powers would concede the issue.
Led by Canada, coastal states argued that jurisdiction over
pollution setting standards in the EEZ was essential to their
territorial integrity. Citing foreign-owned vessels as the primary
source of pollution, coastal states demanded the right to establish
ship setting standards in the EEZ. In extending pollution setting
standards to ship setting standards, coastal states sought to gain
control over the navig'ation, construction, maintenance, staffing and
operations of all ships traversing their coastal waters. To protect
its Arctic sovereignty interests, Canada also proposed that coastal
states have the right to set and enforce their own standards for
environmental protection in vu Inerable areas, such as the Arctic. 104
The maritime powers were acutely aware of the need for more
stringent pollution setting standards. As coastal states, they too
were subject to the aftermath of oil tanker accidents. Britain and
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France were still smarting from the environmental and economic
costs of the Torrey Canyon accident. However, they were not
prepared to relinquish control over ship setting standards to coastal
states. Coastal states hostile to the interests of the United States
and/or other maritime states might use ship setting standards in
order to interfere with the navigational freedom of commercial and
warships. Coastal states aligned with one superpower could be
encouraged to establish standards which discriminate against the
strategic interests of the other superpower. The potential would
then exist for coastal states to upset the delicate balance of power
which, in large part, rested on the freedom of navigation for all
warships. At the same time, there would be nothing to prevent
coastal states from using their jurisdiction over ship setting
standards as a bargaining chip. Economic and/or political
concessions might well be extracted from maritime states or
private shipping companies in exchange for relaxed pollution
enforcement laws. States and private shipping companies refusing
to comply mig ht be forced to use longer and, therefore, more costly
routes. Turning pollution and ship setting standards over to coastal
states would, ineffect, be tantamount to granting them the
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authority to intervene in maritime defense and commerce. These
were the same concerns expressed by the United States in 1970
when Canada legislated the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.
The United States and the other maritime powers, had refused to
recognize coastal state jurisdiction over pollution setting standards
then and refused to recognize it now. The maritime powers,
particularly the United States, insisted that the EEZ was part of the
high seas and, therefore, was subject to the international rules and
standards for pollution control. They were equally intransigent
about ship setting standards which they maintained were, and would
remain, under the domain of the flag-state.
As with the debate over freedom of navigation in international
straits, the majority of coastal states concluded that jurisdiction
over pollution setting standards was not necessarily in their best
national economic interest. Their dependency on foreign-owned
shipping companies is superseded by their dependency on access to
the maritime states' ,particularly the United States', cansu mer
markets. Since the maritime powers are also coastal states, the
possibility existed that they would use ship setting standards as non-
tariff barriers to trade. When the economic costs of retaliatory
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sanctions were factored in, the coastal states relented. However, as
most states have little or no interest in the Arctic, they supported
Canada's proposal for coastal state jurisdiction in vulnerable areas.
The international community's desire to achieve an accord on
the conventional uses of the sea is reflected in the 1975 single
negotiating texts produced by Committees II and III. Incorporated
into the 1976 single draft negotiating text, the draft articles
produced by Committees II and III provided for:
1 . The establishment of a twelve-mile territorial sea
with the freedom of navigation on, over, and through
straits used for international travel;
2. The establishment of a two hundred-mile EEZ in which
coastal states have exclusive jurisdiction over living
and non-living resources. Subject to the relevant
provisions of the Convention, all states enjoy the
freedom of navigation, the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines, and any other internationally lawful
uses of the sea related to navigation and
communication;
3. The establishment of an International Trustee Zone
between the two hundred-mile limit of the EEZ and the
outer edge of the continental shelf. As trustees,
coastal states have ju risdiction over all research,
exploration and exploitation conducted in the Zone.
Coastal states shall make payments in respect of
exploitation of the non-living resources in the Zone to
the ISA. Payments will be based on a certain
percentage of the value of the volume of production;
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4. Vessels navigating in the EEZ are governed by
international rules and standards for the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution;
5. Coastal states have jurisdiction over
nondiscriminatory pollution setting standards - and
enforcement in areas of the EEZ which are covered
with ice most of the year and where particularly
severe climatic conditions exist.
As the draft articles indicate, the United States achieved its
objectives in Committee II and III. The United States' fundamental
objective in Committee II and III was to limit the expansion of
coastal state sovereignty and jurisdiction. In Committee II, the
United States success was twofold. First, coastal states did not
gain jurisdiction over navigation in international straits. Second,
coastal state jurisdiction was not extended to the superjacent
waters of the EEZ or the continental shelf. And, in Committee III,
coastal states did not acquire jurisdiction over pollution or ship
setting standards in the EEZ. Equally important, the United States
was not required to make any more economic concessions than those
it had already conceded in its draft seabed treaty proposal. Having
achieved these objectives, the United States attained its principal
law of the sea goal. The United States' national strategic interests
were protected from the creeping jurisdiction of coastal states.
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Canada's success in Committees II and III was less impressive
than that of the United States. At the most, Canada was only
partially successful in protecting its national sovereignty interests.
The establishment of the twelve-mile territorial sea and the two
hundred-mile EEZ are consistent with Canada's objectives. Canada's
unilateral claim to a twelve-mile territorial sea is now entrenched
in international law. With the adoption of the two hundred-mile EEZ,
Canada has acquired jurisdiction over a tremendous accretion of
territory. However, in order to achieve its law of the sea goal--
protecting its national sovereignty interests--Canada needed to
secure its objectives. This it did not do. The text did not entrench
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. Jurisdiction
over resource exploitation was the only concession granted to
coastal states. This was a bitter disappointment for Canada.
However, since the text was only a draft, Canada did not consider the
battle fast. Instead, Canada expressed a willingness to entertain the
notion of profit-sharing in the Trustee Zone conditional upon the
final Convention recognizing coastal state sovereignty over the
entire continental shelf.
While Canada claimed that the Northwest Passage and the
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Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act were protected by the draft
text, the claim is questionable at best. The draft article on the
freedom of navigation through international straits did not contain
the "traditional use" clause. The draft article, in fact, provided for
the freedom of navigation through straits used for international
travel. Therefore, it would appear that any state wishing to use the
Northwest Passage for international travel is free to do so. Whether
or not the Northwest Passage has been traditionally used for
international navigation does not appear to be relevant. A similar
situation exists with the draft article on ice-covered areas. Coastal
state jurisdiction over pollution setting standards in ice-covered or
vulnerable areas was limited to the EEZ. Coastal states do not have
jurisdiction over pollution setting standards in ice-covered or
vulnerable areas that fall outside of theirEEZs. Therefore, in order
for the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act to be protected by
the draft article, Canada must first establish sovereignty over the
archipelagic waters of the Arctic, particularly the Northwest
Passage. Therefore, the draft article did not legitimize Canada's
sovereignty or jurisdictional claims to the Arctic.
Canada's failure to achieve its objectives and, therefore, attain
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its law of the sea goal is directly attributable to the success of the
United States. When Canada's interests were consistent with those
of the United States, Canada achieved its objective. And, when
Canada's interests conflicted with those of the United States,
Canada did not achieve its objectives. Since the United States
endorsed the twelve-mile territorial sea and the two hundred-mile
EEZ, Canada realized its objective of extended coastal state
jurisdiction. United States support for the Trustee Zone, however,
undermined Canada's efforts to retain sovereignty over the entire
continental shelf. The United States rejected coastal state
jurisdiction over pollution setting standards. Therefore, Canada's
efforts to extend coastal state jurisdiction into this area failed.
And, since the United States disputes Canada's Arctic sovereignty
claims and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, neither the
Northwest Passage nor the Act were protected by the draft articles.
In reality, Canada's national sovereignty objectives were not only
too ambitious, they were too unrealistic. To protect and or extend
its national sovereignty interests, Canada sought convention
provisions which would seriously undermine the freedom of
navigation and, therefore, the national strategic and economic
interests of maritime states.
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Therefore, the United States, not
Canada, achieved its law of the sea goal with respect to the
conventional uses of the sea.
Despite Canada's disappointment, the magnitude of the
agreements concluded in Committees II and III cannot be
overestimated. After more than four decades and three international
conferences, the international community finally reached consensus
on the breadth of the territorial sea and the freedom of navigation.
Although the 1976 single draft negotiating text was only a
procedural device and only intended to provide the basis for
negotiations,105 there was little doubt that the draft articles would
be incorporated into the final Convention., Anticipating this
development, coastal states began to declare, unilaterally, two
hundred-mile exclusive fishing zones. As a result, by 1978 fifty
coastal states claimed a two hundred mile fishing lone. fOG
Consistent with these claims, Canada legislated a two hundred-mile
exclusive fishing zone in 1977. Uniformity also began to develop
with respect to the territorial sea. Coastal states began to adjust
the width of their territorial seas to conform with the new twelve-
mile internatio nal standard. Unfortunately, the wide spread
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agreement on the conventional uses of the sea did not extend to deep
seabed mining. While a convention on the conventional uses of the
sea was all but achieved, broad divisions in Committee I made a
convention on deep seabed mining far from a certainty.
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VIII
COMMITTEE I: THE DEEP SEABED
The maj-R protagonists in Committee I were the industrialized
powers, the G77, and the land-based mineral produ·cers. Although
the United States was the only state that did not align with anyone
specific group, it was clearly the unofficial leader of the
industrialized powers. Committed to the free market system, this
group advocated the establishment of a relatively weak
international authority empowered to issue licences and resolve
disputes. This was the most cohesive and unified group. Its
members were not only the major consumers of mineral resources,
they were also the only group capable of developing the deep seabed
mining industry.
The G77's efforts to present a united front were undermined by
the divergent interests of the developing nations. Not all developing
nations are land-based mineral producers. Those who are, do not
produce the same minerals. The only true consensus among the
members of this group was their commitment to a new world
economic order. The G77'5 fundamental goal in Committee I was to
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use deep seabed mining as a means of effecting a new world
economic order. To achieve this goal, the G77 sought the
establishment of a powerful supranational authority with profound
regulatory powers.
The land-based producers were organized and led by Canada.
This group's principal goal was to protect their national economies
from the uncontrolled exploitation of deep seabed minerals.
Therefore, they also sought the establishment of an international
authority with the power to regulate and control the international
seabed area. Like the G77, the members of this group had divergent
and often contrasting interests. Whereas Australia and Canada are
industrialized states the· others are developing nations. Australia,
Canada, Cuba, Indonesia, and the Philippines are nickel producers.
The African states, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, are the principal
producers of cobalt. The Latin American states are primarily copper
producers. Since the extent to which deep seabed mining posed a
threat to a nation's economy depended upon the type of minerals it
produced, the internal unity of the land-based producers was
undermined. 10 7
The conflict of interests dividing the groups escalated in 1975
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when the first single draft negotiating text plus a revised set of
G77 articles were tabled. Not only did the draft text give weight to
the common stand adopted by the G77 on most issues l08 , the revised
articles called for the mandatory transfer of technology to the fSA
as a condition of deep seabed mining. The failure of the documents
adequately to reflect the legitimate interests of the industrialized
states coupled with the enormous obligations imposed upon theml09 ,
precipitated the drafting of the 1976 revised draft single
negotiating text.
Prior to the drafting of the 1976 text, Secretary of State
Kissinger addressed the 1976 negotiating session in New York. The
intent of Kissinger's address was to enunciate clearly the United
States' interest in and position on deep seabed mining. As well,
Kissinger attempted to stimulate a compromise agreement by
proffering American concessions to the G77 and the land-based
producers. Kissinger began his address with some cautionary
remarks. He cautioned that without an international accord the
competition over deep seabed mining could escalate into economic
warfare. As a result, not only would the freedom of navigation
be endangered but it would ultimately lead to tests of strength and
military confrontations.
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Kissinger then reminded the Conference
that the United States is many years ahead of any other country in
deep seabed mining technology and is in all respects prepared to
protect its interests. From a practical standpoint, investment,
access, and profits are best protected in an established and
predictable environment; therefore, the United States favoured an
international agreement.
Following these remarks, Kissinger set forth proposals which
the United States believed could form the basis for anew consensus
on deep seabed mining. Since the composition of the International
Seabed Authority, voting procedures, access to deep seabed
resources, and production limitations were the most contentious
issues, the United States proposed that:1. The power of the
Authority be carefully detailed by treaty to preserve all rights which
fall outside the competence of the Authority and to avoid
jurisdictional overlap with other international organizations;
1. The composition and structure of the Executive
Council reflect the producer and consumer interests
of those states most concerned with seabed mining;
Nations most affected by the decisions of the
Authority have a voice commensurate with their
in·terests;
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2. The treaty guarantee nondiscriminatory access to
deep seabed resources for all states and parties
without restrictive limitations on the number of sites
which anyone nation or party might exploit. Both a
parallel mining system and an international seabed
mining company, the Enterprise, be established.
Individual mining contractors would propose two mine
sites for exploration. The ISA would select one of the
sites for mining by the Enterprise or by a developing
nation. The other site would be mined by the
individual contractor.
The United States would assist with the financing
costs of the Enterprise and aid the developing nations
in their efforts to gain access to deep seabed mining
technology.
3. A temporary limitation, for a fixed period of time, be
established for the production of seabed minerals. At
the end of the fixed period of time, seabed production
would be governed by overall market conditions.
An adjustment allowance program be established in
collaboration with other international institutions for
countries which suffer economic dislocation as a
result of deep seabed mining.
To ensure that the concessions were not interpreted as a
weakening of the United States' position on deep seabed mining,
Kissinger ended his presentation with a further clarification of the
United States' position. Although preferring an international accord,
the United States would not, according to Kissinger, delay its efforts
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to develop an assured supply of critical resources through deep
seabed mining projects. To emphasize this point, Kissinger
reminded the Conference that the foreign policy of the United States
is conducted on the basis of the best permanent interests and values
of the United States. Therefore, if the negotiations deadlocked
completely J there was a much greater danger that the United States
would act unilaterally than that the United States would change its
position.***·
Clearly, 1976 was a critical juncture in the law of the sea
negotiations. The United States was losing patience with the whole
process. For the sake of an international accord, the United States
was willing to compromise its national economic interests in deep
seabed mining. It would not, however, sacrifice the freedom of
action or the market system in order to achieve an accord.
Therefore, the future of the accord rested on the capacity of the G77
and the land-based producers to adopt a market mentality.
Otherwise, the United States would act unilaterally.
Altho ug h re markab Iy clear ~ Ki ssi nge r' s messag e was
misunderstood. The concessions offered were interpreted as a sign
of American vulnerability. It was assumed, particularly by the
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developing nations, that the United States was willing to sacrifice
its national economic interests for the sake of its national security
interests. In other words, because the United States was anxious to
achieve an accord on the conventional uses of the sea it could be
coerced into accepting the G77's position on deep seabed mining. The
failure of the G77, and to a lesser extent the land-based producers,
to recognize that the United States was seriously considering
unilateral action was a monumental mistake. Rather than
facilitating agreement, the 1976 single draft negotiating text
extended negotiations into 1982. Part XI of the draft text contained
ten articles which were consistent with the interests of the G77 but
undermined the interests of the industrialized states and stimulated
conflict between the land-based producer states. Since a draft
convention could not be produced until an agreement was reached on
the provisions of the single draft negotiating text, consensus on the
controversial articles was imperative. In the interest of achieving
an accord, six years were invested in negotiating the provisions of
the following ten draft articles:
Powers of the ISA
The draft article provided that international regulations
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governing the development of all resources of the seabed and subsoil
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction were to be vested in the
ISA .110 The establishment of a restrictive international regime with
such broad enforcement powers was anathema to the United States.
The United States insisted that the powers of the ISA be carefully
detailed and limited to the exploration and exploitation of the deep
seabed. Otherwise, it was conceivable that the ISA might attempt to
use its open-ended powers to intervene in areas outside its
jurisdiction, such as the freedom of navigation on the high seas or
the processing of deep seabed minerals.
While Canada agreed that the powers of the ISA would have to be
clearly defined, it supported the ISA's broad regulatory and
enforcement powers. It was anticipated that the ISA would use the
powers to prevent the uncontrolled exploitation of deep seabed
minerals, thereby protecting Canada's land-based nickel industry.
The Structure of, and Voting Power in, the ISA
By the proposed plan, the ISA would consist of four organs--a
general assembly, an executive council, a tribunal, and a secretariat.
Unlike other international organizations, however, the main decision-
making body would be the. general assembly, not the executive
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council. To ensure equality of power, voting in the general assembly
would be governed by the principle of one nation, one vote. Since the
proposal discriminated against those investing the money, scientific
research, technology and expertise, it was unacceptable to the
United States. As stipulated by Kissinger, the United States insisted
upon the supremacy of the executive council and weighted voting. To
ensure equality, the United States proposed that the executive
council reflect the interests not only of producer and consumer
states but also of geographically disadvantaged and developing
states. But, the pre-eminence of those states with the capacity to
develop the deep seabed mining industry was non-negotiable.
Since weighted voting would give decision-making power to the
mineral consuming states, Canada supported the notion of one nation,
one vote. To protect the national economic interests of land-based
producers, Canada advocated the allocation of four permanent
executive council seats to land-based mineral exporting states. III For
Canada, the executive council would, of course, be the main decision-
making body.
Financing the ISA
As proposed, ISA financing would be based on the United Nations'
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assessment system. The industrialized powers would, therefore, be
responsible for sixty percent of the ISA's overall financial costs.
The entire start-up costs of the ISA would be absorbed by the deep
seabed mining states (the industrialized states). Fifty percent of
the start-up costs would be paid directly to the ISA and loans would
either be assumed or guaranteed for the other fifty percent. 1I2
This provision is, of course, a reflection of the developing
nations hopelessly unrealistic expectations of large revenues from
deep seabed mining. 113 There is a clear lack of appreciation for the
massive financial outlays and major risks involved in developing the
deep seabed.114 Financing only one venture per year at the smallest
scale possible would, according to rough estimates, cost
approximately two hundred million dollars. IIS To assume that the
international capital market or the states party to the Convention
would be able or willing to subscribe the millions of dollars required
by this proposal given the awesome regulatory powers of the ISA
was unrealistic. 116 Naturally, none of the industrialized states,
including the United States and Canada, would ratify a convention
under these financial terms.
Licensing
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Under the terms of the draft article, the ISA was granted
discretionary power in the issuing of deep seabed mining licences.
As proposed by the industrialized states, the purpose of licensing
was twofold. First, licensing would ensure equal access to deep
seabed minerals for states or parties interested in deep seabed
mining. Second, a system of licensing would prevent conflicts
arising over overlapping site claims. Since the power to determine
who does and who does not get a licence is both discriminatory and
conflict oriented, the purpose of licensing was undermined.
The potential for the ISA to use its discretionary power to
discriminate against American companies was not lost on the United
States. The United States insisted that the system of licensing must
guarantee nondiscriminatory access to deep seabed resources for all
states and parties. 117 Imposing arbitrary or restrictive limitations
on the number of sites which anyone state or party might exploit
was equally unacceptable to the United States.
As Canada also expected to become an important producer of
deep seabed minerals, it was anxious for Canadian companies to
share in, and have equal access to, deep seabed mineral resources.
Canada wanted to limit seabed mineral production not to limit
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access to the deep seabed. Therefore, Canada also opposed the
discriminatory powers of the ISA.
The Parallel Mining System
But for one major deviation, the parallel mining system proposed
in the draft text was identical to the one proposed by Kissinger. All
financing and operational costs of the ISA's seabed mining company,
the Enterprise, would be assumed by state and private mining
interests. As with the ISA financing, these parties would pay fifty
percent of the Enterprise's start-up costs and assume or guarantee
loans for the remaining fifty percent. And, as a condition of
licensing, they would provide the Enterprise with the technology,
research, and personnel necessary to engage in deep seabed mining.
When combined with the ISA's regulatory and discretionary
licensing powers, the financing provisions actually undermined the
parallel mining system. Since private investors would be unable to
compete, the Enterprise would gain a monopoly over deep seabed
mineral production. 118 Furthermore, in the absence of any licensing
guarantees, there would be nothing to prevent the ISA from
discriminating in favour of the Enterprise. Once the Enterprise
acquired the capital and the expertise it would, therefore, have a
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monopoly. For these reasons, the United States rejected the proposal
outright.
As early as 1973 Canada recommended the adoption of a joint-
venture system between private interests and the ISA. The Canadian
proposal provided for joint-venture arrangements involving revenue
sharing as opposed to production sharing. llg Shifting the focus to
revenue sharing would eliminate the enormous financing costs of the
Enterprise; enable developing nations to share in seabed revenues
without imposing onerous obligations on the industrialized states;
and, restrict the ISA's ability to gain control of seabed production.
While the G77, the United States, and Britain showed initial support
for the Canadian proposal, the G77 favoured the parallel system.
Whereas the joint-venture system would give the G77 access to
seabed revenues, the parallel system would give the developing
nations access to technology as well as capital. Because the G77
was intent on acquiring technology as well as, if not more than,
capital, it was reluctant to renegotiate the proposed parallel mining
system.
The Mandatory Transfer of Technology
The draft article on the mandatory transfer of technology was
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consistent with the G77's 1975 revised draft articles. State and
private interests were obligated to transfer their technology to the
Enterprise as a condition for obtaining a mining licence. 120 Parties
refusing to comply with the provision would be denied mining
licences. Because the draft article failed to provide adequate
protection for the owners of the technology, it effectively extended
the power of the ISA. Using the mandatory transfer of technology
provision, the ISA could legitimately restrict access to the deep
seabed. This draft article,more than any other, brought the
ideological conflict to the fore. Under the terms of the article, the
Enterprise would acquire the technology and then turn it over to the
developing nations wishing to engage in deep seabed mining. The
mandatory transfer of technology provision was, therefore, the
means by which the G77 could effect a new world economic order.
Not only was the mandatory transfer of technology coercive, it
was a direct violation of the free market principle that the owners
of technology have rights in its sale and use. 121 Even assuming that
the industrialized states were willing to support the provision,
domestic political limitations would prevent them from doing so.
Offering to assist the developing nations in their efforts to acquire
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seabed mining skills and technology was, therefore, as far as the
United States would go.
While Canada shared the United States', and the other
industrialized states', views on the mandatory transfer of
technology, it took a balanced approach to the draft article. On the
one hand, Canada pointed out the impracticalities of transferring
patented technology. On the other hand, Canada stressed the need of
the developing nations to benefit from ocean-related technology.122
The balanced approach was a political necessity for Canada. Outright
condemnation of the provision might cost Canada the support of the
G77 for production limitations. However, total support for the
provision was inconsistent with Canada's interests. Thanks to the
other industrialized states, Canada was able to waffle on the issue.
With the industrialized states aligned against the mandatory
transfer of technology, Canada's deep seabed mining interests were
protected. 123
Production Limitations
The production limitation formula contained in the draft text
was designed by the United States and Committee I Chairman Paul
Engo. The formula arbitrarily established a six percent increase per
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annum in world nickel demand and provided that deep seabed nickel
production would not exceed the cumulative increase in world
demand. According to Canada, if the demand for nickel were to
increase six percent, land-based production would be only marginally
affected by deep seabed production. However, if world demand was
lower than six percent, or actually decreased, the result could be a
limitation on land-based production .124 The formula was, therefore,
totally unacceptable to Canada.
If the rate of increase in world nickel demand was as low as
three percent, as Canada predicted it would be, while seabed nickel
was mined to meet the project six percent increase, land-based
production would suffer. Seabed production under the proposed
formula would, given this scenario, have a deleterious effect on the
production of nickel in Canada. 125 Canada, therefore, argued that not
only was the projected rate of increase too high but that deep seabed
mining would have to be phased in over a number of years. While
opposed to production limitations, in general, the United States was
willing to accept temporary limitations for a fixed period of time.
Consequently, in May, 1978, the United States and Canada tabled a
compromise formula. The new formula provided that for the first
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twenty-five years of deep seabed mining, the maximum production of
seabed nickel would not exceed sixty percentaf the annual increase
in world consumption. Although the compromise formula diffused
tensions between the United States and Canada, it did resolve the
conflict over production limitations.
Canada's zeal for production limitations was not shared by the
G77 or the majority of industrialized states. And, while the land-
based mineral producers favoured production limitations, they
disagreed on the formula. Production limitations were counter-
productive for the G77. The G77's primary objective was the
transfer of seabed mining profits and technology to the developing
nations. The fewer the minerals produced, the lower the profits and,
therefore, the smaller the sums transferred to the developing
nations. 126 And, since the mandatory transfer of technology was
related to production, a limitation on one was an automatic
limitation on the other. For the developing nations to gain the
maximum possible benefits from deep seabed mining, unlimited, not
limited production was necessary. However, while unlimited
production was in the best interest of the group as a whole, it was
not in the best interest of the land-based mineral producers. To a
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certain extent, the economic benefits accruing to the group in
general would be acquired at the expense of the land-based
producers. Therefore, for the sake of group cohesion, the G77
supported production limitations.
The industrialized states maintained that production limitations
were discriminatory. The proposed formula protected the interests
of the land-based producers at the expense of the deep seabed
producers. The formula's built-in bias restricted the industrialized
states capacity to generate revenues and acquire access to seabed
mineral resources without imposing similar restrictions on land-
based producers. Production limitations would, because of the high
costs associated with deep seabed mining, discourage private
investors from developing the industry. Only those states with
extremely limited access to mineral resources would be willing to
underwrite deep seabed mining projects. Based on these arguments
the industrialized states, particularly the United States, maintained
that seabed production must be governed by overall market
conditions. 127
Not only did the production limitation formula discriminate
against deep seabed miners, it discriminated against the land-based
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cobalt producers. The discriminatory nature of the formula stemmed
from the uneven admixture of the minerals found in seabed nodules.
The nodules have a higher content of cobalt than nickel and a higher
content of nickel than copper. Any formula based on nickel
production would, therefore, provide the greatest protection for
copper producing states and the least protection for cobalt producing
states. 128 Since most of the Latin American states are copper
producers, they were the first to lose interest in the production
formu la. 129 Never a strong advocate of production limitations,
Australia concluded that they were impractical, From 1980 on,
Australia aligned with the other industrialized states in support of
free market forces rather than quantitative measures. 130 With the
abdication of the Latin American states and Australia, the land-
based producer group was left to the hardliners--Canada, Indonesia,
the Philippines, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. However, the intra-
group conflict was as great as the inter-group conflict. Whereas the
nickel producers defended the production formula, the cobalt
producers argued that it discriminated against their interests. As a
result,group unity was eroded and Canada's leadership strength was
undermined.
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Financial Compensation
The text contained two draft articles designed to protect the
developing nations' economic interests from the disruptive
influences of deep seabed mining. The first article stipulated that
the ISA would provide financial compensation to the developing
nations if their. land-based resource industries were adversely
affected by seabed mineral production. The second exempted
developing nations,which are net importers of hydrocarbons, from
revenue-sharing obligations in the Trustee Zone. Combined, the draft
articles provided the developing nations with the opportunity to
share in the benefits from deep seabed mining without sharing in the
costs.
While the United States supported an adjustment allowance
program, it opposed the establishment of a permanent compensation
fund administered by the ISA. As proposed by the United States, the
adjustment allowance program would be designed and administered
in collaboration with other international organizations. Exemptions
from revenue-sharing were also unacceptable to the United States.
The provision not only discriminated against the developed states
which were net importers of hydrocarbons, it undermined the
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economic interests of the land-locked and geographically
disadvantaged states. If the developing coastal states were
permitted to retain the ISA's share of Trustee Zone revenues, they
would, in effect, be taking money from the poorest nations. This
was, of course, inconsistent with the common heritage of mankind
principle.
From Canada's perspective, the compensation fund and revenue-
sharing exemption were subsidies. Since both direct and indirect
subsidies would give an unfair advantage to Canada's competitors in
developing countries l31 , they were impediments to Canadian
ratification of the law of the sea convention.
National Liberation Movements
In spite of profound United States' opposition, the G77 secured
Conference observer status for national liberation movements such
as thePLO and SWAPO. Then, in 1975, the G77's revised set of draft
articles raised the status of the national liberation movements from
observer to equal partner in deep seabed mining. Consistent with
these manoeuvres, the 1976 single draft negotiating text granted
national liberation movements equal rights in the sharing of
revenues from deep seabed mining. 132 To propose that the ISA have
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the power to transfer funds to political regimes or would-be ruling
parties was irrational. Only states party to the Convention would be
governed by its provisions. Nonetheless, the United States was
outraged by the mere suggestion that it would be party to a
convention which provided financing assistance to groups which
were hostile to the United States' interests.
Convention Review
The provision for convention review at the end of fifteen years
was unacceptable to the industrialized states. Under the terms of
the draft article, after five years of negotiations the convention
could be amended by a two-thirds majority vote. States party to the
convention would be bound by the amendments. When combined with
the one nation, one vote principle, there was inadequate protection
for the interests of the industrialized states. States with the least
investment in deep seabed mining could combine their votes in order
to push through amendments which discriminate against the
interests of those states with the greatest investment. Since there
was no guarantee that the convention could not be amended against
their will, the industrialized states sought radical changes to the
draft article.
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Investment Protection
Prior to the General Assembly decision to establish the ISA and
the international area, deep seabed mining was conducted under the
auspices of individual states, particularly the industrialized powers.
While willing to suspend licences, these states sought assurances
that the integrity of investments made under their jurisdiction
would be protected. As proposed in the United States' draft seabed
treaty, all investments made prior to the convention entering into
force would be protected. During the interim period, coastal states
would continue to issue licences for exploration and exploitation of
the continental shelf beyond the proposed two hundred-metre outer
limit. However, a substantial portion of the revenues would be
transferred to the ISA. The issuance of licences for exploring and
exploiting the deep seabed would be suspended until the convention
entered into force. Although endorsed by the industrialized states,
the United States' proposal was vehemently rejected by the G77.
To protect the common heritage of mankind principle from the
unlimited claims of state and private investors, the G77 aligned
behind Moratorium Resolution 25740 (XXIV). Tabled at the twenty-
fourth session of the General Assembly, by members of the OAU, the
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Resolution provided that pending the establishment of an
international regime, states and persons shall refrain from
exploiting the seabed areas beyond the present national jurisdiction
and no claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be
recognized. 133 To strengthen the Resolution, the G77 proposed that
all research and development respecting deep seabed mining
technology be suspended during the interim period. While the
industrialized states agreed to suspend licensing during the interim
period, they would not agree to suspend technological research and
development. The G77 retaliated by blocking all efforts to include
pioneer investment protection in the single draft negotiating text.
Consequently, there was no provision for investment protection
in the 1976 single draft negotiating text. Pioneer investors,
therefore, stood to lose both their investments and their mining
sites to which they had a prior claim. As a result, the industrialized
states refused to be party to any convention which failed to
guarantee pioneer investment protection. Since the majority of
pioneer investors were American, the United States stood to lose the
most. Unless pioneer investments were protected in the convention,
the United States was prepared to proceed unilaterally with deep
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seabed mining. As with the mandatory transfer of technology
provision, Canada took a balanced approach to pioneer investment
protection. On the one hand, Canada argued in favour of protection.
On the other hand, Canada distinguished between the right to develop
ocean technology, which it supported, and the actual unilateral
exploitation of the deep seabed, which it opposed. 134
After six years of non-productive negotiations there was a
hardening of positions and a widening of the gap between the G77 and
the industrialized states. A number of states had begun to question
the value of pursuing seemingly interminable negotiations. 135 A
number of industrialized states were preparing to resume issuing
seabed mining licences. And, the United States was proceeding with
legislation which would enable it to go ahead unilaterally with the
exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed. 136 While
overwhelming support for the text's provisions on the conventional
uses of the sea meant that the cleavage was not all embracing it
was, nonetheless, ironclad. As a consequence, the United States
suspended negotiations in 1981.
On March 1, 1981, the new Reagan administration informed the
Conference that the United States had decided to undertake a one-
135
year review of the single draft negotiating text. As stated by
President Reagan, the review was necessitated by part XI of the
draft text which the United States executive believed mitigated
against obtaining the advice and consent of the United States
Senate. 137 Based on the findings of the comprehensive, inter-agency
review, the United States executive concluded that while most of the
draft provisions were consistent with the United States' interests,
the major elements of the deep seabed mining regime were not. 138
Therefore, on January 29, 1982, President Reagan announced that the
United States would return to UNCLOS III to seek the necessary
changes to the deep seabed mining provisions. While not specifically
stated, the President's statement contained the same message as
Kissinger's 1976 statement. Unless changes were forthcoming, the
United States would proceed unilaterally with deep seabed mining.
Canada got the message. Since United States unilateral action would
undermine Canada's national economic 0. interests, Canada was
motivated to seek a compromise agreement.
However, Canada's capacity to mediate an accord was
circumscribed bOy its declining status at the Conference. By 1981,
Canada had become isolated diplomatically.139 Taking a balanced
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approach on the more contentious issues had cost Canada its
credibility with the other protagonists. Aligning with the
industrialized states on the issues of technology transfers, the
structure and financing of the ISA, the compensation fund and the
exemption from revenue-sharing while courting G77 support for
production limitations, had cost Canada dearly. The G77 felt that the
production limitation formula was biased i.n favour of Canada and
that Canada was, therefore, one of the major beneficiaries of the
Conference. 14o However, to acquire these benefits Canada might have
exploited the developing nations, particularly the land-based cobalt
producers.
Relying on the industrialized powers to protect those interests
which it had in common with them while diametrically opposing
their position on production limitations was even more costly for
Canada. It split the Canadian delegation and caused the major
Canadian mining companies, Noranda Mines and Inco, to align with the
United States. Canadian delegates who supported the industrialized
powers' position on deep seabed mining felt that Canada's policies
undermined its interests as an industrialized state. They, therefore,
broke rank and sought alliances with the United States and
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Britain. 141 Noranda Mines joined an American deep seabed mining
consortium and Inco applied for deep seabed mining licensing under
the United States' new legislation. 142
Canada's position on unilateralism was also inconsistent.
Canada's national oceans policy was founded on unilateralism. As
recently as 1977, Canada used unilateralism to declare a two
hundred-mile exclusive fishery zone. Yet, Canada ardently opposed
all moves toward unilateral action in deep seabed matters. 143 The
contradiction can only be explained in terms of self-interests.
Canada used and defended unilateralism in the conventional uses of
the sea because it was in Canada's best national sovereignty and
national economic interests to do so. Canada opposed unilateralism
in deep seabed mining because it might have a deleterious effect on
Canada's land-based mineral exports. As a result, Canada appeared
to align with the developing nations against the industrialized
states, particularly the United States, and its own mining companies.
While Canada's balanced and inconsistent approach to
negotiations was necessitated by its dual position as an
industrialized and land-based producer state, it, nonetheless,
undermined Canada's credibility_ Consequently, Canada was unable to
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draw upon its traditionally strong ties with the industrialized
powers and the G77 in order to mediate an accord. Therefore, Canada
organized the Group of Eleven (GII)--Australia, Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland. Led by Canada, the Gil hastily prepared amendments to
Part XI of the draft negotiating text to serve as the basis for further
negotiations. 144 Although the amendments did not address all the
draft articles of concern to the United States, the G77 insisted that
they were exhaustive. Negotiations centred on pioneer investment
protection and amendments to executive council representation.
However, neither issue was resolved to the satisfaction of the
United States.
As proposed, the draft article on investment protection imposed
onerous financial obligations on pioneer investors in exchange for
guaranteed investment protection. In addition to the financial
obligations contained in the draft text, the requirements for
investment protection included: a five hundred thousand dollar
payment upon registration; the accrual of a one million dollar annual
fee payable upon approval of a plan of work; expenditures to meet
diligence requirements established by the ISA; exploration of the
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reserved area on a reimbursable basis; the training of personnel
designated by the ISA; and, the mandatory transfer of technology
prior to the convention's entry into force. 145 Because the draft
article neglected to provide a clear definition of "pioneer investor"
it afforded those states which were not true pioneer investors,
India, Japan, the Soviet Union, the opportunity to claim pioneer
investor status. Since the majority of pioneer investors were
American, the draft article not only undermined the interests of the
real pioneer investors, it undermined the interests of the United
States. More importantly, the United States maintained that the
imposing regime would discourage private investment in deep seabed
mineral production. In the first place, a fundamental lack of
certainty would exist with regard to the granting of mining
contracts and the mandatory transfer of technology requirements.
And, in the second place, the burdensome financial requirements
would result in governments subsidizing private companies and/or
operating state-owned industries. 146 In its present form, the draft
article clearly discriminated against those it was supposed to
protect--the pioneer investors.
The proposed amendment to the draft article on executive
140
council representation was equally unacceptable to the United
States. The amendment granted the United States a permanent seat
on the executive council. The seat, however, was tied to the United
States' status as the world's foremost mineral consuming state.
There was no recognition of the United States' preeminence in seabed
mining technology and investments. Nor was there any recognition of
the fact that the United States would be the ISA's principal
financier. Of far greater concern to the United States was the status
of the executive council. So long as the executive council was
impotent, the permanent seat was irrelevant. The first priority of
the United States was the transfer of decision-making power from
the general assembly to the executive council. It was only when
decision-making authority was vested in the executive council that
the issue of permanent representation and weighted voting was of
critical importance. Since the amendment failed to alter the status
of the executive council, it was unacceptable to the United States.
The inadequacy of the changes and the G77's refusal to
renegotiate the other substantive issues in Part XI caused the United
States to conclude that all efforts to achieve consensus had been
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exhausted. Achieving consensus on a single draft negotiating text
from which a draft law of the sea convention could be derived had
proven to be an impossibility. The United States, therefore,
requested that the Conference vote on the adoption of the single
draft negotiating text. The vote was held on April 30, 1982. The
results were one hundred and thirty states in favour of adoption,
fau r opposed, and seventeen abstentions. 1 47 As a result of the
majority vote, the single draft negotiating text was transformed
into the draft 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Upon finalization,
the draft Convention was opened for formal signature in Montego
Bay, Jamaica on December 10, 1982.148
Although the draft Convention was adopted by an overwhelming
majority, the economic importance of those voting no or abstaining
is significant. Not only are they the states with the capacity to
develop the deep seabed mining industry, they produce more than
sixty percent of the world's gross national product and provide more
than sixty percent of the financial contributions to the United
Nati 0 ns. 149 Without their support, implementing the Convention's
deep seabed mining provisions (Part XI and Annexes three and four)
would prove to be a formidable task. So, too, would bringing the
Convention into force.
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IX
THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION
Prior to the dissolution of UNCLOS III, two resolutions were
adopted as annexes to the Final Act of the Convention. 150 The first,
Resolution I, provided for the establishment of the Preparatory
Commission (PrepCom) to lay the foundation for the ISA and the Law
of the Sea Tribunal which will begin operations when the convention
comes into force. 151 Resolution II established preparatory
investment protection for pioneer investors. Once pioneer investors
have settled amongst themselves any disputes arising over
overlapping site claims, the PrepCom is authorized to register their
clai ms. 152 Together, the Resolutions represent an interim regime for
deep seabed mining until the Convention enters into force. 153
The PrepCom has held six relatively unproductive negotiating
sessions since 1982. Under the terms of Resolution I, signatories to
the Convention have full participation rights in the PrepCom's work
and non-signatories enjoy observer status. However, the number of
states represented at the sessions only range from eighty to one
hund red. 154 Since the United States voted against the Convention, it
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does not send representatives to the sessions. While Canada sends
four delegates to the sessions, they maintain a very low profile. 155
When the low salience of the PrepCom's work is combined with the
stagnating ratification process, it is evident that a significant
number of states have lost interest in the Convention.
Contrary to Conference expectations, the Convention did not
enter into force within five years of the official signing ceremony.
By the end of 1990, only forty-four of the sixty required
ratifications were on deposit with the Secretary General of the
United Nations. Although the 1958 Geneva Conventions only required
twenty-two ratifications, the final Convention did not enter into
force until 1973. The slow ratification process is, therefore, not an
unusual situation. There is one significant difference, however. The
forty-four states which have ratified the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention are primarily smaller developing nations. Not only are
the Western industrialized states and the countries of Eastern
Europe entirely missing l56 , none of the land-based producers or the
pioneer investor states have ratified. At the heart of the matter is
deep seabed mining. Because of the prolonged negotiating process,
deep seabed research and mining technology developed faster than
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the new accord. As a result, the deep seabed mining provisions, in
Part XI and Annexes three and four of the Convention have been
eroded by time as well as technology. Since many of the
Convention's provisions have been overtaken by time, they are simply
inapplicable in the light of changed circumstances. lss Hence, when
the ISA's enormous financial costs are taken into consideration, the
Convention is substantially less attractive than it was in 1982.
According to all projections, the costs of financing the ISA, the
Enterprise, and the Law of the Sea Tribunal are horrendous. United
Kingdom estimates indicate that at 1983 prices the fixed
administrative costs for the United Kingdom would be between one
point five and one point eight million pounds. Their estimated cost
of financing the Enterprise would be between twenty-four and forty
million pounds in interest free loans plus an equal amount in debt
guarantees. And, because of the United States' withdrawal, the
figures would have to be adjusted upwards by approximately thirty-
three percent. The government of the United Kingdom has, therefore,
determined that their national seabed mining companies would be
discouraged from participating in deep seabed ventures. 159 Based on
their research findings, the United Kingdom notified the Secretary
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Understandably, Canada has adopted a wait and see attitude. 163
The conflict of interests in the PrepCom is not limited to the
financing schedule. Deep divisions over all substantive issues have
prevented the PrepCom from implementing Resolution I. The G77, the
former group of Eastern European Socialist States, the EC, and other
special interest groups are divided over the establishment, powers
and functions of the Finance Committee; the desirability of
establishing a compensation fund; the imposition of a production
limitation formula; and, the implication of subsidies both with
respect to the competitiveness of the Enterprise and the General
Agreement on Trade Tariffs (GATT) regulations. 164 In other words,
the conflicts at UNCLOS III were simply transferred to the PrepCom.
The PrepCom is beset with the exact same concerns that
precipitated the United States' withdrawal, Canada's diplomatic
isolation, and the Conference's failure to achieve consensus. For the
PrepCom to succeed, then, it will have to resolve the deep seabed
mining issues of greatest importance to the United States and
Canada.
After more than eight years of PrepCom negotiations, the
structure of the Finance Committee has not been established. The
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impediment to agreement is weighted voting. A growing number of
delegates believe that states with the highest contributions to the
administrative budget of the ISA should have a right to substantial
representation on the Finance Committee. By the late 19805 there
was a growing realization that both the Assembly and the ISA
require the assistance and advisory expertise of a subsidiary organ
on financial matters. 165 As a result, a subsidiary organ was
appointed in 1990 to advise and assist the PrepCom's financial
committee. The decision to enlist the aid of a subsidiary organ is
clearly an indication of the G77's dramatic change in position. The
United Nations, many of its subsidiary organs, and a number of other
international organizations are founded on the principle of
preferential voting rights. There can be little doubt, therefore, that
the G77 is beginning to soften its position on the issue of equal
representation.
Protection and compensation for land-based producers who
experience a loss in exports and foreign exchange earnings l66 asa
result of deep seabed mining is another contentious issue. While the
production limitation formula, the compensation fund, and
exemptions from revenue-sharing were designed to remedy the
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situation, the provisions are seriously flawed. Under the terms of
the Convention, seabed mineral production is limited to sixty percent
of the increase in world demand for the first twenty-five years of
production. The formula, however, is based on the prospective rate
of increase in nickel consumption and offers no protection for the
land-based producers of other minerals, particularly cobalt. Because
of the admixture of manganese nodules, producing the lawful amount
of nickel will not only wildly overproduce cobalt, it will seriously
affect the price of cobalt. 167 A second conflict arises from the fact
that land-based nickel producers are developed states, white land-
based cobalt producers are developing states. The latter· states
argue, and rightly so, that the formula discriminates in favour of the
wealthier nations. The land-based cobalt producers, therefore,
insist that not only the formula be adjusted to reflect their
interests but that they receive financial compensation for their
anticipated losses.
Without specifically calling for a compensation fund, the
Convention requires the ISA to establish a system of compensation
or take other measures of economic adjustment assistance to aid the
developing states which suffer serious adverse effects on their
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export earnings or economies resulting from activities in the seabed
area. 168 Because of the discriminatory nature of the production
limitation formula, the G77 has placed great emphasis on the
importance of establishing a compensation fund. But, a number of
West European and other states maintain that the PrepCom's mandate
requires that it must first establish whether or not a fund or other
measures are required. Some argue that an economic environment in
which seabed mining would be profitable would lead to increased,
not decreased, profits for all land-based mineral producers. Still
others, such as the EC,are of the opinion that as seabed mining will
not be economically viable in the near future, it would be premature
to recommend remedial measures at this time. 169 Since neither
Australia nor Canada qualify for compensation, they argue that the
fund would give their competitors an unfair marketing advantage.
Whereas the developing nations argue that the production limitation
formula discriminates in favour of the developed nations, the
developed nations maintain that the compensation fund
discriminates in favour of the developing nations. In effect, then,
while both groups of land-based producers maintain that they will be
disadvantaged states, others insist that it is too early to draw any
1 51
conclusions about the implications of deep seabed mining.
Not only are delegates divided over the implications and value of
the compensation fund, they disagree on the source of financing.
Some states are of the opinion that the financing should be derived
solely from part of the profits of the Enterprise. Others insist that
all seabed miners must be required to contribute a portion of their
profits to the fund.170 And, financing the fund raises the question of
subsidization. Contributions to, and disbursements from, the fund
are in effect subsidies. Therefore, a number of states, particularly
the United States and Canada, argue that the fund would be a
violation of the GATT rules and regulations. They maintain that
subsidies not only afford protection to land-based producers, they
offer an unfair advantage in deep seabed mining. The result might
well be a loss in competitiveness and revenues for the Enterprise
and private investors. As a result, a number of delegates have
concluded that the production limitation formula, the compensation
fund, and the revenue-sharing exemptions contravene GATT
provisions and cannot be implemented. 171
A similar conflict exists between the mandatory transfer of
technology provision and national security interests. Article 302 of
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the Convention provides that states are not required to disclose
information which is contrary to the essential interests of their
security. Since there is a direct relationship between seabed
technology and military research and development, Article 302
overrides the mandatory transfer of technology provision. So long as
Article 302 is invoked, the ISA would be prohibited from denying
licences to those states refusing to comply with the mandatory
transfer of technology requirements. While the G77 is attempting to
plug the loophole, there is a general agreement among delegates that
Article 302 is warranted for national security interests. With
Article 302 considered a sine quo nonl72 , the G77's attempts to
implement the mandatory transfer of technology provision are
undermined. So, too, is the G77's vision of a new world economic
order arising out of deep seabed mining.
Despite waning interest in the substantive issues of deep seabed
mining, the PrepCom has succeeded in implementing Resolution II.
However, Resolution II has been circumscribed by unilateralism,
time, and changed circumstances. Unilateralism began in earnest on
March 10, 1983. On that date, the President of the United States
declared that while the United States is prepared to accept and act
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in accordance with the balance of interests relating to the
conventional uses of the oceans, it will continue to work with other
countries to develop a regime, free of unnecessary political and
economic restraints, for mining deep seabed minerals beyond
national jurisdiction .173 According to the presidential statement,
deep seabed mining remains a lawful exercise of the freedom of the
seas open to all nations. The United States would, therefore,
continue to allow its firms to explore for, and when the market
permits, to exploit deep seabed minerals. 174 Shortly thereafter, in
1984, the United States Department of Commerce issued four
licences authorizing deep seabed mineral exploration in specific
areas of the east-central Pacific Ocean. 175 The Secretary General of
the United Nations received formal notification that the licensees
and their vessels were operating under the sale jurisdiction of the
United States and that "in the exercise of the high seas freedom to
engage in exploration for, and commercial recovery of, hard mineral
resources of the deep seabed, it was the international legal
obligation of all states to avoid unreasonable interference with the
interests of other states. "176 Si milar licences and declarations
were issued by the United Kingdom, theFRG, and the Soviet Union.
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Nonetheless, the Soviet Union declared that its unilateral action was
precipitated by the need to protect its interests from the Western
capitalists. Of course, since there was no legal status under the
Convention which has not entered into force, whether or not the
actions can be considered unilateral or illegal is debatable.
While the G77 criticized the actions as illegal unilateralism,
PrepCom reaction was mixed. On August 30, 1985 and again on April
11, 1986, the PrepCom issued declarations rejecting any claims or
actions incompatible with the Convention on the grounds that they
are illegal and devoid of any basis of legal rights. However, a
number of delegates refused to participate in the declarations of
condemnation because of uncertainty about both the substance and
effect of the declarations. 177 Whether or notPrepCom consensus on
the declarations of condemnation would have influenced the
licensing practices of individual states is not clear. However, it is
clear that the issuing of deep seabed mining licences by individual
states has profound implications for the ISA.
Had the PrepCom been able to register pioneer investors in 1982
or 1983, it might have prevented the industrialized states from
gaining the upper hand. As it was, the need to resolve overlapping
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site claims caused a five year delay in the licensing of pioneer
investors. Under the terms of Resolution II J the successful
registration of pioneer investor sites presupposes an undisputed
area that does not overlap the site claims of competitors. All
parties are, therefore, compelled to settle their site disputes prior
to applying to the PrepCom for registration. Dispute resolution was
complicated by the fact that the interests of the majority of
investors, who had already invested more than thirty million dollars
(US) in exploration of the ocean floor l78 , were concentrated in the
Clarion-Clipperton area of the east-central Pacific ocean. To
compound further the problem J there were two separate and distinct
groups with overlapping claims both within and between groups.
Group one consisted of the state enterprises--France, India,
Japan, and the Soviet Union--which were seeking pioneer status
under the ISA. Group two was comprised of private companies from
eight Western states--Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, the FRG, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States--which had
come together in four consortia. Unlike the state enterprises, the
consortia were not seeking PrepCom licences nor were they
encumbered by state bureaucracy. Consequently, they arrived at a
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provisional understanding on August 3,1984. 179 The provisional
understanding facilitated the issuing of licences by the United
States, the United Kingdom and the FRG. The state enterprises,
however, did not conclude a balance of interests agreement until
February, 1986. 180 As a result, the state enterprises submitted their
site claims to thePrepComon March 25, 1987, more than a year
after the final date for registration had expired. 181 Since Resolution
II was no longer in effect, the PrepCom lacked the legal authority to
register the claims. An amendment to Resolution II was, therefore,
necessitated. Under the terms of the amendment, the registration
period for pioneer investor status is extended until the Convention
enters into force. This means that any state wishing to claim
pioneer status, whether it has a prior claim or not, is now able to do
so. Rather than affording protection to the true pioneer investors,
the amendment gives the PrepCom a blank endorsement to issue
seabed mining licences. The amendment did, however, expedite an
accord between the four state enterprises and the consortia. On
August 4, 1987, the two groups signed The Agreement on the
Resolution of Practical Problems with Respect to Deep Seabed Mining
Areas. With the mechanism for resolving conflicts on overlapping
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site claims, the PrepCom was finally able to register pioneer
investors.
The first state to receive pioneer investor status was India.
Under the terms of registration, India was granted an undisputed
exploration field of approximately seventy-five thousand square
kilometres in the Indian Ocean. Shortly thereafter, France, Japan,
and the Soviet Union were granted equal areas in the Pacific Ocean.
However, the licences are for exploration purposes only. Production
authorization is withheld until the Convention enters into force and
until these states deposit ratifications with the Secretary General
of the United Nations. In the meantime, the ISA has acquired
jurisdiction over seventy-five thousand square kilometres of the
Indian Ocean and two hundred and twenty-five thousand square
kilometres of the Pacific Ocean. And, with payment of the five
hundred thousand dollar registration fee by each of the pioneer
investor states, the ISA has acquired its own finances.
The importance of these achievements, of course, rests on the
ability of thePrepComto implement Resolution I. Unless Resolution
I is implemented, the Convention will not enter into force and until
the Convention enters into force the pioneer investors cannot exploit
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their deep seabed mining sites. The same does not hold for the four
private consortia however. They are free to exploit their mining
sites whenever the market is conducive. Hence, unless the
Convention enters into force, thePrepCom will have served the
interests of the industrialized powers rather than the interests of
the signatories to the Convention. Because of the provision for
mandatory resolution of overlapping site claims, the state
enterprises were forced to conclude an accord with the private
consortia. As a result of the accord, the private consortia now have
the mechanism for conflict resolution. In effect, then, the PrepCom
not only facilitated the drafting of an accord but the implementation
of an accord outside both the law of the sea negotiations and the
ISA's authority. Since it is the members of the four private
consortia who are the true pioneer investors, it is perhaps fitting
that they should reap the greatest benefits from Resolution II.
Although a significant achievement, the successful registration
of pioneer investors has had no effect on the ratification process.
Even the pioneer investor states have notified the Secretary General
of the United Nations that they will not ratify the Convention unless
Part XI and Annexes three and four are renegotiated. The PrepCom,
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however,maintains that it is mandated to implement, not to
renegotiate, theConventionfs deep seabed mining provisions. The
belief that in time and before the coming into force of the
Convention substantial renegotiation of Part XI and Annexes three
and four will be possible is, therefore, illusory.182 This argument
notwithstanding, there are indications that major changes in the
international political climate are beginning to have a positive
impact on PrepCom negotiations
For the first time ever, delegates have acknowledged the
futility of attempting to negotiate a universal convention without
universal participation. 183 On September 1, 1989, the G77 and other
special interest groups actually supported a series of statements
advocating universatparticipation in the Convention. In endorsing
the statements, the G77 indicated a willingness to hold discussions
with any delegation or group of delegations, whether signatories to
the Convention or not, without any preconditions other than that all
parties assume a positive approach to serious and meaningful talks.
Then, in 1990, the Secretary General of the United Nations initiated
a series of informal consultations aimed at achieving universal
participation in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. In so doing, the
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Secretary General identified the Convention's deep seabed mining
provisions as the major impediment to universal participation.
Noting that, in the eight years since the Convention was adopted,
significant changes have occurred in the international political
climate and in deep seabed mining interest, he urged the
international community to take these factors into account. Unless
the problems with the Convention's deep seabed mining provisions
are addressed from the perspective of changed circumstances, the
Secretary General expressed the view that opposing states would
neither ratify nor accede to the Convention.
The changing attitudes in the PrepCom, particularly in the G77,
and the new initiative of the Secretary General indicate a growing
awareness of the fact that the Convention's deep seabed mining
provisions have been overtaken by time. Since the dissolution of
UNCLOS III, manganese nodules have been discovered in the EEZ and
continental shelf areas of Chile, France, Mexico, the United 8tates l84 ,
and undoubtedly a number of other states. With the discovery of
shallower- water manganese nodules, interest in deep seabed mining
has declined. Compared to deep seabed mining, the problems, costs,
and risks involved in shallower-water mining are substantially
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lower. Shallower-water mining technology is far more advanced
than deep seabed mining technology. And, because of logistics, the
staffing, transportation, risk and financial costs of shallower-water
mining are far more advantageous than for deep seabed mining.
Therefore, capital and insurance are not only more readily available,
the financing rates are much lower. As a result, the locus of
attention has shifted from the deep seabed to the EEZ and the
continental shelf. An agreement has already been concluded between
Mexico and an American firm to exploit the mineral resources in
Mexico's EEZ. As a result of these developments, the most
contentious provisions in Part XI and Annexes three and four of the
Convention are now redundant. Canada's hopes of implementing a
production limitation formula have been dashed. To limit production
in the international area would simply mean limiting the ISA out of
production. 185 Since there can be no compensation for production
under national jurisdiction, which might equal affect prices and
make it impossible to determine what is affecting what l86 , the
compensation fund is undermined. Not only is the mandatory transfer
of technology provision circumvented by Article 302, it cannot be
applied to production in areas under national jurisdiction. And, so
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purpose in bringing the ISA into force. The reality is that because of
the protracted negotiating process, the Convention's deep seabed
mining provisions have been overtaken by time and changed
circumstances. So, too, has the PrepCom's mandate.
Time has run out for the PrepCom. Its mandate expires at the
end of 1991. Unless the delegates follow through with the
initiatives undertaken by the Secretary General, the deadline should
not be extended. Time has proven the Convention's deep seabed
mining provisions not only unrealistic but unworkable. The
Convention must, therefore, be amended. The argument that the
PrepCom is not mandated to amend the Convention is invalid. The
PrepCom is mandated to implement Part XI and Annexes three and
four of the Convention. If implementation requires an amendment
then renegotiations must occur. Resolution II has been amended
and/or renegotiated twice. In 1987 the PrepCom amended the
registration deadline for pioneer investor site claims. And in 1990,
the PrepCom waived the annual fixed fee of $US one million for
France, Japan and the Soviet Union in exchange for technology
transfers to the Enterprise and the traini.ng of Enterprise personnel.
However, Annex three of the Convention provides for the annual fixed
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fee of $US, one million (Article 13), the transfer of technology
(Article 5), and the training of Enterprise personnel (Article 15).
The Convention does not provide for the exchange of one provision for
another. Clearly, then, if implementing Part XI and Annexes three
and four requires an amendment and/or renegotiation, the precedent
has already been set. The future of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention is dependent upon recognition of this reality and so, too,
is the future of the PrepCom.
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CONCLUSION
In the eighteen years since UNCLOS III was convened .. world
interest in deep seabed mining has waned. Time -ha--s- proved
AmbassadorPardo's predictions wrong. World demand for mineral
resources has not increased; it has slgnificantly decreased.
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half of the Twenty-First Century.
The unfavourable prospects of deep seabed mining has shifted
the focus of attention back to the areas of the seabed under national
jurisdiction. The discovery of shallower-water manganese nodules
and the continuing demand for off-shore petroleum resources have
precipitated an increase in national boundary disputes. According to
the latest United Nations' estimates, there are three hundred, or
more,boundary disputes between coastal states with adjacent or
opposite coastlines. Predictably, the number of disputes will
increase proportionately with the discovery of EEl and continental
shelf mineral resources. Also predictable is a resurgence of interest
in the exploitability clause of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf. Combined, the decreased value in deep seabed
mining, the discovery of shallower water manganese nodules, and the
continuing demand for off-shore petroleum will motivate coastal
states to extend, not limit, their national jurisdiction.
The law of the sea has developed through the unilateral actions
of coastal states. Historically, coastal states have sought to extend
their· national sovereignty whenever it was in their best economic
interest. It is, therefore, predictable that coastal states will
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attempt to absorb the EEZ and the continental shelf into their
territorial seas. If historic precedent prevails, the resultant dispute
between coastal and maritime states will precipitate the convening
of UNCLOS IV. Since the common heritage of mankind, with respect
to seabed resources, will not be in the best national economic
interest of coastal states, the implications for deep seabed mining
are twofold. First, the locus of seabed mining will be in the area of
the seabed under national jurisdiction. National interests will
determine the degree to which the industry is developed. Bilateral
agreements will be negotiated between coastal states and state or
private enterprises with the technology and the capital to develop
the industry. The new world economic order envisaged by the G77
will only be realized by developing coastal states with mineral
resources in their national seabed areas. At least, it is to be
assumed that the mandatory transfer of technology would be a
precondition of bilateral or joint-venture agreements. While the
other developing nations might still share in the development of the
deep seabed mining industry, they will have to adopt a market
mentality.
Second, Part XI and Annexes three and four of the 1982 Law of
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the Sea Convention will be renegotiated. The structure and financing
of the ISA, the production limitation formula, the compensation fund,
the mandatory transfer of technology,the Trustee Zone and the
parallel mining system are impediments to defining the boundaries
of the international area. If they are not removed, the deep seabed
industry will be developed under the freedom of the seas doctrine.
Because of the tremendous cost and risk involved, large-scale
commercial development projects are the only economically viable
means of exploiting the deep seabed's mineral resources. The future
of the common heritage of mankind principle is, therefore, dependent
upon the adoption of a joint-venture system.
As proposed by Canada in 1973, a joint-venture system, based on
revenue sharing not production, would ensure that the interests of
all parties are protected. Not only would the deterrent to private
investment be removed, the future of the ISA would be secured.
Since the function of the ISA would be restricted to issuing deep
seabed mining licences, resolving disputes and transferring profits
to the poorer nations, there would be no need for a powerful
supranational authority. The developing nations would share in the
benefits of deep seabed mining, and the interests of those with the
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capacity to develop the industry would be protected.
Of course, these predictions are purely speculative. It is not
possible to know whether or not coastal states will once again
challenge the conventional uses of the sea or ifUNCLOS IV will be
convened. It is possible, however, to predict that the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention will not enter into force unless Part XI and
Annexes three and four are renegotiated. While it is possible to
bring the Convention into force without implementing the deep
seabed mining provisions it is doubtful if the industrialized states
would participate. So long as the provisions remain in the
Convention, there is no guarantee that implementation would n.ot
occur at some future date. Renegotiation of Part XI and Annexes
three and four, not dormancy, is the key to ratification of the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
What, then, are the implications for the United States' and
Canada's law of the sea interests Are the developments in the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention, with respect to codification and
ratification, consistent with the United States' and Canada's
objectives? And, if so, have the United States and Canada attained
their law of the sea goals?
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Protecting its national strategic and national economic
interests were the United States' fundamental law of the sea goals.
Since the United States' goals were directly dependent upon the
freedom of the seas doctrine, its two principal objectives in the law
of the sea negotiations were: one, limiting the extension of coastal
state sovereignty; and two, limiting the power and authority of the
ISA. The prolonged negotiating process, however, gave rise to a third
objective. This was to ensure that the conflict over deep seabed
mining did not undermine an accord on the conventional uses of the
sea.
With the twelve-mile territorial sea and the two hundred-mile
EEZ entrenched in customary international law, the United States has
achieved its principal law of the sea goal. The freedom of navigation
through international straits, the EEZ, and the superjacent waters of
the continental shelf are protected by international law. In
recognition of this achievement, the United States joined forces
with the Soviet Union in issuing a joint statement on the
conventional uses of the sea. On September 23, 1989, the United
States and the Soviet Union declared inter alia that they are guided
by the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
1 71
of the Sea with respect to the conventional uses of the sea. In
calculating that coastal states would compromise their national
sovereignty and national security interests in exchange for economic
concessions, the United States was able to secure its goal and, at
the same time, reject the Convention!
While the primacy of national strategic interests is not denied,
there was a hidden agenda behind the United States' economic
concessions to coastal states. As the world's foremost coastal
state, economic concessions were also in the best national economic
interest of the United States. In fact, it is quite probable that the
United States gained more from the concessions than any other
coastal state. With the passage of the twelve-mile territorial sea
and the two hundred-mile EEZ into customary international law, the
United States acquired jurisdiction over a tremendous accretion of
territory. The extent of the acquisition is evident in the policy
statements issued by the United States in 1983 and 1988. On March
10, 1983, the United States claimed sovereignty and jurisdiction
over a two hundred-mile EEZ. The claim, however, was not limited to
the continental United States. Noting that the recently discovered
nodule deposits are a significant future source of strategic
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minerals, the United States declared sovereign rights and
jurisdiction over a two hundred-mile EEZ contiguous to the
territorial sea of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Commonwealtb of the Northern Mariana Islands, and all the
United States' overseas territories and possessions.J 91 Then, in
accordance with international law, the United States extended its
territorial sea to twelve miles on December 27, 1988. At the same
time, the United States claimed a twelve mile territorial sea for
Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern
Mariana Islands, and any other territory and possession over which
the United States exercises sovereignty.1 92
With this massive accretion of territory, the discovery of
shallower water manganese nodules is of profound significance to
the United States' national economic interests. Having secured a
future source of strategic materials, access to deep seabed minerals
is no longer of critical importance to the United States.
the United States created a win-win situation for itself.
In effect,
Proffering
economic concessions to coastal states enabled the United States
not only to protect its national strategic interests but to protect its
national economic interests as well. This, of course, was the United
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States' second Jaw of the sea goal. The United States' national
economic interest is best protected by the free market system.
Since the establishment of a powerful supranational organization
would interfere with market forces, the United States had to ensure
that the jurisdiction of the ISA was limited. Although singularly
unsuccessful in achieving its objective in the Jaw of the sea
negotiations the United States has, nonetheless, attained its goal.
The discovery of manganese nodules in areas under national
jurisdiction, the decline in world demand for mineral resources, and
dramatic changes in the international political climate have
undermined the Convention's deep seabed mining provisions. As a
result, the PrepComis dead-locked and the ratification process is
stagnating. Even if by some remote chance the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention enters into force, the deep seabed mining provisions will
not be implemented. The exploitation of seabed minerals in areas
under national jurisdiction precludes the introduction of the
production limitation formula and the compensation fund. Since the
production limitation formula does not apply to areas under national
jurisdiction, implementing it would simply result in limiting the
Enterprise out of production. And, there can be no compensation for
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production in areas under national jurisdiction. The ISA is not
mandated to compensate land-based producers for disruptions caused
by seabed mineral production under national jurisdiction. Deep
seabed mineral production will, as the United States advocated, be
treated on the same basis as land-based mineral production.
The dramatic changes in the international political climate are
also a major factor in the United States achieving its second law of
the sea goal. The Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe,
except for Romania, either voted against the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention, abstained or declared the Convention non-ratifiable
because of the deep seabed mining provisions. Most of these states
as well as China, the newly industrialized countries of Asia, and a
number of South and Central American states have now adopted
market mentalities. In the process they have} or are attempting to,
fa rged stro ng er ties with the Western ind ustrial ized states,
particularly the United States. Concomitant with these changes, a
number of PrepCom delegates are now of the opinion that the
structure, decision-making authority, and voting rights in the ISA
must reflect the interests of the highest financial contributors This
change in position reflects a significant loss of support for the G77.
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The ISA, as envisaged by the G77, will not enter into force. The new
East-West alliance makes it a certainty that if the ISA enters into
force, it will be modelled along the lines of other international
organizations, such as the IMF or the World Bank. As proposed in the
United States' draft law of the sea treaty, the jurisdiction of the ISA
will be limited.
With the jurisdiction of the ISA limited, the United States has
achieved its second Jaw of the sea goal, which was to protect its
national economic interest. However, this achievement is a result of
the overwhelming success of the United States' third objective, not
its second. The United States failed to achieve its second objective.
Despite sweeping concessions to the G77 and the land-based
producer states, the United States was unable to prevent the
establishment of a powerful supranational authority. Nor was the
United States able to effect significant changes to Part XI and
Annexes three and four of the Convention. The deep seabed mining
provisions in the single draft negotiating text and, therefore, the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention are anathema to the United States.
As a result, the United States abandoned its second negotiating
objective and focused on its third objective.
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The United States' third objective was to ensure that the
conflict over deep seabed mining did not undermine the accord on the
conventional uses of the sea. After eight years of negotiations, the
United States had two options. It could either continue with the
fruitless negotiations or it could withdraw. Taking a one-year
sabbatical from negotiations enabled the United States to conduct a
comprehensive inter-agency review prior to exercising one of the
options. The review clearly indicated that the latter option was in
the best national strategic interest of the United States. By 1982 it
was evident that the twelve-mile territorial sea and the two
hundred-mile EEZ were, or soon would be, customary international
law. Hence, with or without a new law of the sea convention, the
freedom of navigation through international straits was secured.
With its national security interests protected and the world-demand
for mineral resources declining, the United States concluded that
there was no longer an urgent need for a new law of the sea
convention. Therefore, the United States demanded a vote on the
adoption of the single draft negotiating text. In so doing, the United
States was acutely aware that the text would be adopted by a
majority vote. However, it was also aware that the majority vote
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would have no bearing on the ratification of the Convention. So long
as the deep seabed mining provisions remained in the text, the
industrialized powers would never ratify. And, without the financial
contributions of the industrialized powers, other states, whether
they supported the deep seabed mining provisions or not, would not
be party to the Convention.
The United States' greatest ally in the law of the sea
negotiations was time. Because of the prolonged negotiations, the
Convention's deep seabed mining provisions have been overtaken by
time. With the passage of time shallower water manganese nodules
were discovered, the world demand for mineral resources declined,
and dramatic changes in the international political climate occurred.
As a result, the international community has not only lost interest in
deep seabed mining, it has concluded that the industry must be
developed under the market system. Consistent with these
developments, the PrepCom has come to the realization that a
universal law of the sea accord cannot be achieved without universal
participation. Time has clearly favoured the United States. In
securing its .third objective the United States achieved its second as
well as its first law of the sea goal. The United States protected its
178
national security and national economic interests by ensuring that
the jurisdiction of coastal states and the supranational authority
were limited. And, it is not insignificant that the United States
achieved its law of the sea goals without having to be party to a new
law of the sea convention!
Canada's record of achievement in the law of the sea
negotiations is more ambiguous than that of the United States.
While Canada has not achieved its goals, it has enjoyed partial
success. Like the United States, Canada had two law of the sea
goals. First and foremost, Canada sought to protect its national
sovereignty interests. Canadian sovereignty over the entire
continental sheff, the archipelagic waters of the Arctic, particularly
the Northwest Passage; the twelve-mile territorial sea; and, after
1973, the two hundred-mile EEZ were critical to Canada's national
oceans policy and national economic interests. Canada's principal
objective in the taw of the sea negotiations was to extend and/or
protect coastal state jurisdiction. Canada's second law of the sea
goal was to protect its national economic interest from the
uncontrolled exploitation of deep seabed minerals, particularly
nickel. Canada's second objective in the law of the sea negotiations
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was to ensure the establishment of a powerful supranational seabed
mining authority_
With the passage of the twelve-mile territorial sea and the two
hundred-mile EEZ into customary international law; coastal state
jurisdiction over the exploitation of continental shelf mineral
resources; Convention provisions for ice-covered areas; Canada's
unique interpretation of the Convention's freedom of navigation
provisions: the allocation of four executive council seats to land-
based mineral producers; the production limitation formula; and, the
creation of a powerful supranational seabed mining authority,
Canada's achievements appear quite impressive. However, an
analysis of these and countervailing Convention provisions indicates
that Canada's achievements are considerably more modest. While
the passage of time and changed circumstances have been
advantageous to Canada, they have also undermined Canada's goals.
Adoption of the twelve-mile territorial sea and the two hundred-
mile EEZ was of vitaJ importance to Canada. Canada's unilateral
extension of the territorial sea has acquired legal status. And,
because of Canada's indented coastline and island portions, using
straight baselines to measure the new area substantially increases
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Canada's sovereignty. However, the extensions fall short of
establishing or protecting Canada's sovereignty over the archipelago
waters of the Arctic. Although Canada claims that the freedom of
navigation does not apply to the Northwest Passage because it has
not been traditionally used for international navigation, th is does
not appear to be the case. The "traditional use" clause does not
appear in the Convention. Nor does the Convention distinguish
between internal and international straits. It simply provides for
the freedom of navigation through straits used for international
purposes. Foreign-owned vessels, therefore, appear to have the legal
right to use the Northwest Passage for international purposes
whether or not it is "traditionally usedn as an international strait.
In the event of an internationaJdispute it is doubtful if Canada's
unique interpretation of the Convention would be accepted by the
International Court of Justice. To do so could precipitate a host of
international disputes and, thereby, undermjne the Convention.
Since the continental shelves of most coastal states extend
less than two hundred miles seaward, their national sovereignty
interests are protected by the two hundred-mile EEZ. They not only
retain sovereignty over the mineral resources of the continental
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shelf, they acquire a two hundred-mile exclusive fisheries zone.
And, if the Convention enters into force, the developing coastal
states will share in the Trustee Zone profits of the broad-margin
states. This is not the case for Canada, however. In order for Canada
to acquire jurisdiction over a two hundred-mile fisheries zone it
must relinquish sovereignty over four hundred or more miles of
continental shelf. And, it must contribute seven percent of the
Trustee Zone profits to the ISA for distribution to its competitors.
Despite Canada's insistence that the final Convention recognize
coastal state sovereignty over the entire continental shelf, it fails
to do so. The Convention only grants coastal states jurisdiction over
the exploration and exploitation of continental shelf resources.
Since jurisdiction is a far cry from sovereignty, it is a major
deterrent to Canada's ratifying the Convention.
A second deterrent to Canada's ratification is the Convention's
provision for ice-covered areas. Again, although Canada maintains
that the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act is protected by the
provision, it is not. Under the terms of the Convention, coastal
states have the right to establish and enforce non-discriminatory
pollution controls in vulnerable and/or ice-covered areas of their
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EEZ. The provision does not apply to areas outside coastal state
jurisdiction. Since Canada has not established sovereignty over the
archipelagic waters of the Arctic, particularly the Northwest
Passage, there is no legal basis for Canada to claim an Arctic waters
EEZ. Ergo, without an Arctic EEZ Canada cannot apply, let alone
enforce, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The only way
that Canada can establish Arctic sovereignty is through cooperation
with the United States or dispute resolution. The issue of dispute
resolution, however, gives rise to another conflict for Canada.
Under Canadian legislation all disputes retating to pollution,
conservation and exploitation in Canada's coastal waters are not
justiciable before the international court. Not only is the legisl.ation
an impediment to resolution of the Arctic dispute, it is a direct
violation of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Since the
Convention provides for compulsory dispute resolution, Canada will
either have to amend the legislation or remain outside the
Convention. This is not the only Convention conflict posed by the
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. By virtue of the 1970
amendment to the Canada Shipping Act, the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act is extended to Canada's two hundred-mile EEZ. Under
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the terms of the Convention, however, coastal states have no
jurisdiction over pollution setting standards in the EEZ. With the EEZ
enshrined in international law, Canada must amend the legislation
whether the Convention enters into force or not.
Ironically, then, while Canada was remarkably successful in
achieving its objective of extended coastal state jurisdiction, it fell
short of achieving its principal law of the sea goal. On the one hand,
the twelve-mile territorial sea and the two hundred-mile EEZ are
consistent with Canada's goal. On the other hand, coastal state
sovereignty over the entire continental shelf, Canadian sovereignty
over the archipelago waters of the Arctic, the status of the
Northwest Passage, and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act
are circumscribed by the Convention. It is, therefore, in Canada's
best national sovereignty interests to remain outside the
Convention. In so doing, Canada can continue to found its national
oceans policy on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf. This will enable Canada to combine the territorial sea, the
EEZ, and the exploitability clause in the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the continental shelf. However, while this will substantially extend
Canada's coastal state sovereignty, it will not establish Canada's
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sovereignty over the Arctic or protect the Northwest Passage or the
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. But, neither will ratifying
the Convention.
A similar situation exists with Canada's interests in deep
seabed mining. While Canada failed to achieve its goal.of protecting
its national economic interest, it achieved its objective in the law
of the sea negotiations. This latter achievement, however, has been
eroded by time and changed circumstances. Unlike the United States,
Canada had a conflict of interest in deep seabed mining. Canada is
both a land-based mineral producer and an industrialized state with
the capacity to develop the deep seabed mining industry. Therefore,
Canada sought to protect its national economic interests from the
uncontrolled exploitation of deep seabed minerals while at the same
time securing access to deep seabed minerals. Because of this
conflict, Canada sought the establishment of a supranational
authority with the power to limit and regulate the production of deep
seabed minerals, particularly nickel. At the same time, however,
Canada did not want the supranational authority to have the power to
interfere with, or impair, its interests as an industrialized state and
a future developer of the deep seabed mining industry. As envisaged
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by Canada, the ISA would function primarily as a licensing agency.
The ISA would issue non-discriminatory licences on the basis of a
production limitation formula. The production limitation formula
would provide for the phasing-in of deep seabed mineral, particularly
nickel, production over an extended period of time. In this way, the
dislocation of land-based mineral production would be prevented and
Canada's national economic interest would be protected.
To Canada's credit, the production limitation formula is
entrenched in the Convention. Although production is not phased in,
as Canada had hoped, it is limited to sixty percent of the increase in
world demand for nickel during the first twenty-five years of
production. This is a remarkable achievement considering that by
1981 neither the industrial nor the developing nations supported the
formula. A second major achievement for Canada is the allocation of
four permanent executive council seats to land-based mineral
producers. With this provision entrenched in the Convention,land-
based mineral producers are guaranteed representation on Council.
When these achievements are combined with the profound .powers of
the ISA, it is clear that Canada more than realized its objective in
the deep seabed mining negotiations. Countervailing Convention
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provisions and external developments, however, have rendered the
objective ineffective in protecting Canada's national economic
interest.
Although the Convention does not specifically provide for the
establishment of a compensation fund, it requires the ISA to
compensate developing nations, which are land-based mineral
producers, for losses incurred from deep seabed mineral production.
The Convention further provides that developing nations, which are
net importers of deep seabed minerals, are exempt from revenue
sharing in the Trustee Zone. Since Canada is neither a developing
nation nor a net importer of deep seabed minerals, it is exempted
from the provisions. Canada contends that the provisions
discriminate against land-based producers which are developed
states. Subsidizing Canada's competitors not only gives them an
unfair price advantage, it encourages them to engage in unfair trade
practices. So long as the developing nations will be compensated for
their losses, there is nothing to prevent them from selling their
minerals below market price. Canada, along with the other
industrialized states, therefore, maintains that the compensation
fund and the revenue-sharing exemption are violations of the Gatt
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and cannot be implemented. (Curiously, Canada does not view the
production limitation formula from the same perspective.) As such,
they are an impediment to Canada's ratification of the Convention.
A second impediment to Canada ratifying the Convention is the
financing arrangements for the ISA and the Enterprise, a third is the
structure of the ISA, and a fourth is the mandatory transfer of
technology provision. Not only are the costs of financing the ISA and
the Enterprise onerous but the non-participation of the industrialized
powers means that Canada could be responsible for
thirty percent, armore of the bill. Canada would not, however, be
responsible for thirty percent of the decision-making authority or
voting power. Although land-based producers have four permanent
seats on the executive council, the executive council is impotent.
Decision-making power resides with the general assembly which
operates on the principal of one nation, one vote. Hence, if Canada
ratifies the Convention, it will bear the lion's share of the costs
while the developing nations bear the lion's share of decision-making
and voting power. This is particularly significant in view of the
mandatory transfer of technology provision and Canada's interests in
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developing the deep seabed mining industry. Unless Canadian
companies transfer their mining technology to the ISA they will not
be issued licences. For this reason, Inco and Noranda mines applied
to the United States for licensing. Since Canadian companies are
obviously determined to avoid the ISA's regulations, Canada's only
hope of becoming a deep seabed mining state is through the
establishment of a state-run enterprise. However, Canada does not
have the capital for such a venture. This poses a rather interesting
situation. If Canada ratifies the Convention, it will be responsible
for one-third of the JSA's financial costs, will have no voting or
decision-making power and will not even be a deep seabed mining
state. In effect, because of the disproportionate sharing of the
financial costs, Canada will be subsidizing the deep seabed mining
activities of the developing nations. Clearly, then, ratifying the
Convention would undermine, not protect, Canada's national economic
interests.
Of course, Canada's national economic interests are not
protected by remaining outside of the Convention either. If sixty
other states ratify the Convention, it will enter into force. Whi·le
Canada will not be bound by the terms of the Convention neither will
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it be able to prevent the compensation fund from providing an unfair
advantage to its competitors. At the same time, with or without the
Convention, Canada witl have to contend with the production of
seabed minerals in areas under national jurisdiction. Not only has the
discovery of shallower-water manganese nodules undermined the
Convention, it has undermined Canada's second law of the sea goal .
Limitations on the production of nickel will be determined by market
forces not a supranational organization. If, as, and when conditions
warrant, seabed mining will be developed under the free market
system. Canada will have to adopt new production and marketing
strategies if its land-based mining industry is to remain
competitive.
This, of course, is the same reality facing the PrepCom. The
market system cannot be artificially controlled by a supranational
seabed authority. Time ensures that the market system is 5elf-
regulating. Time facilitates scientific research, technological
advances, shifts in world demand, and changes in the international
political climate. Whether driven by strategic, economic, or other
interests, new forces evolve. Old market forces become outmoded.
This is why the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention will not enter into
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force. Many of the provisions, contained in Part XI and Annexes three
and four of the Convention, have been eroded by time. Even had the
Convention entered into force in 1975, as anticipated, the deep
seabed mining provisions would have been obsolete by the mid-
19805.
What, then, is the future of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention?
With the passage of the twelve-mile territorial sea and the two
hundred-mile EEZ into customary international law, the need for a
convention on the conventional uses of the sea is precluded. And,
because of time and changed circumstances, the Convention's deep
seabed mining provisions are redundant. Therefore, the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention will not be implemented.
The Jaw of the sea is a constantly evolving system which must
have the flexibility to keep pace with science and technology. The
inherent relationship between science and technology and the law of
the sea is historic. Scientific and tech nologicat discoveries
increased the uses of the sea, raised the seabed from obscurity, and
precipitated the division of the sea into zones. It is, therefore,
predictable that, in time, scientific and technological advances will
necessitate the convening of UNCLOS IV. It is also predictable that
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the delegates to UNCLOS IV will. attempt to manipulate the law of
the sea to their advantage. The progressive development of the law
of the sea will once again be undermined by states seeking to protect
their perceived national interests from advances in science and
technology. On the other hand, given the dramatic changes in the
international political climate, it is possible that UNCLOS IV will
produce a law of the sea convention which uses scientific and
technological advances for the common benefit of mankind.
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